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January, 1974

Mr. Ernest J. Zupancic
Office of Community Planning and Development
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
451 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20410

Contract H-3610-R

Dear Mr. Zupancic:

We are pleased to submit this test case study of land disposition in urban renewal. This report is one of a series of six test cases undertaken by Real Estate Research Corporation, with the assistance of RTKL, Inc. The entire series includes:

- Boston, Massachusetts
- Durham, North Carolina
- Kingston, New York
- Louisville, Kentucky
- St. Paul, Minnesota
- Tulsa, Oklahoma

The results of our work to date are most encouraging, and we look forward to continued participation in this program.

Very truly yours,

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Anthony Downs
Anthony Downs
Chairman of the Board

Lewis Bolan
Lewis Bolan
Assistant Vice President

This report was prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, under Contract H-3610-R. Its contents reflect the views of the contractor and do not necessarily reflect the policy or views of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

URBAN RENEWAL LAND DISPOSITION STUDY
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report could not have been possible without the cooperation and extensive time of a number of individuals both inside and outside the Boston Redevelopment Authority. These included developers, representatives of citizens associations, business leaders and government officials. Our special thanks go to Mr. Robert Kenney, Director of BRA, and to these staff persons: Robert Walsh, Matthew Curry, Stuart Forbes, Richard Garver, David La Lima, Charles Speliotis, David Weiner, and Ann Wolpert. We wish also to acknowledge the contribution of Robert McKay of Citizens Housing and Planning Association and Frank Del Vecchio from the HUD regional office.

Each of these persons generously contributed to our understanding of the Boston renewal program. The findings and conclusions are our own.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
I.	SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS	1
II.	CITY AND SMSA DYNAMICS	10
III.	LOCAL FACTORS IMPACTING THE RENEWAL PROGRAM	30
IV.	ANALYSIS OF LOCAL PLANNING AND RENEWAL STRATEGY	47
V.	SOUTH END PROJECT, R-56	55
VI.	WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT, R-24	102
VII.	SOUTH COVE PROJECT, R-92	133
VIII.	DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT-FANEUIL HALL, R-77	174

TABLES

No.		Page
II-1	Population, Boston SMSA	11
II-2	Selected Population Characteristics, Boston SMSA and Central City	12
II-3	Percent of Younger Females Ever Married, City of Boston, Metropolitan Central Cities, All SMSA's	13
II-4	Population Density, Boston SMSA and Central City	14
II-5	Family Income, Boston SMSA and Central City	17
II-6	Labor Force Characteristics, Boston SMSA and Central City	18
II-7	Welfare Caseload -- 1960-1972	20
II-8	Retail Sales Volumes, Boston SMSA, Central City and CBD	21
II-9	Housing Inventory Characteristics, Boston SMSA and Central City, 1950-1970	23
II-10	Dwelling Units Built in Boston, 1960-1972	24
III-1	Present Organization of Boston's City Government	33
III-2	Continuity of BRA Chief Administrator and Project Directors, 1960-1973	39
III-3	Urban Renewal Funds	42
III-4	Average Annual Expenditures, HUD Grants to Boston, 1968-1971	43

TABLES
(continued)

No.		Page
V-1	Statistical Summary, South End Project (Mass. R-56)	56
V-2	Project Characteristics, South End (Mass. R-56)	57
V-3	Population Characteristics, South End (Mass. R-56)	60
V-4	Chronology, South End (Mass. R-56)	67
V-5	Rehabilitation, November 1973	76
V-6	Summary of Elapsed Time, South End (Mass. R-56)	85
V-7	Delay-Causing Factors, South End (Mass. R-56)	100
V-8	Exogenous Delay-Causing Factors, South End (Mass. R-56)	following 100
V-9	Accelerating Factors, South End (Mass. R-56)	101
VI-1	Statistical Summary, Washington Park Project (Mass R-24)	103
VI-2	Project Characteristics, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	104
VI-3	Population Characteristics, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	106
VI-4	Chronology, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	111
VI-5	Summary of Elapsed Time, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	124
VI-6	Delay-Causing Factors, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	131
VI-7	Exogenous Delay-Causing Factors, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	following 131
VI-8	Accelerating Factors, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	132

TABLES
(continued)

No.		Page
VII-1	Statistical Summary, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	134
VII-2	Land Use Characteristics, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	135
VII-3	Population and Housing Characteristics, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	141
VII-4	Chronology, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	146
VII-5	Summary of Elapsed Time, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	162
VII-6	Delay-Causing Factors, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	173
VII-7	Exogenous Delay-Causing Factors, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	following 173
VII-8	Accelerating Factors, South Cove (Mass. R-92)	174
VIII-1	Statistical Summary, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall (Mass. R-77)	176
VIII-2	Land Use Characteristics, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall (Mass. R-77)	177
VIII-3	Chronology, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall (Mass. R-77)	186
VIII-4	Summary of Elapsed Time, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Mass. R-77)	211
VIII-5	Delay-Causing Factors, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall (Mass. R-77)	230
VIII-6	Accelerating Factors, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall (Mass. R-77)	following 230

EXHIBITS

No.		Following Page
II-1	City of Boston, Census Year, 1970 (Population)	13
II-2	City of Boston, Census Year, 1960 to 1970 (Population)	13
II-3	City of Boston, Census Year, 1970 (Family Income, Education)	18
II-4	City of Boston, Census Year, 1960 to 1970 (Family Income, Education)	18
II-5	City of Boston, Census Year, 1970 (Resident Labor Force and Employment)	18
II-6	City of Boston, Census Year, 1960 to 1970 (Resident Labor Force and Employment)	18
II-7	City of Boston, Census Year, 1970 (Housing Stock)	23
II-8	City of Boston, Census Year, 1960 to 1970 (Housing Stock)	23
V-1	Key Components of Execution Stage, Annual Progress Chart, South End Project (Mass. R-56)	71
V-2	Pattern of Land Disposition (Deeded) by Re-Use Category, South End Project (Mass. R-56)	79
VI-1	Key Components of Execution Stage, Annual Progress Chart, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	117
VI-2	Pattern of Land Disposition (Deeded) by Re-Use Category, Washington Park (Mass. R-24)	119
VII-1	Key Components of Execution Stage, Annual Progress Chart, South Cove Project (Mass. R-92)	152

EXHIBITS (Continued)

No.		Following Page
VII-2	Pattern of Land Disposition (Deeded) by Re-Use Category, South Cove Project (Mass. R-92)	155
VIII-1	Key Components of Execution Stage, Annual Progress Chart, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project (Mass. R-77)	197
VIII-2	Pattern of Land Disposition (Deeded) by Re-Use Category, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project, (Mass. R-77)	202

MAPS

	Following Page
BOSTON REGION, FEDERALLY ASSISTED URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS	3
BOSTON'S REGIONAL LOCATION	10
BOSTON'S SMSA	13
SOUTH END PROJECT, ILLUSTRATIVE SITE PLAN	56
SOUTH END PROJECT, LAND USE PATTERN	56
SOUTH END PROJECT, FUNCTIONAL PATTERN	56
SOUTH END PROJECT, LAND DISPOSITION MAP	79
WASHINGTON PARK, FUNCTIONAL PATTERN	103
WASHINGTON PARK, LAND USE PATTERN	103
SOUTH COVE PROJECT, ILLUSTRATIVE SITE PLAN	134
SOUTH COVE PROJECT, LAND USE PLAN	134
SOUTH COVE PROJECT, FUNCTIONAL PATTERN	134
SOUTH COVE PROJECT, LAND DISPOSITION MAP	155
DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT-FANEUIL HALL PROJECT, ILLUSTRATIVE SITE PLAN	176
DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT-FANEUIL HALL PROJECT, LAND USE PLAN	176
DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT-FANEUIL HALL PROJECT, FUNCTIONAL PATTERN	176
DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT-FANEUIL HALL PROJECT, DISPOSITION MAP	202

1. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

Boston developed in 1960 a clearly enunciated strategy to carry out a massive urban renewal program. The strategy called for the development of 10 GNRP's to cover nearly one-quarter of the land area of Boston. Seven major renewal projects developed out of these GNRP's and the federally funded urban renewal projects encompassed 2,673 acres. These federally funded urban renewal projects have over-shadowed all other federally supported programs. Consequently, the projects have significantly changed the visual character of the city and have been the major single factor in the creation of a better downtown climate for investment in both commercial and residential development.

Four of the projects were selected for detailed examination of factors that affect the speed of project execution in general and land disposition in particular. Prior to 1967, project execution proceeded rapidly, with few inappropriate delays. Following 1967, project execution lagged for a host of reasons, many of which were beyond the control of the local planning agency. However, one delay causing factor stands out above all others. Estimates of project costs in the Loan and Grant applications were unrealistically low. Project execution depended upon predictable and orderly approval of amendatory budgets. In the absence of sufficient and predictable additional funding, project execution became haphazard. Administrative and interest costs became more significant parts of project budgets, and an orderly sequencing of priority actions became difficult to implement. Rather than impose an order of acquisition, the BRA increasingly responded to pressures and initiatives from the outside. In addition, many aspects of the original renewal plans became irrelevant, particularly in consequence to the changed directions of transportation planning. The BRA found itself locked into plans that it could not carry out. In order to bring early close-out to the projects, the LPA must be granted major changes and more flexibility in the project plans.

Unlike problems with land disposition in many other cities, most of the land in the renewal areas has a strong market demand. Given a deliverable site not environmentally encumbered, the BRA has little difficulty in finding interested developers. If the BRA were to have the means to accomplish a more flexible plan, it could bring the projects toward an early close-out. This is not to say that there are not numerous obstacles to overcome in the disposition of a large number of parcels within the projects. Even given sufficient funds,

delays will be considerable in both the Downtown Waterfront and South End Projects. Yet the overall plans for these areas are sound and both projects promise to be excellent examples of the renewal process.

B. City SMSA Dynamics/Exogenous Factors

Boston's urban renewal program has been undertaken within the context of the following key socioeconomic dynamics:

1. From 1950 to 1970, the population of the city of Boston declined 20 percent while the population of the SMSA increased 16 percent.
2. During the same period, the proportion of blacks, elderly, and poor increased in the city of Boston. The median family income for the city of Boston in 1970 was $2,300 less than that for the Boston SMSA, and the differential had increased sharply since 1960.
3. The city of Boston is restricted by state law in the manner in which it may raise revenues. It is more dependent upon the property tax than any other major city in the country. It has had to provide increased services for its poor from a tax base that has increased slowly. Hence, the property tax rate is extraordinarily high. The high tax rate has spurred the movement out of Boston of higher income residents, retail facilities, and industries.
4. Orderly transportation planning for the Boston SMSA is made more complex by the extreme fragmentation of local governments. There are over 100 political jurisdictions within the Boston SMSA.
5. Boston has one of the best rapid transit systems in the country, but has experienced a decline in transit patronage since 1950 due to the construction of elements of a radial expressway system.
6. The first major circumferential expressway of any major city was built around Boston in the late 1940's. This expressway provided an early stimulus for a rapid reduction of industrial employment in the city.
7. Through the use of tax statements, the city has stimulated a tremendous increase in new office space and office employment in and near the CBD. The increased downtown employment has strengthened the market for residential and commercial land.
8. Boston has a disproportionate share of the subsidized housing within the SMSA.
9. The minority population has become increasingly segregated as have the schools. The degree of school segregation has brought to a halt the construction of new schools.

C. Local Factors Impacting the Renewal Program

1. The BRA staff is characterized by:

   - Rapid turnover of the chief administrator, with four new directors since 1967
   - Rapid turnover of project directors in all four projects under study
   - A high degree of professionalism
   - A loss of talent in recent years.

2. The BRA is an independent authority which nevertheless appears to be very much under the control of the mayor's office.
3. The BRA is responsible for all planning for the city. Until recently, the bulk of its planning was related to the renewal projects.
4. The BRA and the mayor's office are promoting the Park Plaza Project, a privately funded project. Development within Park Plaza would compete directly with disposition in the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project.
5. The HUD area office in Boston has disputed proclaimers and minor plan changes, delaying BRA action. The conflict between BRA and the HUD area office has not expedited the execution of renewal projects.
6. There are incidents in which informal letters on tax agreements have been arbitrarily changed by the city. Local developers have developed mistrust of the city's and BRA's decision-making process.
7. The failure to receive Section 312 funds for rehabilitation has seriously impacted the rehabilitation projects. The moratorium on subsidized housing may delay the disposition of a number of parcels earmarked for moderate income families.
8. The use of early land acquisition in residential projects speeds up the development of new construction, and if used in conjunction with housing subsidies, provides a relocation resource when the project goes into execution.
9. Where a renewal plan calls for construction of subsidized housing subsidy funds should be allocated or authorized at the time of Loan and Grant approval. Housing production could then be coordinated with acquisition and relocation.

D. Projects Under Study

Four projects were selected for detailed study within this report. Two projects, the South End and Washington Park, were predominantly residential rehabili-

FEDERALLY ASSISTED URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS
BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
N
CHARLESTOWN
East Boston
SUMNER STREET NDP
WEST END
GOV'T CTR. WATERFRONT
SCHOOL-FRANKLIN
BOYLSTON-ESSEX
ST BOTOLPH STREET
SOUTH COVE
SOUTH STATION
NEW YORK STREETS
SOUTH END
FENWAY
CAMPUS HIGH
KITTREDGE SQUARE
Roxbury-North Dorchester
WASHINGTON PARK
BRUNSWICK-KING
South Boston

tation projects which required demolition of 20 to 30 percent of the existing housing units. Two other projects, South Cove and Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall, were CBD-related projects of multiple land use. The projects were selected to illustrate the breadth of disposition problems within Boston. The map (on the following page) shows the location of the four selected projects within Boston. A brief summary of findings on the projects follows.

1. South End Project (Mass. R-56)

The South End Project is a 616-acre project just south of the CBD. It is a complex mixed use project whose major goal was to rehabilitate and strengthen a once-fashionable, in-town project. Land values in the South End have increased rapidly due to the proximity to the Prudential Center and the new Hancock Building to the west and the rapid expansion of office space downtown. The project area has concentrations of extremely low income persons, moderate income working class families, and high income professionals, who have rehabilitated many of the South End townhouses. Community politics are extraordinarily intense; a major political issue is over the future of the area characteristics: should it retain low cost housing for poor people or should it be a high income neighborhood for professionals. Conflict over this issue has been continuous for ten years.

The latest approved budget is $92 million, with $60.7 million from federal grant. However, the current budget has no relevance to that required to complete the project. The project as originally conceived defies completion. The project was laid out according to plans to complete a radial highway system, and an Inner Belt Expressway. The radial and the Inner Belt that were to serve as boundaries for the South End were never built, though cleared land for the Inner Belt continues to blight the project. With the deletion of the expressways, the project boundaries make little sense and the project itself is simply too large to be readily manageable.

Planning for the South End Project began in 1960 and project execution started in 1966. Delays in the planning period may be attributed to the complex community politics, which were associated with an overly-large project that had too much diversity. Although the project has been in execution for more than seven years, the original plan is far from finished. Less than 65 percent of the originally scheduled acquisition is complete.

Land acquired by BRA is scattered throughout the project. Of 167 original disposition parcels, 70 have been disposed. In few of the remaining parcels has acquisition been completed. The phasing of acquisition was made complex by (a) hardship acquisitions; (b) funding uncertainty and budgetary problems; (c) community politics over developer designation. Despite the complexities, the phasing of acquisition in retrospect has been chaotic. The BRA has currently proposed a reduction in the scale of the plan in order to bring the project to some kind of completion. The proposed plan change provides systematic ordering of priorities which could impose phasing of future execution. Without some flexibility, the BRA is locked into an urban renewal strategy in the South End which becomes almost impossible to implement. It should be noted that there is an extraordinarily strong market for land in the South End. An infusion of funds to complete the priority acquisitions, relocation and demolitions should lead to early disposition of many parcels. Otherwise, there will be heavy interest on the project loan, and no close out may be foreseen for many years.

Despite the difficulties with project execution and land disposition, the project may be termed a qualified success. There is renewed interest in the area on the part of private investors while substantial new housing has been developed for low and moderate income families. Overall, renewal has played a positive role, and the South End promises to be a strong viable neighborhood that is a credit to urban renewal.

2. Washington Park Project (Mass. R-24)

The Washington Park Project is a 502-acre residential project in a predominantly inner city area three miles south of the CBD. When planning started during the late 1950's, the area was still predominantly white. The last 15 years has witnessed a great reduction in the size of its population and a transition to a virtually all black neighborhood.

The project went into execution in May 1963, and progressed with great rapidity during its first four years. The acquisition was 80 percent complete at the end of 20 months with demolition proceeding rapidly. At the end of four years, disposition was two-thirds complete and a large number of subsidized housing units had been constructed. As long as 221 d (3) subsidy funds were available, there was no difficulty in disposing of the bulk of the land. The market could not support new

housing construction within the project in the absence of a subsidy. Land disposition was possible due to the readiness to provide subsidy funds for a major concentration of housing for low and moderate income families. Despite the concentration of subsidy housing, the project area has a higher income distribution than the surrounding Roxbury area.

After 1967, project completion bogged down under forces beyond the control of the local planning agency, notably the inability of the city to construct schools due to the Racial Imbalance Law. The initial execution of the project was technically excellent and extraordinarily expeditious. The design review process insured an unusually attractive architectural quality to the new units.

However, technical excellence and expeditious disposition do not necessarily make an urban renewal project successful. The Washington Park Project was a small part of a larger GNRP, and was to be the first of a number of projects. As a single project standing alone, it is fighting trends in that area of the city that are simply overpowering, and its long term prospects are poor. Signs of blight and deterioration are abundantly visible. To maintain standard housing will require a continuous input of funds and efforts.

Of the four projects examined, the Washington Park Project experienced the most rapid pace of land disposition. An analysis of the project provides insights into the prerequisites for rapid land disposition in a poor inner city neighborhood:

- Predictable flow of housing subsidies
- Neighborhood support for renewal goals
- A policy of relocation that meets needs of those displaced
- A sense of urgency within both renewal agency and city government to expedite execution

All these prerequisites were met in Washington Park during the 1963 - 1967 period.

3. South Cove Project (Mass. R-92)

The 96-acre South Cove urban renewal area lies immediately south of the CBD retail and entertainment sections. Many of the land uses within the project are an extension of CBD land-use patterns. The treatment of the

project required half clearance and half rehabilitation. The purpose of the project was to support continuation of existing land uses, although there was some decrease in commercial land use.

The project went into execution in June 1966. Land disposition lagged behind other execution activities. It took three years for the first major land sale. After more than seven years, less than half of the land to be disposed has been sold. However, many of the parcels are designated or committed to developers.

Several parcels have been delayed by constraints on school construction and transportation actions that are clearly beyond the province of the BRA. A school site has been cleared for disposition since early in the project execution, and failure to complete the school affects disposition of other parcels, including the old Quincy School which cannot be demolished and the site of the YMCA, which may move to the old school site. The new MBTA Orange Line tunnel has been completed, but the old elevated tracks are still being used, which holds up development of two residential parcels as well as an additional parcel designated for use by the medical center.

Several major residential parcels within the South Cove area have been sold, developed and successfully marketed. Parcels proposed for institutional re-use have also been developed or committed. The marketability of parcels proposed for commercial re-use, however, remains somewhat marginal. The marginal marketability of two large commercial parcels on Stuart Street led to land banking by the original owner or tentatively designated developer and the subsequent reluctance of the BRA to rescind tentative designation for a period of several years. These parcels are to be advertized again in the near future.

Major delays have resulted from an open-ended cooperation agreement with the Tufts-New England Medical Center (T-NEMC). By the terms of the agreement, several parcels were to be turned over to T-NEMC "as needed" to carry out their master plan which calls for completion by 1987. Hence, disposition of the reserved parcels has been delayed. Negotiations are presently taking place for a revision of the cooperation agreement to permit the BRA to lease the committed parcels to T-NEMC until development is completed. Such an agreement must be approved by HUD if an early close-out is to be achieved.

Despite the major delays in the South Cove Project, outlined above, it is felt that land disposition has proceeded relatively smoothly. Two major residential parcels have been sold, developed, and successfully marketed; a major commercial parcel has been developed, despite the marginal marketability of commercial land in the area; this latter trend may be changed as future development occurs in adjacent areas. Don Bosco Technical High School has almost doubled its capacity and T-NEMC continues to expand its services as a result of construction on urban renewal land. Project improvements funded through the urban renewal process have supported private rehabilitation in the Bay Village neighborhood.

The BRA is attempting to work out an arrangement with HUD to bring the project to early close-out. The project would be completed essentially as planned, but an additional $7.3 million is requested for the federal grant. Of the projects studied, this project has the best chance for meeting an early close-out date, given intensive efforts on the part of BRA and cooperation from HUD.

4. Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project (Mass. R-77)

The Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall project consists of 105 acres located on the Boston Harbor directly east of the new city hall and government center. Treatment for the area involves approximately half clearance and half rehabilitation. The plan called for almost a complete change in land use for the area, requiring extensive relocation of the meat and produce wholesalers and complex restructuring of the transportation system. The project entered execution nine years ago and is far from completion.

Delay causing factors having significant impact on the progress of project execution in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall project are primarily market related or local management related factors. National program related factors have not, for the most part, had an impact on project execution. However, delays may be forthcoming as the BRA seeks approval of a complex leasehold agreement between the renewal agency and the Rouse Company, proposed developer for the historic market buildings in the Faneuil Hall area. The lack of experienced staff at the local level of HUD may contribute to this delay. Exogenous factor, i.e., national socioeconomic trends, have not affected the Waterfront Project. The marketability of land within the project area, particularly for residential re-uses, has been strong and has been

supported by increasing employment opportunities and the myriad of cultural and entertainment facilities offered in downtown Boston. In the absence of federal funding, local institutions are supporting residential rehabilitation in the area. The potential market for housing - primarily adult-oriented households - is not adversely affected by national trends as it might be in other metropolitan areas. This market is attracted by the accessibility of the area to the CBD.

When the Waterfront Project went into execution, there was a strong market for office space in the CBD. Since that time, extensive office construction has brought increases in vacancy rates that affect the potential marketability of these sites. In reflection of the reduced marketability of office sites, a recent plan change has been approved by the City Council to change the land use of a major site from office to residential use. If the Park Plaza project is approved, there may be greater reluctance by developers to construct offices on remaining commercial parcels.

There are a number of local management related factors that have delayed project execution. There was an unrealistic reliance on cooperation from outside agencies in completion of an ambitious plan. The construction of the "Walk to the Sea" required the removal by the state Department of Public Works of ramps to the Central Artery. The discontinuance of the Union Freight Railroad required action by several federal and state agencies. There was excessive reliance on continued dynamic leadership on the part of BRA staff to carry out the plan.

Actions have been taken by the Waterfront Residents' Association against BRA that resulted in court actions. In 1972, the court imposed a moratorium on the initiation of further acquisitions or demolitions in the area. This moratorium was followed up by a court-sanctioned restudy of the renewal plan, which further delayed land disposition. The future plans for the Downtown Waterfront remain uncertain, pending finalization of the major plan changes and an agreement between BRA, HUD, and the city of Boston on an early close-out. The arrangement, as proposed by BRA, would require an additional $9 million to complete the project essentially as planned.

From a standpoint of land disposition, the project has not been particularly successful. After eight years, only one-third of the current disposition inventory has been sold. Most significant was the lack of a systematic disposition strategy, as seen in the offering of Parcel C-2 (see Chapter IX). However, the plan and objectives of the project are sound, and it is recommended that HUD assist the BRA in expeditiously reviewing major plan changes and evaluating proposals for early close-out or more flexible land disposition strategies.

II. CITY AND SMSA DYNAMICS

A. Local Statistic Trends and Analyses

After 25 years of a declining population and a decline in the strength of the downtown area in relation to outlying areas, the trend in Boston has changed. The revitalization of the downtown area, in accordance with the urban renewal plans of the 1960's, has fostered an expansion of service-related activities and employment.

1. Population and Race

An analysis of building permits and vacancy rates confirms the police survey findings that the population of Boston has increased slightly during the last three years. Such an increase stands in contrast to the previous twenty years, when the population of the city of Boston declined 20 percent from 801,000 to 641,000. During the same period, the population of the SMSA increased 16 percent from 2,370,000 to 2,754,000. Whereas Boston housed over one-third of the SMSA's population in 1950, only 23 percent of the SMSA's 1970 population lived within the city. Therefore, Boston was experiencing the rapid suburbanization of its population that was faced by most large cities. But Boston's position, relative to its SMSA, is weaker than that of other large cities. On the average, central cities in the U.S. house 46 percent of the population of an SMSA, exactly double the percentage for the Boston SMSA.

While the population of Boston was shrinking, the non-white population was increasing rapidly. From 1950 to 1970, the non-white population more than doubled from 42,700 to 104,700. In 1970, 82 percent of the non-white population in the SMSA lived in Boston. Although the non-white population in the SMSA is highly concentrated in Boston (82 percent), the proportion of the population that is non-white is somewhat below the national average. Whereas non-whites in the average large city account for 22 percent of the population, only 16 percent of Boston's population is non-white. However, an unusually large proportion of Boston's non-white population are newcomers, since the proportion of the population that is non-white has increased from 5 percent in 1950 to 16 percent in 1970. The rapid rate of in-migration of relatively poor non-whites into Boston has had a major effect upon the Washington Park Project. The non-white newcomers moved almost exclusively to Roxbury and South Boston, resulting in a high degree of neighborhood segregation. In fact, 77 percent of the Negro population lives in the

Map Boston's Regional Location



Prepared By: REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Table II-1

POPULATION TRENDS: BOSTON SMSA

	Number				Change			Percent Change		
	1950	1960	1970	1973	1950 - 70	1950 - 60	1960 - 70	1950 - 70	1950 - 60	1960 - 70
Total Population - Boston SMSA	2,369,986	2,589,301	2,753,700	2,825,000	383,714	219,315	164,399	16.2%	9.3%	6.3%
Suffolk County	896,615	791,329	735,190		-161,425	-105,286	-56,139	-18.0	-11.7	-7.1
Middlesex Co. (part)	854,854	973,481	1,052,027		197,173	118,627	78,546	23.1	13.9	8.1
Essex Co. (part)	269,584	308,051	342,999		73,415	38,467	34,948	27.2	14.3	11.3
Norfolk Co. (part)	345,605	442,150	510,076		164,471	96,545	67,926	47.6	27.9	15.4
Plymouth Co. (part)	43,914	74,290	113,408		69,494	30,376	39,118	158.3	69.2	52.7
Central City	801,444	697,197	641,071	650,000	-160,373	-104,247	-56,126	-20.0	-13.0	-8.1
Central City as Percent of SMSA	33.8%	26.9%	23.3%							

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Censuses of Population, 1950, 1960 and 1970.

Table II-2

SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
BOSTON SMSA AND CENTRAL CITY

	Number			Change			Percent Change		
	1950	1960	1970	1950-70	1950-60	1960-70	1950-70	1950-60	1960-70
Nonwhite Population									
SMSA	55,725	87,092	127,035	71,310	31,367	39,943	128.0	56.3	45.9
Boston	42,744	68,493	104,707	61,963	25,749	36,214	145.0	60.2	52.9
Percent of SMSA Non-white Population in Boston	76.7	78.6	82.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
Percent Non-white to Total Population in:									
Boston	5.3	9.8	16.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
SMSA	2.4	3.4	4.6	--	--	--	--	--	--
Elderly Population (over 65)									
SMSA	230,179	281,797	309,885	79,706	51,618	28,088	34.6	22.4	10.0
Boston SMSA	77,634	85,585	81,759	4,125	7,951	-3,826	5.3	10.2	-4.5
Percent of Elderly Population in Boston	33.7	30.3	26.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
Percent Elderly to Total Population in:									
Boston	9.7	12.3	12.8	--	--	--	--	--	--
SMSA	9.7	10.9	11.3	--	--	--	--	--	--

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Censuses of Population, 1950, 1960 and 1970.

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South End, Washington Park and th surrounding model cities neighborhood, and Mattapan, while only 10 percent of the white population lives in these areas. The high degree of housing segregation has been a major factor in Boston's difficulties in integrating its schools, and has led to a moratorium imposed by law, courts, and the U.S. Department of HEW on most school construction in Boston since 1965. Within the projects under study, only one public school has been built since 1960. The failure to build new schools within the projects, particularly in Washington Park, accelerated the loss of confidence of middle income families in the area.

2. Population Characteristics and Housing Distribution

The Boston SMSA is noted for the very large number of institutions of higher learning that attract a large student population to the city. The impact of the colleges and universities is apparent in the age structure. The city has 12 percent of its population in the 20-24 age group, substantially more than is typical of central cities across the country. Boston also has a 13 percent proportion of its population over 65, somewhat greater than the 11 percent proportion of elderly within the SMSA for central cities. The large proportion of students and elderly provides a high dependency ratio on Boston of individuals who contribute least to the city revenues.

Table II-3 PERCENT OF YOUNGER FEMALES EVER MARRIED, BY AGE, FOR CITY OF BOSTON, ALL METROPOLITAN CENTRAL CITIES, AND ALL SMSA'S

	City of Boston	All Metropolitan Central Cities	All SMSA'S
Age	% Ever Married	% Ever Married	% Ever Married
15 - 24	21.3	35.6	35.2
25 - 34	71.1	85.2	89.0

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1970.

This atypical situation in Boston may be noted in the table that shows marriage rates by age of females. Young adults in Boston have a much greater likelihood of being single than is true in other metropolitan

Map The Boston SMSA



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Exhibit II-1

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1970

POPULATION



REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Exhibit II-2

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1970

POPULATION



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Table II-4

POPULATION DENSITY
BOSTON SMSA AND CENTRAL CITY

	1960	1970	Change 1960 - 1970	Percent Change 1960 - 1970
Area in Square Miles				
SMSA	969	987	18	1.9%
City of Boston	48	46	-2	-4.1
Boston as Percent of SMSA	5.0%	4.7%		
Population Per Square Mile				
SMSA	2,674	2,791	119	4.5
Boston	14,586	13,936	-650	-4.5

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1960 and 1970.

areas. Whereas in Boston 21 percent of the females aged 15 - 24 have married, in other large cities 35 percent of such females have married. The large number of single men and women accounts for a smaller size of household in Boston than is true of other cities, and the size of the household has declined sharply over the last 25 years, from 3.37 persons in 1950 to 2.77 persons in1970. The number of households in Boston declined only 0.8 percent between 1950 and 1970 while the population declined 20 percent. The trend toward smaller households is national and therefore is likely to remain. Reduced fertility and marriage rates will continue to reduce household size in Boston as in other areas. The chief implication of the change is that the density of dwelling units will have to increase even to maintain a constant population. Since it is expected that the population of Boston will increase by 50,000 during the next seven years, an additional 30,000 housing units must be constructed. A very substantial number of these, about 15,000, will be middle or high income units within the downtown core.

Although Boston is the eighth largest city in the country, its physical land area is 22 percent smaller than the average central city within an SMSA. Its density is more than three times greater than the norm, in that it has almost 14,000 people per square mile. The high density makes it more difficult to undertake clearance within residential renewal areas, for acquisition and relocation costs are high. The increasing density projected for Boston will mean a larger proportion of multifamily units and a higher proportion of renters. At the present time, only 15 percent of the housing units in Boston are single-family, as opposed to 51 percent in the typical central city. The present vacancy rate for Boston is 6 percent which is about average.

3. Employment and Labor Force Characteristics

There has been a continuous change in the composition of the labor force, with a rapid decline in industrial and manufacturing employment combined with a growth in service employment. Manufacturing employment has been declining at the rate of about 2,000 per year for the last 20 years. The BRA projects an increase of 4,000 manufacturing jobs between 1973 and 1980, but there appears to be little chance that such growth will take place.

Manufacturing employment ranks fourth in Boston, after retail and wholesale trade, government, and services. In 1968, the Economic Development and Industrial Commission of the city of Boston (EDIC) made a sur-

vey of 309 of Boston's larger manufacturing firms. The study concluded that lack of space for expansion is the paramount impediment to the retention and expansion of the city's industrial base. Ninety-five of these firms, with a total of over 10,000 employees, stated that they were seriously considering leaving Boston for another location. The study also concluded that there were 46 million square feet of vacant or underutilized land which is zoned for industrial usage, and that strong action by the city should make land available at a competitive price. However, the experience in the South End indicates that it is difficult to recruit industry even with the land assembly and write down powers of an urban renewal project. Action necessary to recruit industry does not appear likely to come out of BRA or the mayor's office and without such action, EDIC's attempt to reverse the decline of industrial employment is not likely to succeed.

Offsetting the decline of manufacturing employment has been the increase in office employment at the rate of 5,000 per year over the last 10 years. BRA estimates that the employment increase within the overall services area to be 60,000 jobs between 1963 and 1972, and that this increase will continue as new office space goes into construction. Between 1960 and 1970, office space increased from 16.6 million to 23.7 million square feet, for a net increase of over 7 million square feet. BRA estimates an additional 13 million square feet of space between 1970 and 1980. However, with the softening of the office market observed in 1972-1973, the estimate appears to be optimistic.

Almost all of the new office space was developed within the central core area and the majority of the increase in jobs between 1960 and 1970 occurred in the vicinity of the Central Business District extending to the Prudential Center. Employment is more concentrated than ever within the downtown area. There are a number of major consequences of this increased concentration:

- Need for improved transportation access from outlying areas into the city core.
- Increased demand for housing in or near the downtown area.
- Rise in land values and marketability of land within the South End and Downtown Waterfront Projects.
- An increased base of support for downtown retailing to serve office workers and downtown residents.

Table II-5

FAMILY INCOME: BOSTON SMSA AND CENTRAL CITY

	Number			Change			Percent Change		
	1950	1960	1970	1950-1970	1950-1960	1960-1970	1950-1970	1950-1960	1960-1970
Median Family Income									
SMSA	$3,516	$6,687	$11,449	NOT APPLICABLE			NOT APPLICABLE		
Boston	3,249	5,747	9,133						
Families with Incomes under $3,000									
SMSA	199,970	70,716	40,217	-159,753	-129,254	-30,499	-79.9	-64.6	-43.1
Boston	77,380	27,359	14,862	- 62,518	- 50,021	-12,497	-80.8	-64.6	-45.7
Percent of SMSA Low Income Families in Boston	38.7%	38.7%	37.0%						
Percent of Low Income Families Reporting in:									
SMSA	36.5%	11.0%	6.1%						
Boston	43.3%	16.7%	10.5%						
Families with Incomes over $15,000									
SMSA	24,985	45,501	199,139	174,154	20,516	153,638	697.0	82.1	337.7
Boston	4,340	5,445	25,764	21,424	1,105	20,319	493.6	25.5	373.2
Percent of SMSA High Income Families in Boston	17.4%	12.0%	12.9%						
Percent of High Income Families of Total Families Reporting in:									
SMSA	4.6%	7.1%	30.0%						
Boston	2.4%	3.3%	18.1%						
Total									
Boston	178,500	164,215	142,019						
SMSA	548,110	640,506	661,650						

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1950, 1960, and 1970.

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Table II-6

LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
BOSTON SMSA AND CENTRAL CITY

	1960			1970			Percent Change 1960-70	
	SMSA	Boston	Central City as % of SMSA	SMSA	Boston	Central City as % of SMSA	SMSA	Boston
Total Resident Labor Force	1,063,840	303,567	28.5	1,177,942	278,607	23.7	10.7	-8.2
White	1,027,634	274,837	26.7	1,132,745	242,457	21.4	10.2	-11.8
Non-white	36,206	28,730	79.4	45,197	36,150	80.0	24.8	25.8
Total Resident Unemployment	39,900	15,248	38.2	41,468	12,102	29.2	3.9	-20.6
Percent Unemployment	3.8	5.0	--	3.5	4.3	--	--	--
White Unemployment as Percent of White Labor Force	3.6	4.8	--	3.4	4.0	--	--	--
Non-white Unemployment as Percent of Non-white Force	6.7	7.3	--	6.0	6.6	--	--	--
Total Resident Employment	1,023,725	288,246	28.2	1,136,474	266,505	23.5	11.0	-7.5
Employment by Industry								
Manufacturing	294,434	70,326	23.9	254,546	46,646	18.3	-13.5	-33.7
Trade	190,926	53,488	28.0	238,557	51,693	21.7	24.9	-3.4
Services	173,014	53,958	31.2	243,672	68,653	28.2	40.8	27.2
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	62,810	18,224	29.0	85,416	24,479	28.7	36.0	34.3
Public Service	120,757	33,533	27.8	175,788	42,236	24.0	45.6	26.0
Other	181,784	58,717	32.3	138,494	32,798	23.7	-23.8	-44.1

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1960 and 1970.

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Exhibit II-3

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1970



FAMILY INCOME

Central city income level

Median family income in central city as compared with SMSA

Proportion of low income familes in central city population

Proportion of SMSA low income families in central city

Proportion of higher income families in central city population

Proportion of SMSA higher income families in central city

EDUCATION

Proportion of population enrolled in school in central city

Proportion of SMSA school enrollment in central city

Proportion of minority enrollment in central city

Proportion of SMSA minority enrollment in central city

Proportion of elementary school children in private school in central city

Proportion of SMSA private elementary school children in central city

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Exhibit II-4

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1960 to 1970



REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Exhibit II-5

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1970

RESIDENT LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT

Central city labor force participation rate (relative to total population)

Proportion of SMSA resident labor force in central city

Proportion of minority workers in central city labor force

Proportion of SMSA minority labor force in central city

Proportion of central city resident labor force employed

Proportion of central city minority resident labor force employed

Central city resident unemployment rate

Proportion of SMSA resident unemployment in central city

Central city minority unemployment rate

Proportion of central city employment by industry
- Manufacturing
- Trade
- Services
- Finance-insurance-real estate
- Public services
- Other

Proportion of SMSA resident employment by industry in central city
- Manufacturing
- Trade
- Services
- Finance-insurance-real estate
- Public services
- Other



Exhibit II-6

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1960 to 1970



RESIDENT LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT

Central city labor force participation rate (relative to total population)

Proportion of SMSA resident labor force in central city

Proportion of minority workers in central city labor force

Proportion of SMSA minority labor force in central city

Proportion of central city resident labor force employed

Proportion of central city minority resident labor force employed

Central city resident unemployment rate

Proportion of SMSA resident unemployment in central city

Central city minority unemployment rate

Proportion of central city employment by industry
- Manufacturing
- Trade
- Services
- Finance-Insurance-real estate
- Public services
- Other

Proportion of SMSA resident employment by industry in central city
- Manufacturing
- Trade
- Services
- Finance-insurance-real estate
- Public services
- Other

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

- Increased need for amenities, entertainment, and services to a non-family-oriented higher income resident downtown.

After 20 years of decline, the BRA projects estimate a 50 percent increase in retail sales downtown during the 1970's. The estimate is as overly-optimistic as that for office jobs. However, developer interest in the Central Business District is increasing. BRA and the mayor are about to release plans for a privately financed renewal project within the Central Business District, with a major foreign developer.

4. Income

The median family income of $9,130 in Boston is slightly lower than the $9,500 median for U.S. central cities, but the Boston SMSA as a whole has a median income almost $1,000 higher than the median for all SMSA's. Relative to its SMSA, Boston has a very low income distribution. As middle and high income households have been moving to the suburbs, the differential between Boston and its SMSA has increased. In 1950, the median income of the SMSA was $270 greater than that for Boston. By 1970, the differential was $2,330.

In constant value dollars, there was a 21 percent increase in family income over the decade of the 60's. However, the income gains were not evenly distributed by area of the city or by group. The real income in the Back Bay/Beacon Hill area rose from $8,800 to over $14,500 in constant value dollars, while in Washington Park, the increase was from $6,336 to $6,937. Similarly, the median income of black families increased by $900, compared to the $1,900 median income for all Boston families. The welfare case load for Aid to Dependent Children went from three percent in 1960 to seventeen percent by 1970. The increase in welfare load has had a major impact on public housing. From 1963 to 1970 the percentage of tenant households on public assistance and fixed incomes increased from 56 to 75 percent. This increase was associated with the growing proportion of non-white tenants in public housing. Also problems of management of public housing increased over the decade. The deterioration of several housing projects has made the projects themselves blighting influences within a community. Parcels of land adjacent to the Cathedral Project, for example, now stand vacant. Environmental concerns, regarding the impact of a neighborhood with low income housing, have prevented the development of FHA subsidized housing.

Table II-7 WELFARE CASELOAD -- 1960 - 1972

Year	Old Age	ADC Families	General Relief	Disability Assistance	Total Caseload
1960	16,382	4,774	2,051	3,305	26,512
1965	11,470	8,595	2,355	3,766	31,612
1970	13,027	20,477	7,803	4,717	46,024
1972	14,081	23,837	15,642	5,120	58,680

Source: Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare.

5. Strength of the Central City

The history of Boston for the period 1950 to 1970 is a history of the decline of the central city relative to the rest of the SMSA. In the previous sections, statistics have been discussed which indicate:

- a real decline in central city population and in increase in SMSA population
- decrease in the income of the central city relative to that of of the SMSA
- an increased incidence of racial segregation in Boston
- a rapid decline in manufacturing employment in the central city
- a rapid increase in proportion of students and elderly in Boston
- an increase in welfare caseload from three percent to seventeen percent of all families.

However, some positive elements occurred during the 1960's. These included an increase in overall employment and a major expansion of service employment. During the decade of the 1960's, retail sales levels stopped the decline of the 50's and levelled off. This occurred despite the loss of population and indicated the effect of the strengthening office market and the increase in middle and higher income families

Table II-8

RETAIL SALES VOLUMES
BOSTON SMSA, CENTRAL CITY, AND CBD
($000)

	1958		1963		1967		Percent Change in Sales		
	Establish.	Sales	Establish.	Sales	Establish.	Sales	1958-67	1953-63	1963
The CBD - Total	1,486	403,383	1,333	406,826	1,086	410,844	1.8	0.9	1.
General Merchandise	64	201,702	47	205,436	35	222,112	10.1	1.9	8.
Apparel, Accessory	284	57,593	233	53,141	188	53,990	-6.3	-7.7	1.
Furniture, Home Furnishings	96	20,768	84	19,879	55	18,820	-9.4	-4.3	-5.
The City Total	8,555	1,240,975	6,628	1,190,875	5,974	1,415,440	14.1	-4.0	18.
General Merchandise	305	242,598	182	254,180	228	292,955	20.8	4.8	15.
Apparel, Accessory	816	121,570	678	107,852	547	124,851	2.7	-11.3	15.
Furniture, Home Furnishings	495	66,607	371	58,172	333	61,837	-7.2	-12.7	6.
The SMSA - Total	23,341	3,247,521	20,619	3,819,070	20,061	4,671,079	43.8	17.6	22.
General Merchandise	885	422,996	617	564,205	846	778,071	83.9	33.4	37.
Apparel, Accessory	1,962	253,716	1,758	266,931	1,605	326,347	28.6	5.2	22.
Furniture, Home Furnishings	1,344	147,943	1,194	169,508	1,212	252,746	70.8	14.6	49.
CBD Sales As Percent Of:									
City		32.5		34.2		29.0			
SMSA		12.4		10.7		8.8			
City Sales As Percent Of SMSA		38.2		31.1		30.3			

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1963 and 1967 Censuses of Business, III - Major Retail Centers.

living on Beacon Hill and in Back Bay. More recent increases in residents living in the downtown waterfront area and projected residential construction in the vicinity of the Central Business District provide for a higher level of retail sales. An addition of 15,000 units in the city core, mostly financed in the private market, is projected for the next seven years. Over the next five years, downtown retailing will be bolstered by the additional captive markets formed by residents and office workers. The BRA estimates that retail sales in the city core will increase by 50 percent during the decade of the 1970's. The estimated income appears to be high, for there will be a continuing loss of sales of standard brand merchandise to the suburban discount stores which have lower operating costs. However, the expected growth of internal markets should create a substantial growth of retail trade.

The downtown Core of Boston is likely to experience a major revitalization over the decade and strengthen its position for office space. Financial and governmental offices are consolidated in the downtown area. Residential demand for high income units on Beacon Hill and the waterfront will bolster investment in luxury high rise housing. The trend for an increase in luxury in-town housing may be accelerated by the threat of fuel shortages.

The increased residential usage downtown is likely to stimulate an expansion in new entertainment facilities. A 40 percent increase in attendance at museums, theatres, and musical events is projected.

The image that emerges of Boston's downtown is one of increasing health and vitality. However, the image fades upon examination of the dynamics of the Roxbury - Washington Park area. The deterioration of Roxbury surrounding Washington Park has proceeded virtually unchecked by the model cities funds. The area will continue to experience a loss of population as families with sufficient means move away. The continued decline will lead to the closing of many of the remaining retail facilities and the prospects are that the area is ripe for housing abandonment. It is difficult to foresee a turn around of the Roxbury area in the absence of additional renewal or rehabilitation projects. The Washington Park Project provided a temporary amelioration of conditions in the heart of the area. But it cannot maintain itself as a viable area given the present dynamics of the area surrounding it. Meanwhile, the problems of Roxbury will continue to have an impact on the rest of the city.

Table II-9

HOUSING INVENTORY CHARACTERISTICS
BOSTON SMSA AND CENTRAL CITY

	1950		1960		1970		Percent Change 1950-70		Percent Change 1950-60		Percent Change 1960-70	
	SMSA	Boston	SMSA	Boston	SMSA	Boston	SMSA	Boston	SMSA	Boston	SMSA	Boston
Total Year-Round Housing Units	667,412	222,079	814,090	238,802	890,756	232,413	33.5	4.7	22.0	7.5	9.4	-2.7
Single-family	226,927	27,945	383,594	39,027	389,132	34,268	71.5	22.6	69.0	39.7	1.4	-12.2
Multifamily	439,722	193,967	429,085	199,680	499,697	197,828	13.6	2.0	-2.4	2.9	16.5	-.9
Mobile Homes	763	167	1,356	131	1,927	317	152.6	89.8	77.7	-21.6	42.1	142.0
Percent Single-family to Total Stock	34.0	12.6	47.1	16.3	43.7	14.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total Occupied Units	646,156	218,103	770,468	224,687	859,701	217,622	33.0	-.2	19.2	3.0	11.6	-3.1
Owner Occupied	287,861	54,266	402,745	61,291	452,033	59,230	57.2	9.1	39.9	12.9	12.2	-3.4
Renter Occupied	358,295	163,837	367,723	163,396	407,668	158,392	13.8	-3.3	2.6	-.3	10.9	-3.1
Percent Owner Occupied	44.5	24.9	52.2	27.3	52.6	27.2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total Unoccupied Units	20,899	3,859	43,622	14,115	31,055	14,791	48.6	283.3	108.7	265.8	-28.8	4.8
Percent Unoccupied to Total Housing Stock	3.1	1.7	5.4	5.9	3.5	6.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
Percent Lacking Some or All Plumbing Facilities	9.8	13.6	5.8	11.5	3.4	6.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
Median Value Owner Occupied Units	$10,898	$ 9,640	$15,900	$13,500	$23,800	$19,600	118.8	107.2	46.2	42.7	49.7	45.2
Median Rent, Renter Occupied Units	$ 37	$ 35	$ 63	$ 60	$ 106	$ 98	186.5	180.0	70.3	71.4	68.3	63.3
Population Per Household	3.45	3.37	3.23	2.93	3.09	2.77	-10.7	-17.8	-6.6	-13.1	-4.3	-5.5

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1950, 1960 and 1970.

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Exhibit II-7

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1970



REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Exhibit II-8

City Boston, Massachusetts Census Year 1960 to 1970



REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

6. Housing Construction

During the 1960's, there was a net loss of 6,000 dwelling units, despite the construction of 20,000 new units. Of the new units, over 40 percent were subsidized, 1,300 under public housing, mostly for the elderly, and 7,000 FHA subsidized housing. Building permit data for Boston does not provide full citywide counts of completed units constructed. For 1972, building permits list 1,548 new housing units constructed, while BRA estimated 2,200 units were actually built. There were 760 units demolished for a net increase of 1,000 - 1,500 units.

For the six-year period starting in 1973, BRA estimates that 15,000 units for middle and upper income families are under construction, planned, or proposed. Over 50 percent of the non-subsidy housing is projected for the city core. Over the same six year period projections called for the construction of 12,500 subsidized units. Such a projection currently appears to be unrealistic due to the moratorium on subsidized housing. The possibility of a larger proportion of leased public housing could stimulate further private development.

Table II-10 DWELLING UNITS BUILT IN BOSTON

1960	360
1961	930
1962	1,480
1963	1,400
1964	2,260
1965	3,780
1966	2,040
1967	3,860
1968	2,260
1969	1,940
1970	2,050
1971	2,200
1972	2,200

Source: BRA Research Department.

The pace of construction during the 1970's so far has not been up to expectations. The development of rent control within Boston is an inhibiting factor. The present rent control procedures were passed by the ordinance of the City Council in December 1972 to remain in effect until April 1975. The law is administered by a Rent Board consist-

ing of five residents of the city appointed by the mayor. Maximum rent is defined by the law as the rent charged in December 1972. Maximum rents may be individually adjusted by order or regulation of the board to maintain a level that will yield landlords a "fair not operating income". Adjustment of maximum rent will be denied if the board determines that the unit is substandard. The rent control mechanism could become a means for bringing about housing improvement. However, such has not been its effect to date.

7. Property Taxes

The city of Boston has an extraordinarily high property tax rate which has served to spur the migration out of Boston of higher income residents, offices, and industries. The effect of the high tax rate on new construction is somewhat checked in the form of informal letters of agreement with developers to provide tax relief in return for new construction, or under the contract provisions of Chapter 121 A of the Massachusetts General Laws. Under the terms of this tax law, new commercial buildings may be assessed at 15 percent to 28 percent of gross revenues, which is considerable lower than the standard assessment. Office construction has thus provided a higher value to real property in the city, but has not contributed greatly to the city's tax burden. However, the provisions of the tax abatement provide a major tool to the city in negotiating with potential developers within renewal areas. Much of the new commercial construction within renewal projects has been stimulated by the tax letters. Recently, there has been an unsystematic procedure of rescinding tax letters for selected developers either as a means to raise taxes or as a political power move by the mayor's office to maintain developer support for the mayor's programs. There has been a note of protest from developers who now show a greater reluctance to make new financial committments in the city, when the political structure may demand special favors in return for positive governmental action.

Peculiar to Boston is the quantity of property exempt from taxation. Over half of the real property value in Boston is exempt as it is owned by educational, philanthropic, government, or religious organizations. The burden on the remainder of property hence becomes much greater than in the areas outside of Boston.

Not only is Boston renowned for its number of educational institutions and large student population, but it also ranks high in the quantity of hospitals and medical services. In fact, the Boston SMSA has the highest ratio of physicians per 1,000 population of any SMSA in the

country, almost double the median for the largest 20 SMSA's. The Boston SMSA has 3.21 physicians per 1,000 population, and the greatest proportion of them are in Boston.

The high ratio of medical and educational facilities provides support to Boston's image and helps maintain the desirability of many inner city areas. The South End Project houses the Boston University Medical Complex and Municipal Hospital, and these facilities add to the richness and diversity of the South End. However, their lack of contribution to the tax base contributes to the high tax rate.

B. Applicability of National Urban Trends to the Local Situation

Most large scale cities have been affected over the last twenty years by fundamental social trends that are national in scope. Examples are the recent decline of birth rates, the expansion of minority group populations within large cities, and rapid growth of the suburban population of metropolitan areas. Such trends can influence the disposition of land within renewal projects. These trends or factors are called "exogenous" because their nature, strength, and operation are determined by fundamental social conditions and forces over which federal and local urban renewal officials have little or no control. If land disposition plans are consistent with major on-going forces, that should help speed up land disposition.

An analysis of national trends or exogenous factors has been prepared external to this report. In that paper, a listing is made of major trends that impact the urban renewal process, particularly land disposition. A matrix has been prepared that shows the relative strength of the impact that these trends have on different types of projects. The matrices, with a comparison of the impact of the trends on projects nationally with those projects studied in Boston, is included in the analysis of delays in each of the four projects. A more detailed description of the exogenous factors may be found in Appendix I.

For purposes of this discussion, these factors are broken down into the following categories:

- Transportation Factors
- Housing Related Factors
- Population Composition
- Financial and Economic Factors
- Commercial and Industrial Factors
- Miscellaneous Factors

1. Transportation Factors

The Boston metropolitan area is marked by a number of transportation characteristics that have had a major impact upon the strength of the downtown area and disposition of land in the projects under study. These include:

- one of the best rapid transit systems in the country
- the earliest circumferential expressway of any major city (Route 128)
- Construction of major sections of a radial expressway system
- A rapid decline in rapid transit patronage, 1950-1965
- An increased number of automobiles in both Boston and the SMSA, a reflection of real income growth
- An international airport extremely accessible to the CBD
- A moratorium over the last four years on new highway construction
- A multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area that complicates regional transportation planning

The fact that Boston has one of the best rapid transit systems in the country has helped shore up the economy of the CBD. The CBD remains an area highly accessible to Boston's population. The ease of access from major Boston neighborhoods to the downtown retailing center has helped maintain the viability of that center. Whereas most downtown CBD's experienced a real decline in retail sales from 1958 to 1967, the Boston CBD managed to maintain overall sales at about the same level, although losing sales in furniture and home furnishings to suburban stores. However, even within Boston, the use of public transportation has experienced a significant decline. Between 1950 and 1965, the number of transit riders declined 20 percent at rush hours and 70 percent at off-peak hours. These figures reflect the increased use of automotive vehicles and the expansion of expressways. The development of the radial expressways had an ambiguous effect on the projects. On the one hand, it increased access by automobile to the downtown area. On the other, it encouraged the expansion of housing further from the central city. The former encouraged the expansion of office space in the central city, while increasing the suburban competition on higher income housing. The impact on retail trade was probably negative. New highway construction came to a halt in 1969 which provided added impetus to the middle income residential market in or near the downtown area. The marketabili y of luxury housing in the Downtown Waterfront and western half of the South End has strengthened during the last four years. Recent surveys of residents in the Prudential Center and the Charles River Park apartments reveal that approximately a third of the new residents had moved to the downtown area from the Boston suburbs, outside the boundaries of the city of Boston. Most of them were small, upper income households.

The early construction of the circumferential expressway (Route 128) provided a stimulus for a rapid reduction of industrial employment in the city of Boston, as industrial firms moved to locations adjacent to the expressway. Industrial employment in the city of Boston declined by about 50,000 from 1948 to 1973. Only one of the four projects in this study, the South End, had a significant amount of land slated for industrial use. The marketing of this land has been a failure. The only industrial land marketed provided parking space to existing industrial firms.

The proximity of the Logan airport to the CBD provides a support to hotel and recreational facilities in the downtown area. There is little effective hotel competition in the vicinity of the airport. The strong hotel market has been useful in the South Cove area, and a hotel is slated for the Waterfront Project.

2. Housing Related Factors

The Boston SMSA has expanded its population greatly in the last 20 years, but the expansion has been outside the city of Boston. In many suburban areas there are strong prejudices against apartment projects of any character and zoning regulations against apartment development. This has been particularly true of those communities where available land was vacant, and where predominant forms of residential development were single-family structures. Groups that argued that suburban communities had an obligation to build low income housing were frustrated in attempts to develop it. Zoning variances required passage at open town meetings. For example, a motion in the Natick Town Meeting to study the local need for low and moderate income housing was simply tabled. In 1969, the Massachusetts legislature passed Chapter 774, commonly referred to as the "anti-snob" zoning law. According to this law, zoning ordinances are treated like any other local requirements which hamper housing construction: all such local requirements must be modified or ignored if the housing supply is not consistent with local needs. The law was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in March 1973.

The zoning restrictions and difficulty of apartment development during the 1960's served to reduce the movement of minority and lower income families to suburban areas, and as discussed in Chapter II, most minority group families in the Boston SMSA live in the city of Boston. The rapid construction of single-family houses stimulated the movement of middle income families out of Boston particularly from areas like Washington Park and Roxbury where the influx of low income black families was most rapid.

During the last ten years, a majority of the subsidized housing has been built within the city of Boston. The development of subsidized housing in the Washington Park Project and the southern part of the South End Project reduced the marketability of land to middle and upper income families, while having a less pronounced effect in the South Cove and the Downtown Waterfront, where the market was influenced to a greater extent by the expanding office supply.

The unequal code enforcement and the related deterioration of housing in the Roxbury-South End area was associated with the red lining of the area by the banks and a lower demand for housing by middle income families, who moved elsewhere. The South End, which is densely built-up, has a shortage of parking facilities. Consequently, parking difficulties led to delays in development of subsidized units in the South End.

3. Population Composition

In terms of population, Boston is characterized over the last ten years by:

- A rapidly expanding minority population
- An increasingly segregated minority population
- An increase in real income
- A decrease in marriage rates
- A decrease in birth rate

Boston is fairly typical of other large cities in these respects, but the proportion of young singles is higher than almost any other city. The high proportion of young singles and childless couples results in a strong marketability of housing units to an affluent group that desires to live in or near the central city. Such a population has had a strong positive force on the disposition of land for unsubsidized residential development in both the Downtown Waterfront and the South End areas.

However, the increasingly segregated character of the population has resulted in a reduced marketability of land in the Washington Park Project, as middle income families have become increasingly reluctant to stay in the area. Residential segregation has led to an increase in the number of racially imbalanced schools. Over the last seven years, a moratorium has been placed on new school construction. Under the terms of the Racial Imbalance Law, school construction has been blocked until approval is obtained for an acceptable plan to reduce the racial imbalance. Many public school facilities in Boston are presently antiquated and inadequate. The poor image of the schools has contributed to the outflow of middle income families with school age children.

4. Financial and Economic Factors

Loose or tight monetary conditions have had a predictable effect on marketability of land in all the projects. In recent years, the availability of allocations for development of low and moderate income housing has been helped by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, which funds loans for such housing through the sale of tax-exempt notes and bonds to private developers. The fiscal squeeze on Boston's municipal government has slowed the use of the local share of funds for project improvements, notably for water and sewers. Such delays have had an impact on land disposition in the South Cove, South End, and Downtown Waterfront Projects. Disposition in Washington Park was not very much affected, as most disposition land went for subsidized housing.

5. Commercial and Industrial Factors

Most of the land for disposition within the four project areas was for residential, institutional, or office facilities. Very little land was planned for retail or industrial use. Hence, the declining retail dominance of the CBD had little effect on disposition of land in the four projects. The disposition of land designated for industrial use in the South End was a failure, partly due to failure to install planned roadways that are necessary amenities to an industrial firm. Office space planned for the Downtown Waterfront area was consistent with market forces, but disposition has been delayed by a host of factors discussed in detail in Chapter VIII.

6. Miscellaneous Factors

The city of Boston politically represents a very small part of its SMSA, and the fragmentation of government makes it particularly difficult for the city government to implement plans which must be coordinated with over 100 political jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. The political fragmentation in the Boston area is extreme, and such fragmentation has had major implications for regional planning, particularly with regard to transportation planning discussed above.

Boston depends heavily upon the property tax as the major source of its revenue. In 1969, 64.9 percent of total revenues came from property tax, 16 percent from state aid, and 20 percent from departmental fees and fines. Part of the state aid was funded from federal sources.

Of the total budget for the city of Boston, only half is under the control of the mayor. About one-third of the budget is for personnel salaries, 16 percent is for appropriations under the control of the major and City Council.

The remainder of the budget is outside the control of the mayor and used for schools (23 percent), state and county assessments for the MBTA and MDC (12 percent) and debt service (15 percent).

The small physical size of the city has made it difficult to raise funds for the municipal budget through the property tax, and the rise in municipal costs has resulted in the soaring tax rise discussed in Chapter II. The financial squeeze in Boston has been related to delays in investment of local share funds into projects, particularly the Downtown Waterfront Project.

Summary

The Boston SMSA is quite typical of large metropolitan areas in the ways in which it has been affected by fundamental and national social trends. It is distinct in the fragmentation of its governmental structures and difficulty of regional planning. It is characterized by one of the best rapid transit systems in the country, but one that has declined over the last 20 years. The airport that serves the city is unusually close to the CBD. Perhaps most distinctively Boston characteristic is an unusually large population of unmarried adults and childless couples. This population provides a strong demand for higher income housing in the inner city adjacent to the downtown, thus providing unusual strength to the CBD.

III. LOCAL FACTORS IMPACTING THE RENEWAL PROGRAM

A. Institutional Framework

The government of the city of Boston is based upon the concept of a "strong mayor", a chief executive officer with major direction of public services. The mayor and his administration are responsible for preparation of the annual budget, which is subject to approval by the City Council. The mayor is elected every four years.

The City Council is composed of nine councillors elected at large every two years. The Council has only a limited influence over the budgetary process of the city; its power is limited to approve or cut mayoral budgetary or appropriations requests. The political interaction between mayor and City Council is lively. The approval ofrequests for appropriations of local share Item II funds for renewal projects is pushed through City Council as part of a bargaining process in which councillors' positive vote may be obtained in return for positive action on a subject of the councillors' interests. The fact that the councillors are elected at large results in an unrepresentative distribution with regard to districts within the city.

The mayor has direct responsibility over the city departments. However, three major agencies are not under his direct control. These are the Boston Redevelopment Authority, which also provides the city with physical planning and relocation; the Boston Housing Authority; and the School Department, which is controlled by an elected (at large) school committee. The independent authority structure makes it difficult for a mayor to coordinate programs of the authorities with other agencies. For example, it becomes difficult to coordinate use of school facilities as a community resource. Similarly, the Boston Redevelopment Authority may plan for public housing without the knowledge of the Housing Authority. In addition, funds for the three agencies are not under the mayor's administrative control.

It is significant that the two authorities, the BHA and the BRA, are technically not a part of city government. The mayor appoints four of the five members of each authority for staggered five-year terms with one member appointed by the governor. Therefore, it takes a major three to four years to appoint a majority of the board.

In addition to the authorities, the state's Department of Public Works (DPW) has responsibility for construction of highways that will impact local areas. There has been a good deal of conflict between BRA and DPW over transpor-

TABLE III-1

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF BOSTON'S CITY GOVERNMENT



Source: Citizens Housing and Planning Association of Metropolitan Boston, Inc.

tation issues. Prior to the last five years, transportation planning, in general, pitted transportation engineers interested in metropolitan or state transportation requirements against the needs of local communities. The battles over transportation in Boston have been particularly intense.* The struggle against new highway construction led to the governor's moratorium in March 1970, the first one in the country designated by a governor. The diffusion and intensity of transportation planning has had a major impact on the disposition of land in the projects under study, particularly the South End.

There are as many as seventeen agencies in Boston that deal with housing and community development. The number of agencies that deal with some aspect of housing hinders program coordination. In addition, the complexity of the relationships between agencies and authorities inhibits housing development. The Home Rule Commission of the city of Boston issued a report in April of 1971 suggesting a reorganization and realignment of agencies concerned with housing. No action has been taken yet on the proposed structural changes. However, a change from categorical grants to revenue sharing would probably produce a change in the structure of the authorities, making them line agencies under the direct control of the mayor.

The sheer number of agencies concerned with housing development and maintenance has caused numerous delays in the production of housing in urban renewal projects. During the 1960-1967 era, the delays were overcome by the energy and leadership of the BRA staff combined with the strong priority assigned the BRA by Mayor Collins. However, in recent years, a number of delays have developed in such matters as:

- Approval of street closing by Public Improvement Commission
- Transfer of title of abandoned houses from the Real Property Division
- The granting of variances from the city building code.
- The approval of Fire Code provisions in rehabilitated houses
- Coordination of BRA inspection with Housing Inspection Department, inspections which have enforcement powers
- Historical review approvals by architectural commissions
- The assignment of Section 23 leased public housing in renewal areas by the BHA

* See Alan Lupo, F. Colcord, & E.P. Fowler, Rites of Way, Boston: Little, Brown Co. 1971. Melvin R. Levin and N.A. Abend, Bureaucrats in Collision, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1971.

- The Public Facilities Department coordination of public capital improvements

Outside of the mayor's control are two other agencies that affect the development and maintenance of housing. These are the local HUD area office, limited by federal funds and national housing policies, and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), an independent lending institution which was created by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to finance housing for persons with low, moderate, and middle incomes. MHFA makes loans for new construction and rehabilitation of housing developments in which at least 25 percent of the units are to be occupied by low income persons, as defined by the local housing authorities. The MHFA loans are financed through the sale of tax exempt notes to private investors, and are secured by both a pledge to mortgage and by a capital reserve fund. The MHFA was first funded in 1968 and is currently authorized to issue notes and bonds up to $1 billion. The MHFA also coordinates FHA loans for Section 236 subsidized housing.

Finally, in discussing the institutional framework in which Boston's city government operates, it may be noted that local revenue is dominated by the property tax to a greater extent than any other large metropolitan area in the United States. This is a result of distinct state laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which impose extreme limitations on local governments' fiscal powers. Local communities in Massachusetts are limited in their revenue powers to the property tax and user charges and fees for service. These charges must bear a direct relationship to the cost of the service, as any excess would be construed as a new local tax.

In consequence, local governments in the Boston area rely on the property tax for 65 percent of the local general revenues, compared to an average of 40 percent for the 72 largest SMSA's. In addition, revenues from state and federal governments constitute 24 percent of local revenues, compared to an average of 35 percent for the 72 largest SMSA's.*

* See Lloyd Rodwin, Project Director, The Boston Development Strategy, Volume I, Cambridge, Mass. Urban Systems Laboratory, M.I.T. 1972, p. 125.

B. The Renewal Agency

1. Background

From 1949 to 1957, urban renewal activities were carried on by the Boston Housing Authority. The Massachusetts General Law (Chapter 121) enabled the city to establish a redevelopment authority. In 1957, at the request of the mayor and City Council, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) was established.

The agency was first a small agency that obtained federal approval for the West End Project and the New York Streets Project and initiated planning for other projects including the Government Center. In 1960, Edward J. Logue was brought to Boston as development administrator and imposed a vision of a large-scale urban renewal program and a structure that would accomplish it. The mayor submitted to the Boston Redevelopment Authority a proposed reorganization of the authority staff. The new top post of development administrator was established, the City Planning Commission was abolished, and the BRA assumed its duties. The BRA was allowed to hire special employees outside the Civil Service System, and it recruited an extraordinary array of new employees. The BRA stimulated an amendment of the state redevelopment law to permit the borrowing of federal funds to acquire property during the planning of a project. Early land acquisition served to speed up execution of projects and to develop housing which could be used as a relocation resource.

The position of development administrator gave the mayor the power of hiring and firing the top administrator. He could also be removed by the five members of the authority. The functions of the authority were grouped into four divisions:

- Planning Division -- responsible for comprehensive planning in the city, transportation planning, and renewal project planning.

- Project Development Division -- responsible for processing to the loan and grant stage and further utilization of strong project directors to maintain federal relations during the project and coordinate relocation, rehabilitation, and overall project execution.

- Land Division -- responsible for appraisals, negotiations, tax agreements, and land disposition.

- Operations Division -- responsible for completion of projects in execution prior to 1960 and for title searches, closings, engineering, site improvements, and project accounting.

Also, the development administrator of the BRA became the head of the city's Office of Development and had the responsibility of integrating BRA's activities with other city department heads, community relations, housing expediter, and in addition, coordinating code enforcement in improvement areas.

During the period 1960 to 1967, the BRA grew rapidly until it employed over 600 persons. The organization was loosely structured with strong project directors who had direct access to the development administrator. Developers were pleased with the structure because the structure of decision-making was clear.

The BRA developed a high degree of professionalism. With access to federal funds, a high degree of technical skill, strong political support from the office of the mayor, a coalition of interest with business groups, and a dynamic and persuasive leader, the BRA became a power base that was able to implement its policies. This implementation was technically well done. From a point of view of valid planning and design, Boston's renewal program stands out as one of the foremost in the country. The many benefits of renewal seemed to assure a continuous role for a technocratic institution such as the BRA in overcoming the political inertia that is so characteristic of Boston.

However, the success of the BRA's action was a source of criticism and jealousy. Opposition to the BRA engendered the decline of its power and initiative. As community politics became a more dominant component of renewal planning, criticism of the agency, particularly over relocation issues, led to a loss of support for BRA projects within the Boston political structure. With the failure to obtain federal funding for the Central Business District Project, the financial community no longer remained a source of major support. Without the funds it needed for efficient execution of old projects or initiation of new ones, the function of the BRA within Boston was destined to change.

2. Reorganization and Staff Turnover

In 1967, Edward Logue left Boston and the new mayor became interested

in controlling the BRA. There was an internal reorganization, and the title of development administrator was changed to director. The director established a cabinet structure to assist in high-level decisions that affected the projects. Therefore, the project directors lost power and control over the major decisions that affected project execution. As a result tension developed between site offices and the central office over the designation of and negotiations with developers.

During the reorganization, the departments of residential and non-residential development were established. The department of residential development was further divided into a rehabilitation section, a new construction section, and a family relocation section. The department of non-residential development was subdivided into an industrial and institutional section and a business relocation section. Services to all project areas were centralized in an attempt to reduce duplication and provide more efficient services to project area residents. However, responsibilities became diffused within a large bureaucracy and initiatives to accelerate project execution were blunted. In partial consequence of the structural changes, a number of highly capable project directors resigned from the BRA, and the number of staff members in BRA started to decline.

Since 1968, there has been a rapid turnover of the chief administrative office and project directors, as may be seen in Table III-2. Since the beginning of 1968, the South End and Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Projects have each had five different project directors. Continuous changes in directorship have been associated with changes in decision-making structures which have caused a number of delays. In particular, there were delays in requesting additional funds and the BRA no longer had adequate funding to orderly execute the project plans. Changes in project staff also resulted in delays while new personnel learned the details of the projects. One of the major functions of the project director has been the coordination of project activities with community participation. The staff turnover has affected the relationship between the Project Area Committee and the BRA particularly in the South End and in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall projects. In addition, developers also complained that as soon as they had established a rapport with project directors a new project director would appear.

The board of the BRA is composed of five members, four of whom are appointed by the mayor; one by the governor. The authority members have five year terms which are non-concurrent. The board has final responsibility for approval of all land dispositions. In practice, the

Table III-2 CONTINUITY OF BRA CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR AND PROJECT DIRECTOR



Source: BRA

developer selected by the BRA director and his staff is generally approved by the board.

In recent years many of the most talented staff members recruited to the BRA during the period 1960-1966 have resigned. While many capable replacements have been found, the degree of professional spirit within the organization has declined. The change is consonant with the wishes of the mayor, who wants in the BRA not an agency which will develop controversial or imaginative programs, but an agency that will technically implement the programs that are assigned to it. The changed nature of the BRA staff is a reflection of its change in function within the Boston political scene.

3. Land Acquisition

Acquisition of urban renewal land in Boston is carried out by the acquisition officer, assisted by a small staff. The activities involved in the acquisition process can be briefly described as follows:

a. The acquisition officer is directed by the project director to make appraisals on specified parcels selected according to an approved urban renewal plan and schedule.

b. Two fee appraisers, under contract to the BRA, are instructed to make separate appraisals on the specified properties. The appraisals are made based on the fair market value of the land and according to standard appraisal procedures.

c. The appraisals are reviewed by the acquisition officer and his staff; a price is recommended and submitted to the BRA Board or designated official for approval. If the recommended price is more than $500,000, it must be approved by the BRA Board; under $500,000, the approval of the executive director is required. While HUD concurrence previously was required on every recommended acquisition piece, now the BRA sets the price, controlled by periodic HUD audits.

d. After a price has been established, fee negotiators approved by the BRA Board, are selected to call personally on the owner of the parcel and present the BRA offer. Generally, the BRA offers a reasonable price and few problems are involved in the acquisition of residential properties. Commercial properties are more difficult to acquire and it was estimated by the

acquisition officer that approximately 70 percent of all commercial properties have been taken by eminent domain.

4. Land Disposition

Disposition of urban renewal land in Boston is carried out by two qualified and competent disposition officers who deal with residential and non-residential properties. These officers are involved in negotiations after a tentatively designated developer has been selected, although in some instances the disposition officers are involved in advertising a parcel, preparation of a developer's kit, selection of a tentatively designated developer, and final design, development approval and negotiation of the sale.

Land disposition prices, i.e. re-use appraisals, are handled separately by a small disposition staff within the real estate department. A project director requests a re-use appraisal, and the appraisal is made, as close as possible to the time of actual disposition of the property. Therefore, the offering may be based on the original re-use appraisal, carried out at the time the urban renewal plan was drawn up, and the final price could be significantly higher. After a re-use appraisal is requested, the parcel is appraised, either by a BRA staff appraiser or by two independent fee appraisers under contract to the agency. The staff reviews the appraisals and submits a recommended price to the BRA Board for approval. The approved price is that submitted to HUD by the proclaimer procedure, if the disposition proceeds to be received from the parcel are equal to the originally projected amount. If the recommended disposition price is over $500,000, or if there had been a considerable difference between the two appraisals, then this concurrence would be required.

C. City's Relationship to the Federal Government

1. Nature and Funding of the Urban Renewal Program

The city's relationship to the Federal government has been dominated by the urban renewal program. Boston's strategy, clearly enunciated in the mayor's 1960 "The Million Dollar Development Program for Boston", was to obtain massive categorical funds for urban renewal, with the city's local share financed through non-cash neighborhood improvements such as schools.

The grantmanship of BRA provided Boston with the greatest number of per capita dollars of federal grants for urban renewal of any large city in the country. As may be seen in Table III-3, only two cities, New York and Philadelphia, received more absolute funding. Boston received $383 per capita of population for urban renewal as compared to $91 per capita for the other largest 16 cities in the country.

Table III-3 URBAN RENEWAL FUNDS

	City	Total Funds for Federal Urban Renewal	Per Capita Funding	Rank by Per Capita Funding
1.	New York	477	60	9
2.	Philadelphia	362	191	5
3.	Boston	235	383	1
4.	Chicago	232	68	8
5.	Baltimore	180	199	4
6.	San Francisco	165	235	2
7.	Washington, D.C.	165	206	3
8.	Detroit	161	107	6
9.	Los Angeles	75	27	10
10.	Cleveland	67	84	7

Source: Urban Renewal Directory, HUD.

Ranking of the ten cities that have received greater funding per Federal Urban Renewal.

Boston's extraordinary efforts to receive urban renewal funds paid off substantially in actual funds received. The urban renewal projects have very much changed the visual character particularly in the Government Center and Downtown Waterfront areas. Therefore, urban renewal has been the major single factor in creating a better downtown climate for investment in both commercial and residential development.

The 1960 proposed development program was for 10 GNRP's covering nearly one quarter of the land area of Boston. Seven major additional renewal projects grew out of these GNRP's and federally funded urban renewal projects encompassed 2,673 acres or over 8 percent of the city of Boston. So urban renewal in Boston has been massive, ambitious, and highly visible. The federally supported urban renewal overshadowed all other federally supported programs. As may be seen in Table III-4, 74 percent of all HUD funds for Boston were channeled through BRA.

Table III-4 AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPENDITURES HUD GRANTS TO BOSTON, 1968 - 1971

BRA Administered Federal Funds (1969-1971)	$23,513,000
Model Cities	6,108,000
Code Enforcement	884,000
Open Spaces and Beautification	425,000
Neighborhood Facilities	895,000
Total of HUD Grants	$31,825,000

Source: BRA Files.

2. Model Cities

Model cities funds for the four years 1968 - 1971 averaged $6.1 million. The model cities neighborhood is in Roxbury, completely surrounding but not including Washington Park. The area covered by the model cities neighborhood declined 22 percent from 63,000 in 1960 to 49,000 in 1970. Nineteen percent of the model neighborhood families had incomes below $3,000, an increase in proportion

of poor families from the 17 percent in 1960. The area has the lowest income profile in the city and a major portion of the city's worst housing. This area was once part of the Roxbury GNRP and was scheduled to have an extensive renewal program to be coordinated with the model cities plan. However, model cities funds have gone for the construction of family life centers, educational programs, a community development program, emergency rehabilitation, physical planning, and support of special services. The program was not intended to have a major impact upon the physical deterioration of the area and it has not. Physical deterioration has proceded virtually unchecked. About 900 units have been rehabilitated with emergency rehabilitation grants, about six percent of the housing stock, and about 400 units of subsidized housing have been built. Model cities funding has simply been insufficient to have held in check the forces of deterioration in Roxbury, and the city does not expect additional major allocations for model cities.

3. Concentrated Code Enforcement

There are four federally funded concentrated code enforcement areas located in the Dorchester and Jamaica Plan. Applications to HUD by the Department of Housing Inspection have been made for neighborhoods in Parker Hill, South Boston, Allston, and Brighton, but were not funded. These programs served a useful purpose in preventing the blight in Roxbury from spreading outward to Dorchester on the east and Jamaica Plain on the west. Rehabilitation in code enforcement areas has proceeded more smoothly than in renewal areas.

4. ABCD (Community Action Program)

When ABCD received OEO funds as the Boston Community Action Program (CAP) agency in 1965, there were high hopes that it could provide in the social sphere what BRA was providing in physical plans. The ABCD was entrusted with the social planning for both the Washington Park and the South End Projects. Community leaders in the area saw ABCD as the social planning agency. However, the program never received funding to live up to its expectations and much of its activity was lost in the local political entanglements of the two project areas. It played a role in helping to organize the neighborhood groups, but its program had little impact or relationship to the renewal programs.

5. Transportation

It is ironic that the Boston SMSA, that has one of the two or three best public transportation systems in the country and an extraordinary talented set of local planners, finds its current transportation planning locked into politics and squabbling and cannot achieve a comprehensive transportation plan. The city of Boston is crossed with great swathes of land cleared for highways that will never be built, cut with new tunnels for rapid transit that are not yet and may never be put to use, blighted with elevated transit lines that were planned for demolition 10 - 15 years ago, and crossed by a poorly designed Central Artery that creates a great barrier wall through the downtown. In 1948, a plan for a symmetrical development of expressways, including an Inner Belt was adopted. Many of the sections of the overall network had been constructed by the mid-1960's as the renewal plans for the four projects studied in this report were being approved. Acquisition by eminent domain and demolition were proceeding rapidly in 1965. The completion of the proposed transportation as outlined in the 1965/1975 General Plan for the City of Boston and the Regional Core, making use of $157 million in federal funds, was taken for granted by BRA in its renewal planning. The very boundaries of the South End Project were determined by planned but unbuilt highways, as were its re-use categories. High priorities in the plans were given to the relocation of transit lines in Charlestown, South Cove, the South End, Campus High, and Washington Park so that the existing elevated structures could be demolished. The Inner Belt required plans for alignment of project improvements in the South End and Fenway as well as expanded parking capacity in the Government Center, Waterfront, and South Station Projects.

A coalition of advocate planners and neighborhood associations brought sufficient political pressure to bear to stop the construction of the Inner Belt and a number of other highways. The governor's moratorium on the construction of highways and transit extensions appears to be justified; but in its wake, there are enormous consequences, including delays in execution of urban renewal projects.

During 1971 and 1972, the Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) made a three and a half million dollar study which provided a justification for the moratorium on construction of the Inner Beltway and two radial expressways. However, even while the study was in progress, some properties were acquired for these roadways. The BTPR made in-depth analyses of land use, travel demand and the economic impacts of alternative developments. The study was funded primarily by the state's

Department of Public Works with a contribution from the MBTA. The study included an analysis of the southwest corridor and the Central Artery. Boston, as the most over-studied city in the country, has now funded a restudy of the southwest corridor and the feasibility of depressing the Central Artery. The BTPR succeeded in burying the 1948 highway plan, but did not succeed in formulation of an alternate plan.

Today, the future of transportation planning is in doubt and the projects under study will experience additional delays as described in Chapters V-VIII. The problem is greatly aggravated by the unpredictability of mass transit funds from the federal government. The assumption is freely made that there will be a great deal of expansion of mass transit facilities, particularly along the southwest corridor, but detailed planning is currently enmeshed in political infighting and future federal support for transit is unpredictable.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL PLANNING AND RENEWAL STRATEGY

The local planning and renewal strategy in Boston has gone through a number of stages according to the characteristics of the redevelopment directors and staff, the impetus from the mayor's office, the nature and abundance of federal funds, and the shifting facets of community participation. For purposes of this discussion, we may break down the local strategy into four phases as they affect the projects under study: the piecemeal approach of 1955-1960; the super grantsmanship approach (1960-1967); the retrenchment (1967-1972); and facing revenue sharing (1972-1973).

The Beginnings (1955-1960)

The Boston Redevelopment Authority was created as a new agency in 1955, although its predecessor agency within the Boston Housing Authority had planned the redevelopment for the West End and New York Streets Projects. The BRA was oriented toward a few small total clearance projects rather than an attempt to revitalize large areas of the city. New York Streets, the first project, required the clearance of about six blocks of blighted housing to provide sites for industrial firms. It was a small project that did not succeed in its objective of encouraging industrial growth and the project had little impact on future planning. In contrast, the West End Project, which demolished 47 acres of housing adjacent to the downtown area, was representative of the bulldozer image of renewal. The 1950 General Plan for Boston called for clearance and redevelopment of 2,700 acres, and the 47 acres of the West End became the first major test. The West End Project is now evaluated as the classic example of how not to do urban renewal. The disruption and dislocations that affected the West End community brought a reputation to BRA as insensitive to the needs of a community. Due to antagoinism developed by the West End Project, all future planning by BRA in residential neighborhoods operated within two restraints: (1) No urban renewal plan would be approved without an overwhelming positive vote from the local community at a public hearing and (2) No more than 20 to 30 percent of the residences within a project area may be cleared, for it would be politically unacceptable.

The West End Project area was a low rent district. Plans for its redevelopment required the relocation of all residents (mostly low income) and the redevelopment of luxury high rise apartments by private developers. The plan was implemented with almost no planning and little thought for the area's residents.[1] In addition,

[1] See Herbert J. Gans, The Urban Villagers, Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1962, especially Part Four, "Epilogue: Redevelopment of the West End, An Evaluation of the Redevelopment Plan and Powers", pp. 281-335.

the redevelopment agency was unable to develop communication with the area residents. Buildings were taken en masse by eminent domain and landlords whose livelihoods depended on income were given no assurance as to when or how much they would be paid. Therefore, the most serious problem with the West End Project was the relocation plan, which was totally inadequate to the problems of the relocation of 2,700 households from the West End.[2]

The strategy for the West End Project was to remove a section of the slums and redevelop it for high income residents in order to increase the tax base and provide more higher income housing near the downtown area. It was unrelated to any other renewal project then planned. The New York Streets Project similarly demolished an area of blighted housing ostensibly to replace it with a piece of industrial land. It was during this period that the initial planning for the Washington Park Project took place--the city's planning board was reacting to pressure from residents in Roxbury. Local residents had been attempting to develop a renewal program for five years before the City Council voted to approve the application for survey and planning funds.

Also during this period, the Prudential Insurance Company proposed the construction of the Prudential Center. Here again, the impetus for a major project did not evolve out of a comprehensive strategy or BRA initiative. Instead, it may be seen as a response by BRA and other city and state agencies to a proposal from outside to develop one area.

For the four projects mentioned, there was no overall strategy for the city of Boston or a central direction for the redevelopment process. The political leadership saw urban renewal as a means of increasing the tax base and changing low rent buildings into high rent structures that would bring in additional municipal income. The days of citizen participation had not arrived; it was not required either by HUD guidelines or by local policy. Therefore, protests from residents of the West End were simply disregarded. Whereas the Housing Act of 1954 broadened urban renewal to include rehabilitation, only one of the four projects was oriented toward rehabilitation, and that project received its planning funds only at the very end of the period.

[2] Ibid., pp. 321-325.

The Super Grantsmanship Approach (1960-1967)

In 1959, Boston elected a new mayor who saw in the BRA the potential to get control of Boston's political apparatus and consolidate an approach to change the face of Boston. Early in 1960, he called in Edward Logue, the head of renewal in New Haven, as a consultant and later named him Development Administrator of the BRA. The Boston Planning Board was consolidated into the BRA and BRA was given extraordinary powers to hire outside the Civil Service System. Within a few months, the new administrator had conceptualized a strategy for using the renewal process on a wholesale basis which was to have two different focuses: (1) a major downtown development program for the Central Business District and areas adjacent to it, and (2) a neighborhood improvement program coordinating renewal strategy in six neighborhoods, the strategy focused on housing rehabilitation rather than on clearance. The GNRP's defined in "the 90 million Dollar Development Program for Boston" contained a quarter of the land area of Boston. As a result, the strategy that emerged probably had the most comprehensive basis of any renewal program in the country.

However, the overall strategy was frequently at odds with the means for implementation. The renewal strategy in Boston was limited by the antagonisms toward BRA that continued from the West End Project, and in compromises with the Boston political system described in Section III. Most particularly, the new strategy required the strong approval of citizens groups, and a major portion of the planning period was spent in negotiating with citizen's groups the contents of each project plan. The opposition to BRA was sufficiently intense that three of the ten original planning areas were dropped as renewal areas. Within the project areas, the renewal program emphasized the politics of the possible. The new strategy assumed that:

> A plan that had political support of residents of a neighborhood was by definition the right plan for that area and a sum of what the individual neighborhoods want is the proper plan for the city as a whole.[1]

Hence, in the planning of the individual projects, BRA was limited by what could achieve local approval. The goal of all citizen participation in planning was simply to gain the approval of the plan. There is frequently a conflict between what may be perceived by area residents as best for the area and the development of an economically sound plan. Hence, in the South End, a plan was achieved that received local support. But the plan was simply not feasible, insofar as it covered an area too big and complex. It greatly underestimated the costs of housing rehabilitation, and its estimates of project improvements were unrealistic. The process of engineering local consent was directly related to technical problems with the plan.

[1] Langley C. Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game: A Study in the Diversity of Neighborhoods p. 217.

Nevertheless, the planning during this period operated on the basis of a vision of a city as a whole affected by massive renewal projects. Edward Logue saw the difficulties inherent in the Washington Park Project, and saw it as only the first of a number of adjacent projects in Roxbury. For all the technical skill in the planning and execution of the Washington Park Project, the project had no long term viability in the absence of massive intervention in the surrounding Roxbury area. The overall strategy required future commitments to the area, that later proved to be unattainable.

The years 1960-1967 were marked by the establishment of nine federally funded urban renewal projects and several privately sponsored projects. The BRA had the full support of the mayor, who saw it as playing a major role in his political strategy; access to federal renewal allocations in abundance; a superbly qualified technical staff that numbered over 600 persons by 1967; and a set of clear tactics for community participation that had succesfully achieved neighborhood approval for project plans. After 1967, all four of these factors were to change.

The Retrenchment (1967-1972)

By 1967, when Mayor White was elected, there had developed increasing opposition to the BRA and its programs. The BRA during 1965-1967 had a more negative press, particularly in the struggle to get approval for the Charlestown plan. The days of citizen participation had arrived in both local practice and law. Criticism of relocation practices for both renewal projects and highway development was widely reported. Indeed, the BRA itself was a major issue in the 1967 mayoral elections. Edward Logue's campaign for mayor met with overwhelming defeat, and Mayor White came to office with the intention to downgrade the importance of BRA and to improve the delivery of city services.

The retrenchment at the local level was reinforced by a reduction of federal funds from Washington for renewal. The financial crunch of the war in Vietnam made it difficult to obtain new commitments for renewal. Beset with local pressures and reduced future funding, the power of the BRA declined and many of the most qualified staff moved elsewhere. The BRA's position as a stimulus for initiating new programs within the city came to an end. Mayor White wanted in the BRA an agency that was responsive to initiatives from the mayor's office. Increasingly in his appointments to head the BRA, the mayor had named persons whom he could trust to carry out his wishes. A strong or powerful BRA was inconsistent with the desire to provide central direction to the city's community development. Although the BRA still had some special powers and retained its offices on the top floor of City Hall, it no longer had as much clout in dealing

with other agencies and the City Council. During the first half of the five year period, City Council appropriated only limited funds previously authorized for the local share project improvements. The BRA board instituted money-saving measures reportedly questioning purchases of minor office supplies. The planning activity of the agency became oriented toward completion of the existing renewal projects and development of public improvements within non-renewal areas. When the "Little City Halls" were set up, the BRA was responsible for the district planning in coordination with community groups in eleven non-renewal districts. The mayor's office assigned a lower priority to existing renewal projects and district planning in outlying areas received increased attention. Agency staff was no longer devoted to large scale development; instead, it responded to initiatives outside the agency. The change in role of the BRA was not simply a shift in the capability of the men in the agency. It was a change forced on the BRA by both local constraints and federal policies that no longer gushed forth seemingly limitless funds. This change may be seen clearly in the pace of development of urban renewal projects. In the two years from March 1965, to March 1967, the following projects were given final federal approval: Charlestown, Fenway, North Harvard, South Cove and South End, five projects with a total of 1,737 acres. In addition, early land acquisition was approved for three other projects. No other projects, including those in which early land acquisition had commenced, were approved by the federal government over the next three years. During the same period, expected funding for housing rehabilitation with renewal areas failed to materialize, seriously impairing the rehabilitation projects already underway.

Facing Revenue Sharing (1971-1973)

The mayor's office and the BRA have been unusually alert to the prospects of a shift from federal categorical programs to Special Revenue Sharing. Local planning officials are concerned that such a shift would result in a greatly reduced flow of federal dollars into Boston. Practically all community development funds under revenue sharing for four years would be required to complete existing projects without allocating funds to other areas of the city. Given the mayor's interest in city-wide planning, such a use of funds is unlikely.

In consequence, there is a recently emerged sense of urgency emanating from the mayor's office to close out existing projects, so that those revenue sharing funds that come to Boston will not be devoted to the urban renewal projects. In addition, such funds would not be allocated to the newly developed large scale projects. Instead, small scale projects might be developed in scattered areas of the city in response to needs or initiatives coming from those areas. However, it is apparent that the bulk of funds would be spent on general public facilities and

would serve the main function of increasing the city's budget or holding down the tax rate.

There is much discussion in Boston of a "strategy for the seventies." A draft paper put out by the mayor and BRA director states:

> "Boston's development strategy for the 1970's is to marshall planning and policy, and the private sector role, to achieve large goals for the city and its people by reinforcing its expanding service activity oriented economy and fostering the revitalization of the city as a place to live. In contrast to the strategy of the 1960's, goals and programs for the 1970's are designed to take advantage of currents of strength to achieve gains in the quality of life in all of the city's neighborhoods while recognizing the important differences in the range of problems and potential."

The programs enumerated for the 1970's do not match up to the goals of the strategy. The new general plan is city-wide in scope, but in consequence is rather diffuse. It makes the attempt to be all things to all people while resting its implementation on developments within the private sector that are unrealistic.

The strategy for the seventies is broken down into the "Downtown Core Strategy" and the "Neighborhood Development Strategy". While the Downtown Core Strategy is problematic in terms of unrealistic goals, the Neighborhood Development Strategy may be questioned on the basis of commendable goals without the means of achievement.

Downtown Core Strategy

The basis of Downtown Core Strategy lies in the belief that there will be an explosion of office, retail, and residential demand in the downtown area. Among the assumptions made:

- Boston could absorb 14 million square feet of space over the next ten years, an expansion of almost 50 percent.
- Growth of retail sales will rise by 25 percent requiring an additional 2.5 million square feet of net new retail space.
- Tourists and visitors to Boston are projected to increase from 2.4 million in 1967 to 6.4 million in 1975-1976 reducing modestly after the Bicentennial anniversary of the revolution.

- An increase of 4,000 manufacturing jobs over the next ten years after a decline of 20,000 jobs over the last ten years.

The assumptions made have a questionable validity. While Boston's office space has expanded greatly in the last five years, the office market is currently soft with a moderate increase in vacancies during the last two years. Developer plans for new office construction have been cut back. In one case, a plan for a 40-floor office building has been scaled down to 24 floors. Developer confidence in the office expansion is not nearly so great as expressed by the mayor's paper. Similarly, the expansion of retail space will not be as great as the goal. While there will probably be some increase in retail sales, the space allocated to sales may in fact diminish slightly. Rising land values in the downtown area will result in the closing of marginal retail operations and continued loss of certain types of sales to the suburban shopping centers, while internal markets of the increased number of downtown residents should compensate. The desired increase in manufacturing jobs is not likely to be achieved.

The basis of the downtown strategy is an increased role of the private sector. Toward this end, the mayor's office and the BRA have devoted great effort toward the development of Park Plaza and an additional Central Business District Project led by a private foreign developer. The Park Plaza Project has a great deal of local and state opposition.

It is ironic that while the city is promoting a strategy that specifies greater private sector involvement, private developers are losing confidence in future developments in downtown Boston. Several developers interviewed expressed strong reservations in future development because of the difficulty of rationally dealing with the Boston political structures. The increased loss of confidence by major developers will have to become recognized and dealt with in the implementation of the downtown strategy.

Neighborhood Development Strategy

The priority of strategy toward the residential neighborhoods is housing repair and rehabilitation. It is estimated that approximately one-fourth of the housing units need some form of repair or rehabilitation in order to bring the entire housing stock up to par, and half of these require some form of public loan and grant assistance. A special Community Development Revenue Sharing Program has been designed that identifies priorities for viable neighborhoods that are in danger of decline, requiring $140 million funds over a four-year period. Such a program would be designed to provide major funds to middle class neighborhoods in order to stem the flow of middle class families from the city. Whether

the limited revenue sharing funds would be spent in such a fashion is unclear, given the political complexities of Boston's neighborhood politics. A competing plan for a capital outlay for new schools, libraries, park improvements and community facilities would spread funds throughout the non-renewal neighbor hoods. The inner city neighborhoods that had priority in the 1960's are now on the bottom of the priorities list. Strategy for these neighborhoods centers on housing fix-up "constrained by available funding".

The quenstionable future of code enforcement and rehabilitation loans and grants makes uncertain the availability of programs to carry out the objectives. State legislation for mortgage insurance for rehabilitation loans would provide a limited mechanism.

In September 1973, the city announced "The Mayor's Housing Improvement Program". This program specified that selected home improvements could be made with no increase in assessment. In addition, if the repair work corrects a code violation, the owner can receive a tax credit of 10 percent of the home improvements up to $3,000 of repairs per unit. T receive the credit, a homeowner must obtain a work write-up through inspections by the mayor's housing improvement program staff.

These presently available programs for neighborhood conservation are not sufficient to meed the needs. The BRA planners working with neighborhood groups have little to offer in actual programs.* There is a hollowness to the rhetoric of the present neighborhood development strategy. The stated strategy is more an enunciation of goals than an approach to achieve those goals.

Summary

Over the last 10 years, the BRA has changed from a powerful agency, operating with extraordinary powers and funding to initiate and develop a comprehensive renewal program, to a city agency brought under the control of a mayor who sees the BRA as a technical instrument to carry out specific projects. The initiatives no longer lie in the BRA, but have moved to the mayor's office. The BRA, as described by the mayor's assistants, is now "just another agency" which must fit into the political realities of Boston. As such, it responds to initiatives and pressures from without and no longer has assigned to it the development of the overall strategy of Boston's community development.

* James C. Breagy, "Boston, Leader in the Use of Categorical Aids for Urban Renewal, is Searching for Organizational Structure to Maintain the Pace Under Community Development," Journal of Housing, Volume 30, Number 7, July, 1973.

V. SOUTH END PROJECT

A. Summary of Project

The South End Project is a mixed use project designed to rehabilitate and strengthen a once fashionable in-town neighborhood. It is a large (616 acre) project only a mile from the Central Business District. The project area has concentrations of extremely low income persons; high income professionals who have rehabilitated the South End townhouse; large hospitals and medical facilities; and scattered industrial and commercial activity in the eastern third of the project.

The project boundaries were determined by a planned freeway network that was never built, and included institutional areas in order to get non-cash local credits for planned expansion of the medical facilities. It is classified as an institutional project, even though its major purpose was enhancement of the residential area and the area is predominantly residential in character. The plan called for demolition of about 20 percent of 26,000 dwelling units.

The latest approved project budget is $92 million, with $60.7 million from the federal grant. However, it will require at least $30 million to complete the project in a manner described in the original plan. The BRA is currently negotiating a greatly reduced scope of the plan which would require an additional $15 million in federal grant.

TABLE V-1: Statistical Summary of Urban Renewal Project City of Boston, Mass.

1. Project Number: Boston R-56

2. Project Name: South End Project

3. Management Type: NDP _____ Conventional X

4. HUD Project Classification (I-XII): VII - Colleges, University, Hospital

   Project area predominantly residential, but classed as an institutional project in order to obtain Section 112 credits for hospital construction.

5. Distance from CBD: 1 mile

6. Project Size: 616 acres

7. Renewal Mode: predominantly rehabilitation

8. Total Dwelling Units in

Original Area:	20,500
-To be cleared	4,500
-To be rehabilitated	12,000
-To be retained without treatment	4,000
-Treatment not determined	0

9. Latest Revised Federal Grant: $60.7 million
   Grant Basis: 2/3 Federal, 1/3 Local

10. Local Non-Cash Grant in Aid: $31 million

boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

South End Project

Illustrative Site Plan

0 500 1000 2000

Key

RESIDENTIAL

COMMERCIAL

OPEN SPACE

INSTITUTIONAL

INDUSTRIAL

boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

South End Project

Land Use Plan

0 500 1000


Expwy
Castle Square
Arts Center
Industrial
Community Center
MBTA
Residential
Hospital Complex
Railroad
Lower Roxbury
Industrial
boston
massachusetts
Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study
South End Project
Functional Pattern
0
500
1000
2000

Table V-2

PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS
SOUTH END PROJECT

Gross Project Size	616 Acres
(-) Streets/Public Rights-of-Way	213
Net Project Area	403 Acres

	Initial Land Use		1966 Proposed		1966 Proposed Acquisition		Current Disposition Plan*	
	Acres	% of Net Project Area	Acres	% of Net Project Area	Acres	% of Initial Land Use	Acres	% of Total
Residential Total	238	59	259	64	91	38	61	46
Public	14	3	17	4			3	2
Private	222	56	242	60	91	38	58	44
	164	41	151	37	64	39	71*	54
Commercial	64	16	47	12	31	48		
Industrial	57		74	18	16	28		
Institutional/Open Space	43	10	30	7	17	40		
Other			16	4				
Streets and Public R-O-W	213		188		31	14		
Project Total	616		616		186	30	132	

*Current proposed disposition plan, yet to be approved by HUD, City Council, or Project Area Committee, cutting back acquisition plan.

Source: BRA Records.

B. Project Area Dynamics

The South End Urban Renewal Project is a large (616 acre) project that lies between the Central Business District to the north and the Roxbury ghetto to the south. It is no way a coherent community or area, but may be broken into three areas. The western two--thirds of the project area, north of Lower Roxbury, is the traditional South End--an area that has considerable architectural unity but a diversity of ethnic groups. The typical South End row house is a four story brick or masonry bow front, constructed between 1825 and 1875 and laid out in townhouse fashion. The land on which these houses were built is low lying and was once marsh land. The poor soil conditions have led to settling of structures, which has resulted in greater difficulties and expense for rehabilitation. Interspersed throughout the area are a number of tenements. The eastern third of the project area is characterized by institutional and industrial use. A major shoe manufacturer is in the southeast corner. North of the shoe factory are a number of medical facilities: the Boston City Hospital and Boston University Medical Center. Within the eastern segment are a number of small industrial plants, the MBTA yards, and the area along the Southeast Expressway that has now become the new flower market. The third area is Lower Roxbury, the area below Massachusetts Avenue and above the Campus High Project to the south. This area had some vacant land a number of buildings that were deteriorated or abandoned. Massachusetts Avenue serves as a barrier between the Old South End and Lower Roxbury. It has an active night life, populated by prostitutes and night people.

The Old South End had an architectural integrity that provided a positive potential for the development of an attractive residential neighborhood. The upper part of the project, within walking distance of the downtown area, was beginning to become desirable to middle class professionals who, by 1960, were starting to buy row houses and rehabilitate them. Given the dynamics of increased office employment in the Central Business District and the development of the Prudential Center immediately to the west, a new market appeal was developing in the South End, even in the absence of urban renewal. However, some form of renewal was required. The housing stock was deteriorating rapidly, the area was red-lined by the banks, and demolition of abandoned houses was proceeding at an alarming rate. Also, the water and sewage system in the area was archaic. Overloading of that system from the Prudential Center meant basement flooding for many residents. Street lighting was inadequate. Many buildings needed substantial repair and it was doubtful if local residents would or could rehabilitate the houses up to a desired standard.

Population

The South End's population reflected an inner city area that had experienced waves of migration. By 1870, the basic housing stock of the area was developed. The area was a substantial and prosperous area of good single-family homes. Between 1875 and 1900, a large number of these homes were turned into lodging houses. The immediate impetus appears to be the panic of 1873. Columbus Avenue was developed for housing in 1870-1872. The houses were not as attractive and were built on mortgages, and most of them were repossessed by the banks during the panic. They were sold at a tremendously reduced value and real estate in the area plummeted. Banks were reluctant to invest in the area and the houses started changing to lodging houses.

With the lodging houses came the immigrants. Between 1873 and 1900 came the Irish, who were followed by other groups. There is today a Syrian enclave within the South End. The first black families moved into the area during the 1920's, and were followed by a larger number during World War II. By 1950, the Negro population of 18,000 comprised almost a third of the South End population. During the 1950's and 1960's a substantial Puerto Rican population moved into the center of the area, and a number of Chinese families resided in the northern project area. The lodging house population was dominated by elderly persons of Irish background.

As may be seen in Table VI-3, the population declined rapidly after 1950. The population of 57,000 in 1960 was down to 23,000 by 1970, less than half of the earlier population. The racial distribution has remained relatively stable since 1960, but there have been major population shifts. The black population declined from 14,300 in 1960 to 8,970 in 1970, a decline of 37 percent. Today, the population is about 45 percent white, 40 percent black, and 15 percent other. Within the white population, the number of higher income professionals has increased, while there has been a decline in the "urban villagers" and in the number of elderly poor. The median family income rose 66 percent from 1960 to 1970 from $3,650 to $6,050, reflecting the influx of middle class residents and the outward movement of poorer households.

In 1963, there were 923 licensed lodging houses and about 500 unlicensed ones containing over 15,000 residents. For these residents, the South End was a low rent area. These tenants comprised many ethnic groups and a large proportion of elderly were threatened by either renewal or its absence. The market dynamics of the area were working toward the elimination of the low rent lodging house, renewal or not. Many of the lodging houses were badly deteriorated and the low incomes of the tenants made it difficult for any major repairs to be made consistent with the existing tenancy. By the time that the Loan and Grant approvals had been made,

SOUTH END PROJECT
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

	1950	1960	1970	% Change 1950-1960	% Change 1960-1970	Proportion of Boston	Proportio SMSA
Total Population in South End	57,000	35,000	22,700	(-) 40%	(-) 35%		
Negro Population	17,700	14,300	8,970	(-) 19%	(-) 37%	4%	
% Negro Population	31%	41%	40%	+32%		8%	
Population Over 65		5,880	3,300		(-) 44%		
% Over 65		16.8%	14.7%				
Median Family Income		$3,650	$6,050		66%	9,100	11,400
% of Families Under $3,000		41%	20%				
% of Families Over $10,000		4%	25%				

Source: BRA Research Department.

rehabilitation of the South End row house for occupancy by low income families was feasible only when there was some form of rent subsidy. The plan itself did not spell out what subsidy funds would be available for rehabilitation. The Boston Rehabilitation Program experiment in 221d(3) rehabilitation in Roxbury was about to get underway. The BRA had estimated that residential rehabilitation would require about $3,000 per unit for the South End House, whereas actual construction costs under the 221d(3) program in 1967 and 1968 came to $10,000 to $13,700 per unit. In understanding the political dynamics of the project as a whole, it is necessary to keep in mind that the project had two goals that were in direct contradiction: (a) rehabilitation of existing housing, and (b) the opportunity for existing low income families to remain in the area if they chose. The incompatibility of these two goals led to political fights which delayed the non-rehabilitation aspects of the project.

Neighborhood Groups

The South End is a neighborhood whose political complexity lies partly in the sheer diversity of people living there. The most relevant groups for the Urban Renewal plan are:

1. The lodging house tenants, about 15,000 persons in 1965, the major proportion of whom are poor and elderly of both races. This group played a small role in the politics of the renewal program.
2. The lodging house owners, about 1,000, of whom half were resident owners. They were concerned with difficulties of bringing their structures up to a desired standard while maintaining the lodging houses.
3. The "urban villagers" consisting of a number of blue collar ethnic enclaves: Italian, Syrian, Negro, Chinese.
4. The rural newcomers, poor arrivals from the rural South or Puerto Rico, who were too alienated to become involved in the planning stage, but who would suffer most during the execution stage, insofar as they were concentrated in the demolition areas.
5. The urbanites - middle class professionals who were rehabilitating row houses for single-family use or high income tenants. This group was to conflict in every stage of the project with those who were promoting the interests of the lower income residents.
6. The problem people - prostitutes and skid row, whose presence affected the project area, but who were not directly involved in the plan.

In terms of the politics of community participation, the major conflict developed between the urbanites (the middle class professionals) and representatives of the poorer residents, particularly the rural newcomers and lodging house tenants. The poorer residents would effectively be removed from the area by a project that was

founded on the development of a higher income intown neighborhood. In addition, the development of a high income area would increase the tax rate and the marketability of the land. Consequently, there was to be a constant battle between 1963 and the present between an approach to improve the area as a "beautiful" neighborhood and an approach to housing the poorer residents in standard housing at rents that they could afford. The battle ended in a stream of compromises that satisfied neither side, with the BRA acting the role of an arbitrator between the competing groups. Although there were two major camps on this issue, within each camp there were a number of factions vying for control.

Land Use: Relationship to Previous Pattern

The planned land use corresponds closely to the previous pattern. The elimination of incompatibilities--such as the industrial facilities between Tremont and Shawmut along Brookline, Canton and Dedham Streets, which are surrounded by housing--are called for in the plan. The expansion needs of the two hospitals are recognized in the plan. Opportunities for the expansion of existing industrial facilities and the introduction of new industries also has been accommodated in the plan. Some new housing is to be built within the residential areas. However, a substantial amount of existing housing remains for rehabilitation.

The original land use pattern lays out well. The industrial facilities are practically located along the eastern boundary adjacent to the Fitzgerald Expressway and at the southwest corner along the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad tracks. Two existing medical institutions, Boston City Cospital and Boston University Hospital are bounded on both the north and south by the industrial areas. Boston City Hospital was constructed in the 1861-1864 period preceding any substantial industrial development, except waterfront activities interspersed with schools and other community facilities. Retailing generally has followed the alignment of the major northeast-southwest arterials traversing through the South End.

Relationship to Surroundings

The distribution of uses relates well to uses abutting the South End. Across the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad to the northwest, exists housing similar in character to the South End's at this location. The housing south of Massachusetts Avenue continued southwestward beyond the project's boundary. To the east and southeast industrial uses and the Fitzgerald Expressway occupied the land. The northern edge of the project joined with the South Cove--an area in which residential uses make a transition to downtown uses.

The physical structure of the South End, in terms of topography, street patterns or other man-made or natural features, does not allow specific neighborhoods to be easily defined. Apparently neighborhoods can be defined through ethnic and social

affinities. The only physical division seems to be Massachusetts Avenue which is looked upon as a logical separation between Lower Roxbury and the remainder of the South End. However, the characteristic of the housing fronting on Massachusetts Avenue tends to tie the two sides of the avenue together with only the volume of traffic being the actual impediment to connecting the two sides together.

The use of the term "neighborhood" pervades conversation and literature about renewal planning within the South End. Perhaps the failure to actually define a "neighborhood", and the array of facilities necessary--or desirable--to make the entity complete contributed to causing the delays experienced in both the planning and execution of the project.

For several decades planning theory has defined a neighborhood as a place of residence for approximately 5,000 persons. Within the neighborhood would be found an elementary school and a playground. Possibly a few commercial enterprises could be supported, and some neighborhoods could contain facilities for social activities, health care and additional recreation.

Using 25,000 as the population of the South End, five "neighborhoods" might be appropriate, not 16 or so. A plan might have been devised structuring the South End into "neighborhoods" following criteria as to desired socio-economic mixes, public facilities, street patterns, etc. A "super-structure" could then be devised setting forth commercial areas, sites for junior high and high schools and other elements appropriate to the scale of the total South End (or the South End might be divided into two communities of three or so neighborhoods each.)

Transportation

Directly affecting the South End are several highways, existing and proposed. First, the Massachusetts Turnpike which by the time of the planning of the South End roject was in the process of being built on the north edge, the John Fitzgerald Expressway had been built along the east edge, and the proposed Inner Belt linking into the Fitzgerald Expressway was aligned along the south and a portion of the east side. As a means to divert some amount of through traffic from the South End's major arterials, South End Bypass arterial street was proposed to tie the Inner Belt and the Southwest Expressway into downtown Boston's streets. The alignment of this proposed South End Bypass followed the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad tracks along the northwest border of the South End.

With the deletion of the Inner Belt freeway and the South End Bypass, the plan's hope to reduce the amount of through traffic, particularly truck traffic, cannot be fulfilled. The several arterials disecting the South End are vital roads linking many

sections of the metropolitan area to central Boston. The road improvements proposed to channel traffic penetrating the South End in a northwest-southeast direction appear to be well founded. They attempt to reduce the amount of through traffic traversing other streets of the area.

The construction of a surface boulevard following the alignment of the proposed Inner Belt freeway may aid in reducing the amount of through traffic and help achieve some of the original goals set forth in the urban renewal plan. This surface boulevard will enhance the industrial properties adjacent to it as well as provide necessary regional access to the two major hospital complexes.

For almost two centuries the South End has served as a transportation corridor into central Boston. The desire to remove or reduce the amount of through traffic requires significant alteration of historic patterns. The designation of a huge area for the urban renewal project sets the stage for dealing with the through traffic "problem" on a large scale. However, such a large scale requires the integration of major highway and transit building programs--both of which are beyond the direct control of BRA and subject to many other pressures.

Open Space and Amenities

Previously in the South End a minimal amount of open space existed. The plan proposes many parks and playgrounds primarily to be developed in conjunction with the new schools. In addition to these major recreational facilities, smaller parks and open spaces have been provided throughout the South End area. New street lights and other street furniture elements have been added in order to improve the physical appearance.

The Surrounding Area

The South End is separated from the Central Business District on the north by the South Cove Urban Renewal Project, which provides ready through access into the downtown area for pedestrians or cars. To the northwest lie the Prudential Center & the Hancock Building, while to the west lies the Fenway Project with its parks, universities, museums, and Christian Science Church complex. To the southwest is the Campus High Project designed to develop a city-wide campus type high school complex. Although construction started on the school in 1971, the construction schedule has been delayed by the requirements of the Racial Imbalance Law. Between the Campus High Project and the South End, land has been cleared for the Inner Belt, but it is subject to the moratorium on highway construction. There are no alternative plans for the use of this land, which stands desolately vacant. The land has been acquired by the state and never belonged to BRA, although its vacant

status affects two projects. There is speculation that a boulevard or parkway will be built through the strip. To the southeast of the South End lies Roxbury-North Dorchester, separated by the vacant highway land and insulated by the shoe manufacturer in the southeast corner of the project.

The events occurring around the South End neighborhood provide major sources of recent employment growth, particularly in the Prudential Center, Hancock Building, and South Cove Area, as well as providing market impetus to a rapid rise in property values in the South End. The market forces surrounding the South End make the area atypical of renewal projects in blighted areas. Economic forces in that sector of the city are operating strongly for the revitalization of the South End. At the outset of renewal, the South End was going to draw an increasing number of middle income professionals, even in the absence of urban renewal. The politics of renewal revolved around the issue of the poor and their desire to remain in the area as it became more desirable.

C. Project Chronology

1. The Pre-Planning Phase

There was no urban renewal planning for the South End before Edward Logue came to Boston. In 1960, Mayor John F. Collins brought Logue to Boston as a consultant. By September 24, 1960, Edward Logue became development administrator and Logue and Collins issued the "$90 million Development Program for Boston". The report emphasized the widespread growth of blight throughout the residential neighborhoods of Boston. The key to the development program was the rehabilitation of Boston's graying neighborhoods. One of these areas was the South End. The South End was described as a neighborhood needing a major renewal effort and substantial clearance to cut away the slums. Therefore, the focus of the program for the South End was rehabilitation on a very large scale. In 1960, there was little organization or leadership in the South End nor was there any local pressure for a renewal project prior to the preparation of the $90 million development program.

Before Collins and Logue teamed up in Boston, there was a proposed project called Castle Square, a small area in the northern part of the South End. Castle Square became incorporated in the South End Project and planning for its redevelopment proceded on that basis. The incorporation of the Castle Square Project into the larger project was consistent with the new strategy within the BRA for renewal on a massive scale. The preliminary planning for Castle Square enabled the BRA to acquire it under early land acquisitions in December 1962, over three years before the main project was funded. The subsidized housing developed in this area was helpful to the relocation staff.

2. The Planning Phase

Three months after the 1960 draft of the development program, a Survey and Planning application was submitted to HUD and the application (November 1960) was put together with no community input. Shortly thereafter, in January 1961, representatives of the South End Planning Council (SEPC) and the United South End Settlements (USES) held a meeting to set up an urban renewal committee. By mid-summer, a committee was formed with leaders drawn from the professional community, business and institutional leaders, and higher income residents. This committee and the BRA project team met throughout the fall of 1961, and started holding meetings with neighborhood associations. Although the meetings

Table V-4

South End Project - Chronology

PLANNING	1960	
	November	• Application for Survey and Planning Advance
		• South End House combines with four other settlements (United South End Settlements)
	1961	
	January	• South End Planning Council holds meeting to discuss urban renewal
	Summer	• South End Urban Renewal Committee founded
		• Russell Traunstein, BRA Project Director
	1962	
	June	• HUD APPROVAL OF SURVEY AND PLANNING
	October	• "Green strip" sketch plan developed
	December	• "Green strip" plan handed to the Urban Renewal Committee
	December	• Early Acquisition commences
	1963	
	Summer	• "Green strip" plan withdrawn
	May	• Dick Green, BRA Project Director
		• Green makes 16 neighborhood associations the basis of neighborhood planning
	1964	
		• "The South End Concept" emerges
	September	• South End plan developed
	1965	
		• URC approves plan
		• ABCD funded for Community Action Program (CAP)
	June	• City Council approves plan
	November	• Application of Loan and Grant Part I
	September	• HUD APPROVAL OF LOAN AND GRANT PART I

South End Project - Chronology (continued)

PLANNING (continued)	1966	
	June	• Application for Loan and Grant Part II
	August	• HUD APPROVAL OF LOAN AND GRANT PART II
EXECUTION	1967	
		• Thaddeus Tercyak, BRA Project Director
		• Edward Logue leaves BRA
		• HUD approves Amendatory Budget increase of $2 million
	1968	
		• Walter Smart, BRA Project Director
	April	• Citizen groups bars Mayor White from BRA Site Office
	May	• BRA calls halt to demolition in moratorium
	1969	
	May	• Tent City, controversy over relocation
		• First major Project Improvements Contract
		• Robert Walsh, Project Director
	July	• First City held elections for SEPAC in bitter election; validity challenged by People's Urban Renewal Committee
	December	• ETC designated developer of South End center area
	1970	
	October	• Boston Arts Center designated developer of old flower market area
	1971	
		• James Derba, BRA Project Director

South End Project - Chronology (continued)

EXECUTION (continued)	1972	
		• HUD approves Amendatory Budget increase of $27 million. First approved increase since 1967. (two previous applications not approved)
	1973	
		• Matthew Curry, Project Director
	June	• Amendatory Budget increase of $2,116,638

Source: BRA Records and Interviews.

were heavily slanted toward home owners, issues were raised such as should planning be for present residents or focus upon encouraging movement of higher income people into the project area. These community meetings continued until the fall of 1962, when an urban designer from BRA was assigned the task of preparing sketch plans for the renewal area. The planner had not participated in any of the meetings between BRA, the Urban Renewal Committee and the neighborhood associations and many of the issues raised at these meetings were not dealt with in the plan. The proposal was oriented around a "green strip" that would run the length of the South End and provide a spine for a cluster of community and commercial facilities. The northern part of the project area was to be rehabilitated primarily for use by higher income residents while the lower part of the project, lower Roxbury, was to have a concentration of 2,500 units of subsidized housing. Reaction to the sketch plan among the neighborhood associations has been described as loud and violent.

During the winter and spring of 1963, a number of meetings were held on the "green strip" sketch plan and the plan was modified a number of times before being withdrawn in early summer, at which time a new project director was named. The new project director recognized the complexity of the South End and attempted real, substantive negotiations for individual neighborhoods over the content of the plan, rather than develop a planner's plan and steamroll it onto the neighborhood. A large number of meetings were arranged with 16 neighborhood associations. The associations themselves gained strength as bargaining agents in the renewal process. During the early planning period, the Urban Renewal Committee had been dominated by businessmen and professionals, now the neighborhood associations began to play a greater role. Additional delegates from the neighborhood associations were taken onto the Urban Renewal Committee and by 1965, 63 percent of the delegates were representatives of the neighborhood. During this time, there were major changes occurring within the South End. The red-lining by the banks came to an abrupt halt and property values started to increase in value. Private real estate firms began investing in the area. One such firm acquired over 60 properties and attempted to get BRA support for its rehabilitation efforts. The units were for high income tenants. BRA and its project director decided not to deal directly with this firm and insisted that the firm get approval from the neighborhood committee. BRA was not willing to promote extensive rehabilitation with private money as it would jeopardize its relationship with the neighborhood associations. BRA made a clear choice that was to have extensive consequences for the project. Renewal in the South End would not be an exercise in turning over the area to higher income residents, but existing residents would have a significant place in planning and developing the South End.

By 1964, a second South End plan emerged. The new concept called for a residential sector in the western two-thirds of the project and an institutional sector along the eastern tier. The plan was submitted to the Urban Renewal Committee in September 1964. After several months of meetings and negotiation, the committee provided a general endorsement and affirmation that the plan reflected what the neighborhoods had requested. The plan was taken to the neighborhoods and local churches. Finally, a public hearing on the plan was held in August 1965. The application of the Loan and Grant, Part 1 followed in November 1965, and within eight months HUD had approved the Loan and Grant, Part 2.

The details of the plan within each area were hammered out in direct negotiation with neighborhood groups or block associations that were set up to represent each neighborhood. Each organization that bargained during the planning period controlled its own turf. The BRA genuinely attempted to accommodate the demands of the individual neighborhoods. The final plan was:

> "A series of neighborhood designs soldered together into a proposal for the area as a whole. Concern for design criteria or over-all concept went by the boards in the drive to gain the approval of the individual organizations."[1]

3. The Execution Phase

In August 1966, HUD approved the Loan and Grant and the project went into execution. The BRA named as its new project director the individual who had so masterfully orchestrated the early years of the Washington Park project. However, almost immediately the project bogged down in a series of delays which were to plague it thereafter.

It was the general policy of BRA not to acquire complete parcels until a developer was selected for the re-use parcel. But the designation of developers in the South End was extraordinarily difficult, not because there was lack of interest in the land, but because of the number of groups competing for developer status. From the start, the BRA maintained the informal requirement that the neighborhood groups, who were spokesman for particular areas, had to approve the selection of a developer. But the community politics were so extraordinarily complex that the project lost

[1] Langley Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1969, page 81.

KEY COMPONENTS OF EXECUTION STAGE

South End
Exhibit V-1

Boston, Mass.



perhaps two years of time initially over the designation of a developer.[2]

In addition, there were changes occurring within BRA that would have a significant effect on the project. The development administrator made his decision to run for mayor, and leadership and decision-making within BRA became diffuse. A conflict developed between the site office and the central office on responsibilities for land disposition. The powers of the project director of the South End and other projects was declining. With Logue's departure from BRA, there was an interim period in which few decisions were made, and negotiations with community groups became more difficult. BRA's capability to produce new housing was widely questioned. When a new permanent director was named, he established a cabinet in the central office that further assumed powers from the project site office. During 1967 and 1968, several project directors left BRA, including the project director for the South End. BRA, and indeed the South End team, had lost some of their driving force.

In 1967, Boston Rehabilitation Program generated great controversy in Roxbury over the rapid and insensitive relocation of tenants. Relocation became an issue not only in Roxbury but also in the South End. Whereas the BRA staff had expected to use the subsidized units developed in Washington Park as a resource for the South End, neighborhood groups insisted that relocation be made available in the South End. In May of 1968, BRA called a halt to demolition in response to demands made by the neighborhoods that no relocation would take place until the promised subsidized housing was built. In April of 1968, citizen groups staged demonstrations in the South End and in April formed a line barring Mayor White from the BRA site office. The years 1968 and 1969 were ones of confrontation. In May of 1969, the People's Renewal Committee organized Tent City in a controversy with BRA over relocation and housing. A new project area committee called SEPAC was formed and given broad powers by the mayor's office including a veto over the selection of the developer for any parcel. During July, elections sponsored and paid for by the city were held in the South End. The elections were bitter and the validity of the elections was challenged by the People's Urban Renewal Committee which represented the lower income population.

The South End plan called for development of community facilities and new housing in Parcel 19 near the center of the project. The development was to result in the demolition of existing residential units, then occupied by low income tenants, a large number

[2] Interview with Thaddeus Tercyak, November 1973.

of whom were Spanish speaking. During 1968 and 1969, the Emergency Tenant's Council (ETC) was formed. This group became interested in developing Parcel 19 for the existing residents rather than allow the area to be demolished. By December of 1969, BRA had approved changes in the South End plan and designated ETC as developer of the central area to allow for rehabilitation along Tremont Street and Shawmut Avenue. The United South End Settlements Community Center is now to be located on an alternate site.

By 1969, the South End Project was experiencing a financial crunch. Title 1 funds for the South End had been freely borrowed for use in other projects and the financial position was precarious. The 1969 amendatory application, the first since Logue had left, was never approved. It was not until 1972 that more money allocations were forthcoming from HUD. There was very little acquisition aside from hardship acquisitions during the next two years.

In 1970, the Boston Center for the Arts was designated as developer of the flower market area. BRA managed with some delays to complete the acquisition of a site on Albany Street for the relocation of the flower markets.

In 1972, HUD approved an amendatory budget increas of $27 million. This was the first approved increase since 1967. Additional acquisitions were made, particularly in the central area of the project. There was, during this period, a rapid turnover of project staff. Between 1969 and 1973, there were four different project directors for the South End. In June 1973, HUD approved an amendatory budget increase of $2 million, a budget increase described by the project director as being sufficient to pay interest and maintain the administration of the project, but not providing funds for any major capital improvements.

a. Acquisition

The South End Project called for the acquisition of 186 acres, approximately 40 percent of the net project area exclusive of streets or public rights-of-way areas. Planned acquisition was particularly concentrated along the periphery of the project: Castle Square on the north, the industrial strip running the length of the eastern boundary alongside the proposed (but never built) Inner Beltway, the lower Roxbury area below Washington Street along the south boundary, and the proposed South End Bypass highway and transit line relocation along the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railway in the west.

Castle Square was acquired under an early land acquisition plan in December 1962. After the project received funding in August 1965, the initial focus of acquisition was in the lower Roxbury area where there were a number of vacant lots, resulting from demolitions by the building department and abandoned buildings. However, in looking at the list of acquisitions during the first two years one finds that acquisition progressed in a piece meal fashion. During the first two years of the project, about a quarter of all acquisitions were hardship areas, pieces of land appropriated at the request of the owner prior to optimal scheduling. In addition, acquisition costs were higher than anticipated. The South End budget was heavily borrowed upon by other projects, consequently, in the absence of amendatories, the South End came into a financial crunch which after 1968 brought acquisition to a near stop. By December 1968, acquisition was 65 percent completed, and it took two years to reach a 75 percent level of acquisition. During this period, a substantial portion of the acquisitions were hardship areas.

In consequence, the acquisition proceeded in piece meal fashion. The BRA now owns a number of scattered acquisition parcels, but has not amassed all of the land in many of the disposition parcels. In addition, there is uncertainty over just what modifications will be made to the plan which will reduce the number of disposition parcels. The percentage completions listed within this report are based upon a plan submitted by BRA to HUD in November 1973, for reducing the initial scope of the project by lowering the acquisition total to 5.5 million square feet from the original plan of 8.1 million square feet. Hence, as of July 1973, only 60 percent of the land originally scheduled for acquisition had actually been accumulated, but it is 87 percent of the land to be acquired under the reduced plan. Among the major parcels not to be taken are 12 acres along the eastern periphery owned by the Public Works Department, major portions along the western periphery, and a substantial number of individual parcels. A few such parcels have been privately developed in a manner consistent with the plan.

The scattered character of the acquisitions has led to a number of problems. Property management is far more extensive than forecast. Scattered parcels are more difficult to dispose and, therefore, provide a variety of relocation problems. It has also been difficult to coordinate acquisition with relocation and demolition. Substantial additional acquisitions are required to complete even the

reduced scope of the plan. Yet the BRA must take over 90 additional acquisition parcels to complete even the reduced scope. There is, of course, no certainty that the major plan change described will be approved in its present form by the Project Area Committee, City Council, and HUD.

b. Relocation

The original plan called for the relocation of 3,550 households. About half of those to be relocated were single individuals, mostly elderly, and the case load was evenly split between blacks and whites. Of those to be relocated, approximately two-thirds were eligible for public housing.

For the first two years, relocation progressed at very much the same rate as acquisition, but in 1968 under pressure from the Project Area Committee, the BRA placed a moratorium on demolition and, as a result, the pace of relocation slowed down. By 1973, the relocation was approximately three-fourths completed and BRA now houses in its owned parcels a case load of several hundred families.

The difficulty and slowness of relocation has held up the disposition of numerous parcels. Several developers mentioned the difficulty they had in acquiring the land due to the presence of tenants that the BRA was hesitant to evict. The extreme hesitation of the BRA board to use the eviction process may be humane to those dislocated but it has caused a number of substantial delays.

c. Demolition

Data on demolitions provided on the official reports do not accurately portray the rate of demolition. According to reported figures, the schedule of demolition was most rapid during precisely the period when there was a demolition moratorium in effect on residential properties throughout the project. Demolition followed relocation during the first two years of the project. In the summer of 1968, the BRA was heavily criticized for not getting housing into construction. The only housing that had started was in Castle Square, the land acquired in 1962 three years prior to the start of project execution. Due to the outraged cries from community groups, the BRA called a halt to demolition for over a year while the initial FHA housing projects went into construction. Demolitions were limited to unsafe structures and non-residential buildings.

The problem with demolition was in the coordination with relocation. BRA would not sign a demolition contract until the buildings were vacant, but tenants refused to move almost literally until they saw the bull dozer tearing down the building next door. Demolition was delayed by relocation. At the present time, demolition is said to be 75 percent complete which is probably a high figure.

d. Rehabilitation

Within the non-clearance areas of the project, there were 2,580 residential structures, of which an estimated 75 percent required rehabilitation. According to the original plan, the South End row house was to be rehabilitated for between $2,500 and $4,000 per unit, a a figure low enough to provide ongoing housing for moderate income households. However, rehabilitation to meet FHA 221d(3) standards averaged over $10,000 per unit.[1] The fact that the actual costs of housing rehabilitation were much greater than anticipated resulted in a slow down of rehabilitation. In fact, if the BRA had ruthlessly pushed for housing rehabilitation, many of the area's low income residents would have been displaced. The problem was even more difficult because of the shortage of Section 312 and Section 115 funds. However, an additional problem was the competence of the BRA rehabilitation specialists.

Table V-5 REHABILITATION. NOVEMBER, 1973

A. Total Completed or Committed	924
Conventional/Private	521
FHA 220/221	81
FHA 115 or 312	271
FHA 236	51
B. Total Completed	
Residential	806
Non-residential	33
C. Total Structures	
Residential	2,600
Non-residential	400
D. Estimate Structures requiring rehabilitation	1,875

Source: BRA files

[1]Robert B. Whittlesey, The South End Row House and Its Rehabilitation for Low Income Residents, Boston, South End Community Development, Inc., 1969.

During 1962, a small rehabilitation team was set within the BRA site office to provide advice to residents and start the rehabilitation of homes. This team was apparently antagonistic to both higher and lower income residents and developed a negative reputation for confidence. Even today, there is a strong negative attitude toward the urban renewal rehabilitation specialist in the South End from both higher income residents and representatives of community groups. There was ineffectual usage of the Section 312 and Section 115 loans and grants even when they were available.

The pace of rehabilitation was exceedingly slow. By the end of 1969, only 10 percent of the structures had been rehabilitated, 28 months after initiation of the project. Even today, the rehabilitation is only about a third completed.

e. Public Facilities

The original plan for new community facilities included the construction of five schools; three new neighborhood playgrounds adjacent to schools and school playgrounds operated by the school department; two large playfields, one of which was to include a swimming pool-ice skating rink; a community recreation center to include an auditorium and gym; a number of smaller tot lots or green areas; a library; and medical facilities as part of the Boston University School of Medicine and Boston City Hospital.

There have been a number of changes in the original plan. The community center facility with was to replace existing housing in Parcel 19 was effectively changed by a tenants' group that was promoting low income housing development. The library was built nearby. However, no new schools have been constructed because of the Racial Imbalance Law. The failure to build new schools has been related to the inability to complete the playgrounds and playfields. Although public facilities are officially declared to be 55 percent complete, a major portion of this is accounted for by the new medical facilities associated with the Boston City Hospital and Boston University Medical School. The development of Public Facilities proceeded at a very slow pace, with nothing completed during the first four years.

f. Project Improvements

Extensive project improvements for water and sewers, streets and lighting were planned, but the estimated costs submitted with Loan and Grant application had little reality. During the planning period,

the engineering department of BRA came up with a budget, but was told by the redevelopment administrator to cut it back by millions of dollars. He had a notion of how much money was available, and the budget submitted was consistent with that estimate.

The South End is a difficult area in which to install project improvements. Existing water and sewer lines were generally over a hundred years old. Because of the subsoil conditions, some form of piling is required as a foundation for the laying of pipes. In 1969, the BRA put out its first sewer contract for the South End, but got no bidders. Contractors were reluctant to bid because of the uncertainty of the subsoil conditions.

It took three years even to let out the first sewer contract. It is nearly impossible to accurately predict the costs of improvements without a detailed instrument survey that defines the precise boundaries. The survey work after the project went into execution took two years. However, the project engineer devoted his time during the first two years to land assembly and demolition. Therefore, the development of project improvements was not pushed.

When work started on the water and sewers, the problems were extreme. New HUD regulations required the separation of sewage from drainage. The planned sewage treatment plant was not built for two years because the BRA was exploring new federal programs as a possible source of 75 percent of the funding. Existing drainage facilities turned out to be less substantial than anticipated.

The scheduling of project improvements was a continual problem. There were whole streets that required water and sewer improvements that were not in the approval budget. The project improvements were not staged in an efficient fashion. When a developer was ready to proceed with new construction pressure was brought to bear to develop improvements leading to that site. The developers' schedules did not proceed at the convenience of the engineering department.

The problem appears to be that the project was just too immense. As the development of improvements lagged, the more expensive they became. The first project improvements were made in 1968 and proceeded gradually until 1970. However, the pace has increased since 1970. Project improvements reached the halfway mark in June of 1972. During the fall of 1973, extensive project improvements occurred throughout the project area.

g. Land Disposition

Land that was acquired under the early land acquisition in December of 1962 was deeded to Castle Square Associates in 1965 and to the Boston Housing Authority in 1966. In consequence, 10 percent of the total land to be disposed had been deeded prior to the HUD approval of the Loan and Grant application.

For the remainder of the project, the disposition of land proceeded slowly. During 1967 and 1968 the only disposition was limited to 26 townhouses that were deeded for rehabilitation. The first major disposition occurred in 1969, three years from the start of the project. Major housing sites were deeded to two sponsors of low and moderate income housing in lower Roxbury in the area surrounding the Lenox Street public housing development. Roxse (Roxbury-South End) Homes is a 364-unit development of low and moderate income housing on three disposition parcels, and Canfield Gardens is a 135-unit development. Both projects leased 30 to 40 percent of the units to the Boston Housing Authority with the remainder of the units subsidized by the 3 percent interest rates of the 221d(3) program.

Also, during 1969, the first two-thirds of the 12-acre flower market site on the eastern fringe of the project was deeded. There were some delays due to the difficulties BRA had in removing Avis from the site, and cost uncertainty due to poor subsoil conditions.

Overall, 17 percent of the land to be disposed was deeded in 1969, the biggest year for land disposition. The pace of disposition slowed down in 1970, about 10 percent of the disposition land, including four acres of the flower exchange. Three major housing developers held FHA closings and took title to the land: Columbus Avenue Housing, Willard Place Housing, and Rutland Square Housing. In late 1970 and 1971, a number of infill sites were deeded for public housing. In the three years after 1970, land disposition progressed very slowly. For the three years taken together, only 13 percent of the land was deeded, bringing land disposition up to 50 percent completion of the reduced project. As 17 percent of the land was deeded prior to the funding of the project, only 33 percent of the land for disposition was deeded during the seven years from 1966 to 1973, and half of that was deeded in 1969. Of 167 original disposition parcels, 97 had been disposed.

PATTERN OF LAND DISPOSITION (DEEDED) BY RE-USE CATEGORY

South End
Exhibit V-2

Boston, Mass.



boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

South End Project

Land Disposition Map

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Parcels Remaining for Disposition

In the following section will be a brief description of the major disposition parcels that remain for disposition and the problems of the parcel.

Public Non-Residential Disposition Parcels

- P-21 Derby Park. The BRA now owns most but not all of this parcel. It is mostly cleared, but there are still four or five families to be relocated. Some of the remaining properties are owned by the city (tax foreclosures) and BRA must get transfer of the title. The parcel is to be turned into a park which is much needed by the residents of Roxse Homes, Canfield Gardens, and the Public Housing Project. BRA wishes to deed it to the city, but there is some question that the city will maintain it.

- PB-10 Black Stone School. The school has not been built due to the Racial Imbalance Law and associated rulings by HUD and HEW. During the fall of 1973, HUD told BRA that no sites could be conveyed to the city for schools until plans and specifications had been completed. The Texaco Station on the parcel is to be relocated and has been designated as developer of Parcel 51. There are still families to relocate, but acquisition is complete. The delay of the school construction is particularly inappropriate as it would be an integrated school.

- PB-4, 16 Carter School. The difficulty of conveying property for schools applies to these parcels. The state has approved the school program, but City Council has not funded it. Acquisition is virtually complete. A tire company and plumbing supply must be relocated and part of the parcel is leased to a trucking company.

- X-26 This parcel was purchased for an approach to the Inner Beltway, which was not constructed. The previous owner (retail businessman) has expressed an interest in repurchase, but it is illegal to sell back written down land to a former owner. There is currently no plan for this parcel. There is a major sewer line under the parcel which makes construction almost impossible.

- 7 Franklin Institute is designated as developer, but has no funds or approvals for construction. Original plan for dormitory not likely to gain approval. Expectation is that land will be turned over to Public Facilities for use as a police parking lot. One acquisition to be made to complete parcel. SEPAC may make fight over development of parking.

- 31-A Red Fez Restaurant is tentatively designated. Restaurant owns adjacent land and may expand restaurant and/or build parking lot. Parcel is on Washington Street adjacent to elevated transit line and other re-use is limited. Acquisition completed, but closing of Laconia Street not yet approved. Developer has not committed himself.

- 31 Industrial Parcel. BRA owns about half of the parcel. There are still several one-two story commercial facilities left. This is a major problem parcel, for to complete acquisition and relocation may cost $940,000 or more. It is difficult to sell land already acquired without completing acquisition. Effective dealing with the parcel will require extra funds. It could be a possible site for light industry or motel, although it may have a problem with SEPAC in the designation of developer.

- 14 People's Market. Designated developer and plans and specifications have been approved by BRA. However, developer will not accept re-use appraisal value as acquisition price on the basis that subsoil conditions are very bad. Benton Street, which forms part of the parcel, is not yet closed, and street closing has not been approved by Public Improvements Department. The People's Market might want to move back to its original site (X-26, discussed above).

- 17 Harriet Tubman Settlement House. BRA owns site and it is cleared and deliverable. Settlement House received $884,000 grant under Title 703, Neighborhood Facilities Act. Estimates were for $1.3 million construction but bids are $1.6 million. Settlement is in danger of losing its grant. There has also been a dispute over utilization of minority contractors.

- 41-C The designated developer, United Limb and Brace, has dedecided to leave the area. BRA believes the site is suitable for a local contractor, but no one is currently designated.

- X-52 This parcel was purchased for work related to development of Inner Beltway. Acquisition of this parcel is incomplete. BRA has had discussions with Avis about possible development of site. There is no definitive eastern boundary because of uncertainty about the Inner Beltway.
- RC-9 A possible site for First National which is to be relocated from Washington Street site. No firm plan.
- 47 New England Nuclear wishes to use this 4,000-square foot site for parking for its employees. BRA wishes to apply leverage to encourage expansion. The site is currently cleared.
- 55 Abutting commercial uses is designated as developer, but BRA intends to rescind designation and readvertise.
- 20 People's Baptist Church is designated developer. BRA sees no problem.
- 51 A large cleared site north of flower market is designated for light industry. Discussions have been held with a gas station and a warehouse, but BRA would like to encourage a more highly intensive use.
- 36-B This parcel was to be acquired and turned over to Green Shoe for parking. Abandoned housing stands on site. BRA now does not want to acquire on hope that Green Shoe will acquire it directly from owner.
- 46-B Presently owned by city of Boston, Department of Public Works. Plan specified acquisition for institutional development. BRA now does not wish to acquire.

Private Residential

There are a number of sites along Washington Street designated for residential development which do not meet HUD environmental criteria due to proximity to the MBTA elevated line. These parcels include:

- 32-C Originally designated for the expansion of Cathedral High School, but church does not now intend to expand. Acquisition is about half complete.
- R-11 An acquisition only half completed.

- PB-3 Bancroft School. Although the Public Facilities is designated developer for school construction, it is now unlikely that this school will be built, because the primary school in nearby Back Bay is not closed. The parcel may be developed by Public Facilities Department as a playground for the nearby Mackey School.

- PB-12 Williams Elementary School. Acquisition of this parcel is not completed. Relocation includes HUB motors which will cost about $100,000 in relocation costs. It is expected that this school will eventually be built.

- P-17 New playground to replace the Rotch playground. The playground cannot be built until the demolition of the old Williams Elementary School which awaits construction of a new elementary school.

- 49-a Pumping Station. Final relocation of families to be completed and disposition expected in early 1974.

- 12 Park. This parcel was once intended for elderly housing. A plan change now intends this parcel for a park through a HUD Open Space Grant of $154,000 with a local share of $150,000. City Council must read out a bond issue for local share. The parcel is cleared and ready for disposition.

- PB-4, P-22 Carter School Playground. Only problem is delay in development of school.

- R-10 Existing school to be demolished only after construction of new schools. South End Building Systems has been designated developer.

- P-6A, P-6B, P-6C Area along East Berkeley designated for street widening over opposition of neighborhood groups. Land partially acquired and relocation remaining. No clear plan.

Private Non-Residential Disposition Parcels

- PB-9 Cooper Community Center. Acquisition complete, one liquor store to relocate. Mostly demolished and expected to be sold in near future.

- 8 Boston Center for Arts. Getty Oil Station on site has been reluctant to remove itself. It is expected that BCA will soon sign a 40-year lease.

- RC-9 A possible site for supermarket.
- P-16 To be developed by ETC.
- R-12A Advertised with no response.
- R-12B Advertised with no response.

Other Residential Sites

- 54 Planned for subsidized housing, but due to proximity to Cathedral Housing Project, it is not eligible for FHA subsidy because it would result in impacting area with low income residents.
- 19 Emergency Tenants Council (ETC) designated as developer. Commitment from FHA for Section 236 funds predates moratorium. Some evictions to be made, but sale is expected in early 1974 at FHA closing.
- R-6, R-6A, PB-6 ETC designated as developer, but it has no commitment from FHA for subsidy funds. Several businesses, including Craftsman Printing Company, must be relocated. Relocation of printing company to cost $500,000. Inappropriate current usage for industrial facility across street from elderly high rise tower developed by ETC. In PB-6, BRA owns three of seven properties.
- 196 ETC designated as developer. Out of 20 properties, BRA owns 13. Further acquisition required.
- PB-8 ETC designated as developer. BRA owns five out of seven properties. $150,000 required to complete acquisition.
- RC-4, RC-5 Parcels are fully acquired and cleared. Concord Homes is the developer and FHA closing expected soon.
- 30 This site is adjacent to a never completed infill structure. BRA would like one developer to develop Parcel 30 and the infill, but the infill parcel cannot be retrieved until foreclosure is completed.

Table V-6

SUMMARY OF ELAPSED TIME
SOUTH END PROJECT

	Months
PREPLANNING	
First Action to Submission of Survey and Planning Application	6
Submission of Survey and Planning to HUD Approval of Survey and Planning Application	19
PLANNING	
Approval of Survey and Planning to City Council Approval	36
Local Approval to HUD Approval of Loan and Grant, Part I	3
Approval of Loan and Grant, Part I to Submission of Part II	9
Submission of Part II to HUD Approval of Loan and Grant	2

EXECUTION	CUMULATIVE TIME IN EXECUTION TO PERCENTAGE COMPLETION*				
	25%	50%	75%	100%	June 1973
Acquisition	14 mo.	24 mo.	52 mo.	--	86 %
Relocation	33	62	84	--	75 %
Demolition	24	38	72	--	77 %
Rehabiliation	50	--	--	--	33 %
Public Facilities	44	75	--	--	58 %
Project Improvements	47	70	--	--	63 %
Land Dispasition	33	73	--	--	53 %

*Assumes reduced scope of South End Plan, nat currently approved by HUD.

Source: BRA Records.

D. Analysis of South End Project

The South End Project area has changed rapidly over the thirteen years since the commencement of planning in 1960. In 1960, there was virtually no market for middle and high income families and the whole area was "red-lined" by the banks. By 1965, real estate firms and private high income families were purchasing townhouses in substantial numbers and rehabilitating them either for their own use or as an investment.

Since 1965, the chief issue affecting the community politics of the area has been the question: should the project continue to accommodate low and moderate income families within the project area, or should it encourage the taking over of the area by higher income families. Since 1966, the renewal process has been chiefly responsible for the construction of subsidized housing, while working in conflict with market forces that increase the number of houses sold to high income families. Hence, the South End stands in contrast to most blighted inner city rehabilitation projects. It is supported by a strong market for privately financed residential housing.

Delays over disposition of land have not been caused by poor marketability of land. Residential land is so marketable that any particular parcel may have an excessive number of developers interested in redevelopment. Even vacant townhouses or townhouses in a deteriorated state have a strong marketability on the private market. Today, a significant amount of utility and street work and new construction on parcels is underway. The general appearance of the South End from this construction work is messy and not very attractive. Several vacant parcels, designated for school construction, provide sites for dumping and are poorly maintained. Weed infested lots along Washington Street, underneath the elevated MBTA line, contribute to the project's unattractive appearance. A poor visual environment coupled with a poor school plan and topped with a large number of low income residents would be translated, in common knowledge, to a negative market condition for attracting families of middle and upper middle incomes. However, this is not the case in the South End. Instead, local community organizations carry out campaigns against private developers who are rehabilitating houses for higher income tenants. The strong market persists.

Despite the strong market demand for land, project execution has proceeded slowly. There have been extensive and major delays. For purposes of this analysis, the delays are divided into four groups. These exogenous factors that are defined as state or federal laws or national trends that cause delays in project execution; local management related factors that deal with the structure and organization of BRA and its interaction with the city, HUD and citizen's groups; local market related factors dealing with the marketability of land; and national program related factors dealing primarily with HUD administrative rules and regulations.

1. Exogenous Factors

The plan for the South End included the construction of four new schools. The degree of segregation in Boston schools has led to a moratorium on the construction of all new schools under the state's Racial Imbalance Law and guidelines from the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. None of the four schools slated for construction in the South End has been started. The slowness of construction of these schools is particularly ironic insofar as the South End is a highly integrated neighborhood. In fact, the schools in the South End promise to provide racial integration. The failure to build these four schools has been a major delay in the execution of the project. The inability of the Public Facilities Department to construct schools has had a number of consequences. These include: a) lack of local share credits attributable to school construction; b) problems of disposition of land of the old school buildings, as well as continued vacancy of new sites; c) problems of support facilities (playgrounds); and d) the failure to construct schools effects a whole chain of sites. For example, Parcel 49, which is planned as an industrial site, cannot be assembled until the playground is relocated. The playground cannot be relocated to Parcel 317 until the old Williams School is demolished, but the old Williams School cannot be demolished until the new Williams School is built. Hence, the old playground lies in the middle of an industrial site, which is largely vacant. A deteriorating and outmoded school is being used and land for a new school lies vacant. This lengthy delay can only be judged highly inappropriate. However, this delay does not appear to be caused either by HUD regulation or BRA error. The school imbalance situation is largely out of the control of both.

During the last three years, the increasing concern with the environment and the historical monuments has added a new level of review to many urban renewal projects. BRA owns pieces of a great many parcels along Washington Street and stretches from one end of the project to the other. Most of these parcels were planned for housing. Housing as appropriate particularly with the demolition of the elevated MBTA line. However, under existing noise guidelines, no subsidized housing may be developed in the immediate vicinity of the elevated MBTA line. Even projects one-half to one block away have difficulty meeting environmental standards. The ungainly elevated structure and its noisy trains make Washington Street also unattractive for other types of developments. Proposals have been made to eliminate the elevated MBTA and relocate the transit line.

A concern with the quality of the environment surrounding a subsidized housing project is certainly appropriate. Again, the delay with regard to the disposition of these housing parcels appears to be beyond the control of BRA. At the time when it becomes certain that the elevated MBTA line will be demolished, the noise guidelines regarding the elevated MBTA line should be waived to allow completion of the housing.

A second problem regarding the environment has to do with the concentration of subsidized housing in racially impacted low income areas. Parcel 54, adjacent to the Cathedral Public Housing Project, was planned to have FHA subsidized housing. Since the Cathedral Public Housing Project has a predominantly black population, Parcel 54 is not eligible for subsidized housing. At the same time, its proximity to the public housing project discourages private development. The problem is particularly severe insofar as construction of such housing was to provide a relocation resource within the project area which is very much required for the rehabilitation occurring on the private market. In this case, the change in HUD guidelines with regard to the environment causes a delay in the disposition of land. The land was acquired by the BRA prior to the change in HUD requirements.

About half of the project area has been declared a historical review area, and all developments must be scrutinized for preservation of historical quality. There is a considerable conflict within BRA on policy. The naming of the historical review area was largely brought about by a BRA planner. Any development within the review area must be passed on by the joint historical review team that must state, "no adversity". Historical review delayed the Emergency Tenants Council phase I project for months. The delay of phase I postpones the execution of ETC's phase II in an area where BRA has spent considerable sums of money in acquisition, relocation, and demolition. At this time, phase II is also stymied by the housing moratorium as no commitment has been obtained from FHA. The delay on ETC phase I in particular is inappropriate.

There are several social trends affecting the populations of most large American cities which have particularly affected the disposition of land within the South End. One of these is the rising crime rate. The increasing crime rate had rather little impact on the marketability of housing sites, but has had a significant impact on the non-residential sites. This escalating crime rate is associated with a decline of industrial production in urban centers. The suburbanization of industry has been particularly marked in Boston, which was one of the first cities to develop a suburban beltway, Route 128. In 1965, Route 128 had 25 industrial parks or office parks, housing 574 companies and over 54,000 employees. Many of these companies left Boston

during the 1950's. The decline of industrial production in Boston can be seen from census figures on industrial employment. Industrial employment in Boston declined from 100,000 in 1950 to 60,000 in 1970. During a period when industrial production in Boston was declining at a rate of 2,000 a year, it was difficult to dispose of industrial sites within the South End.

2. Local Management Related Factors

The planning for the project set up two project goals that were in conflict. The first goal proposed the rehabilitation of 75 percent of the residential structures. The second goal was to provide housing for low income families and persons at rents that they could afford. Prior to the start of the project, BRA opened a special site office in 1963 to gather information on the cost of rehabilitating South End houses. Estimates of residential rehabilitation made in 1964 varied from $2,500 to $4,000 per apartment, but there was no actual experience to back up these estimates. In 1964, a grant of $205,000 was awarded to the United South End Settlements under section 207 of the National Housing Act, for a demonstration of the methods and costs of rehabilitation for low income families. Their study came up with two major conclusions. The first was the rehabilitation of South End row houses for occupancy by low income families is feasible only when there is a rent subsidy. The average family income of tenants in the study projects was $3,200 per year. Secondly, experience in rehabilitation of the South End row house indicated that apartments would cost $9,000 to $13,000 each for rehabilitation. The construction work was complicated and required craftsmanship. The study made a number of other observations about the use of the FHA subsidy programs and the difficulties of rehabilitating and managing small scattered FHA multifamily housing projects.

During the second round of planning, BRA had to deal directly with neighborhood groups. At that time, it made a clear choice that renewal in the South End would not be an exercise in turning over the area to higher income residents, but that existing residents would have a significant place in planning and developing the South End. However, this decision made almost impossible a rapid implementation of the project. The decision to make provisions for existing low income residents within the present neighborhood areas meant that relocation housing be available prior to demolition. Acquisition and demolition would necessarily be protracted.

The requirement that housing be constructed or made available for low income residents affected several other aspects of the plan. Maintaining large numbers of low income residents discouraged the entry of many middle class

families into the area, reducing the marketability of some small parcels. It seems apparent that if BRA had been able to impose the choice of turning the South End into a high income area, the project would have proceeded more quickly and the desirability of land would have been even greater than it is. The maintenance of the area for low income residents made it necessary to have a slow pace of rehabilitation since subsidy programs or rehabilitation grants and loans simply did not meet the needs of the low income population.

Whether such delays are undue is a matter of debate over the purposes of urban renewal. The delays resulted in a slower displacement of lower income residents, yet lower income residents were and still are being displaced rapidly. The population of the area has been reduced from over 30,000, when the plan went into execution, to about 23,000 in 1973. Most of those displaced were low income residents. Private real estate firms are now investing heavily in the area. One investor has gained control of over 56 buildings during the last two years, including some larger residential buildings. These buildings have been rehabilitated for higher income tenants. Urban renewal relocation benefits do not apply to residents ousted from these buildings and an "ad hoc committee for a South End for South Enders" has called for action by the community against this one investor. Housing for lower income residents in a completed project will be restricted to subsidized housing and the future of subsidized housing in the South End is contingent on national policy. To date, the urban renewal project has provided a mechanism for assisting in the construction of over 2,000 units of subsidized housing, a quantity insufficient to maintain the area as a community for existing low income residents.

The size of the project and diversity of users have caused numerous delays. Numerous acquisitions have been made throughout the project on a piece meal basis because of 1) hardship acquisition, and 2) necessity to demolish dangerous structures. BRA, in consequence, owns a number of small pieces of land scattered throughout the 600-acre project. In some of the larger parcels, BRA may own one or two out of a number of properties. Secondly, the parcels are not deliverable. BRA has insufficient funds to complete the acquisition. The scattering and number of properties owned by BRA has made property management extensive, expensive, and difficult. In addition, if a project were smaller in size, the logical sequence or planning of acquisition could have proceeded more smoothly. However, the major delays resulting from the size of the project have not had to do with the number of parcels, but with the diversity of users and the increased political complexity within the decision-making process. Negotiations with the Project Area Committee and different community groups has simply taken an enormous amount of staff time from the agency. The Project Area Committee represents a variety of income, ethnic and professional interest groups, but it is interested more in housing than industrial usage. Attempts to develop industrial

usage have been seriously hampered.

The degree of this political complexity may be observed in the development of Parcel 19 in the very center of the South End. According to the original plan, Parcel 19 was to be acquired and all structures demolished in preparation for a community facility including library, swimming pool, and ice rink. The Emergency Tenants Council formed in order to protect housing for residents within the parcel and immediately surrounding areas. In order to be designated the developer of Parcel 19, ETC not only had to win the support of BRA and the city, but also of the Project Area Committee. It had some difficulty doing this insofar as leaders of ETC had opposed the SEPAC elections in July of 1969. It took two and one-half years for ETC to become designated developer. ETC received technical assistance from Urban Planning Aids, a group out of Cambridge, and packaging assistance from the Greater Boston Community Development Corporation which also packaged 236 housing units for other nonprofit sponsors in the South End. During the summer of 1969, ETC made a slide presentation to Mayor White and ETC received the support of BRA and the city government. BRA's director ordered a joint planning change to accommodate the housing development in Parcel 19. However, the Project Area Committee had to approve the designation of ETC, which did not occur until December of 1969. ETC won designation on a very small margin. Other community groups had a competitive interest in the development and opposed ETC's developer designation, since ETC was promoting low and moderate income housing. These political problems were again further intensified by the size of the project.

A further difficulty had to do with community control over developer designation, even over that part of the project where industrial development was planned. It became exceedingly difficult for project staff to provide support for industiral development within a predominantly residential project. This can be seen particularly by the difficulties that Stride Rite Shoe Company had in attempting to maintain its industrial position within the South End. A spokesman for the industry described his experience with BRA as "horrendous" over a ten-year period. The manufacturing concern lost a good deal of its parking facilities by emminent domain to the state for the inner beltway. In 1965-1966, they built a new building to conform with the Inner Belt. The company thought it had a clear understanding with the mayor and the BRA director that the urban renewal project would provide them with a level of parking equal to what they had prior to the taking of their land for the Inner Belt. However, the urban renewal project proceeded to take more land from the shoe company to be used for housing. The company now feels that it is impossible to expand their facilities and they stated that they have cut their manufacturing business in half and expanded outside the city. They are still

negotiating with BRA for an additional parking area, but feel that BRA has provided them with little assistance. At the time the urban renewal project started, the shoe factory was the second largest employer in Boston. The failure to construct new transportation networks such as the inner beltway has made it difficult for the company to transport its goods. A representative for the company also mentioned that female employers have difficulty getting to work through a high crime neighborhood. The company plans no further expansion in Boston. BRA, in its day-to-day operation within the South End, has had to focus much more exclusively on the politics of the Project Area Committee, and consequently, interest in an industrial facility became less important.

One of the procedures used by BRA to attempt to facilitate or accelerate development of land is to start the acquisition of land and designate the developer at the same time. This allows the developer to get his financial packaging and design review and FHA processing where relevant completed, while BRA acquires the land, relocates the residents, demolishes the buildings and prepares the sites. Ideally, both parties should take about a year to complete their respective jobs. However, BRA has had difficulty in acquiring the land and turning it over to the developer on the desired schedule, at least in the South End. One of the major reasons for this is the hesitancy of the BRA to evict tenants to be relocated. For example, in the ETC project in Parcel 19, the BRA project director told ETC that all buildings in their FHA package would be ready to turn over to them within three months. The major delay occurred because of the reluctance of one or two households to move out of the structures and failure to evict the occupants resulted in a delay of over a year. Several of the developers mentioned the inability of the BRA to deliver the parcel on the schedule. Relocation of tenants was particularly difficult due to a requirement that relocation housing be made available within the South End. The most obvious source for relocation housing were the new FHA projects in Washington Park and in the South End. However, delays in FHA processing made the timing of completion of FHA projects very difficult to predict. The developers desire a rent raised as rapidly as possible following the completion of the construction. Therefore, it is very difficult to coordinate relocation with the availability of the new units. In addition, some of the developers, including nonprofit organizations, failed to make known to the BRA relocation staff that their units would become available. When the 200 units sponsored by the Grant A and E Church were completed, the sponsor interviewed applicants to fill the building unbeknownst to BRA. Out of 200 units, BRA got seven families off their case load.

The inability of BRA to bring about desired changes in transportation along project boundaries has delayed the development of many aspects of the project and is one of the major factors that prevents the project from attaining even a semblance of completion. Large amounts of land are affected on all peripheral sides of the project and the full length of the project along Washington Street. During the planning period of the South End Project, the state was acquiring land along the southern and eastern boundaries for the project and clearing it for the proposed Inner Belt Expressway. Eight years later, this land stands a wasteland, vacant, garbage-strewn and an ugly eye-sore. Although this land belongs to the State and was never acquired by BRA, the community still blames BRA for the failure to develop this land. Indeed, such land stands between two renewal projects - the South End Project and the Campus High Project. The renewal plan was consistent with studies prepared by the State Department of Public Works. The plan called for the provision of industrial sites along the Expressway. As the Expressway was never built, it calls into question the viability of that area of land for industrial purposes. In fact, there are those in the mayor's office today who believe that, in general, the intown area is inappropriate for the placement of industry and that industry may, indeed, be incompatible with the needs of the city. In any case, the development of the industrial parcels was greatly inhibited by the failure to construct the Inner Beltway. This is not to say that the delay on the Inner Beltway was inappropriate. However, it illustrates the need to be more flexible in making plan changes when the original plan is no longer consistent with the transportation alternatives available today.

The general plan for the city of Boston and the regional core from 1965 to 1975 had as a first priority the southward extension of the Washington Street Orange Line along the existing New Haven railroad right-of-way and the relocation of the Orange Line from Washington Street to the New Haven right-of-way. The plan also called for a South End Bypass arterial street which would distribute traffic from southern radials in the regional core. The renewal plan specified that this roadway was to also pass along the New Haven right-of-way. The moratorium on consturction of the highways seemed to bring about an end to effective transportation planning within Boston. The mayor, BRA and the MBTA all agree that the Orange Line will eventually be replaced from Washington Street to the New Haven Line. They also agree that this will not be done for at least five years. In 1966, it was expected that the Orange Line would be relocated within five years, but it appears to be no closer to happening now than it was then. Meanwhile, the land along the sides of the Orange Line down Washington Street stagnates and is a blighting influence from one end of the project to the other.

It is particularly difficult for Boston to bring about changes in the location or structuring of the MBTA Line. The MBTA not only serves Boston but over 75 political jurisdictions. The fact that the city of Boston is such a small part of the overall metropolitan region makes it difficult for the city to come to grips with the many transportation issues facing it. At present, there is a southwest corridor re-study commission that has been set up to re-examine the relocation of the Orange Line, its expansion and the development of the southwest corridor. This commission is involved in conflicts over its role and structure and has yet to get into the substantive issues of the re-study. Transportation planning is a long-range activity and transportation planning as it affects the South End is in a shambles. BRA currently owns a considerable amount of land in parcels along Washington Street that have no re-use until the Orange Line is relocated. At the same time, the future of land or parcels along the New Haven tracks down the west side of the project cannot be effectively developed. The BRA appears powerless to deal with the situation. The project itself is likely to maintain its appearance of lack of completion as long as transportation plans remain unstructured. Major delays in the project are a direct consequence of excessive reliance on far-reaching transportation plans that were never achieved and a failure to coordinate with the State Transportation Department. Since the plan hinged so clearly on major transportation improvements the status and scheduling of those improvements should have been more clearly defined at the outset of the project. Indeed, BRA's greatest power to achieve its transportation objectives may have been at that point where it was about to receive federal funds.

The strategy of land acquisition became a delaying factor and an "enlightened" land acquisition policy was followed in which land was gradually assembled with the relocation of families occurring over a period of several years. The first pieces of land acquired were vacant parcels and abandoned buildings. Acquisition was most rapid at the northern and southern edges of the project. However, during the early years of the project, BRA acquired bits and pieces of land throughout the project area. Most of these bits and pieces were acquired on a hardship basis as hardship purchases. Relocation, demolition and assembly of land proceeded lethargically, partly out of sensitivity to community pressures. Hence, within many disposition parcels, BRA now controls only part of the land. Scattered bits and pieces of the land within parcels continue in the possession of families or businesses that do not wish to relocate. Since the board is reluctant to evict, it has been difficult and time-consuming to put together a full parcel for a large scale development. The problem has been greatly exascerbated by a shortage of funds from Washington. At the present time, BRA is considering cutting back the scope of the project and limiting some of the original goals. BRA is thus left holding

title to some pieces of land within disposition parcels that it no longer intends to acquire. During various periods of the project, very limited funds were available for property acquisition. This was particularly true between 1969 and 1972. The hardship acquisitions provided a patch-work pattern of land ownership that leads to a less efficient staging.

Once BRA has designated a developer for a disposition parcel, it is very reluctant to rescind the designation. Even when it appears that a developer is not going to develop a particular parcel, the BRA has not put into effect a clear procedure for pressuring the developer to either produce the desired improvement or lose designation. In fact, the entire decision-making process as it affects a developer leaves a good deal to be desired. Developers express a lack of confidence in the ability of BRA and the city to make a clear decision that will affect their development. Developers mentioned several different kinds of problems that caused delays with them in dealing with BRA; mainly, the indecisiveness of BRA on subjects that ranged from site improvements, test borings, timeliness, or appropriateness of the re-use appraisals, deadlines for performance, the timing of street improvements, and tax letters. Developers like to have a predictable decision-making process and that does not seem to be available. A representative of Green Shoe expressed the opinion that it was very difficult to get a decision from BRA and have it kept. Staff turnover has made the process of negotiation difficult for developers such as Green Shoe.

BRA has held land and parcels for so long in some cases that the re-use appraisals made six years ago are now out of date. BRA may attempt to negotiate with a developer without being able to state what the price will be. Then when a re-use appraisal is made, the price will be much higher than that indicated to the developer. The higher price may affect the feasibility of the developer's development. This has been particularly true in some of the FHA projects where the cost margins are very close.

The unclear decision-making process within BRA has indeed been related to the rapid turnover of BRA staff at all levels: five chief administrators of BRA and seven project directors over the project's history. Each administration has set up different lines of authority and there have been substantial conflicts between the site office and central office in decisions that affect developers. During the period 1967-1969, the decision-making power of the project directors was reduced and the central office played more of a role in dealing with the developers. This decline in function resulted in a more rapid turnover at the project level. The reduced authority of the project directors extended to hiring and firing and, in the opinion of most observers, the project staff declined in capability. There were apparent

problems in both the rehabilitation staff and in the property management staff.

Not all of the delays affecting developers were inappropriate. There were indeed major delays on the relocation of the flower market to Albany Street and the deeding of the acquired properties at the old flower market site to the Boston Center for the Arts. Logue first called a meeting of dealers of the flower market together in 1963, during the early stages of project planning. Soon after the project went into execution, BRA worked out the taking of the Cyclorama and the other buildings in a manner that was quite satisfactory to the dealers. BRA experienced delays taking the property on Albany Street which was to be used for the relocation. The relocation site housed Avis Rental Cars and there was protracted litigation between Avis and BRA. When the litigation was completed, BRA delayed the taking until the flower market was ready to contract for the site. In 1969, BRA designated the Boston Center for the Arts as the redeveloper of the cyclorama and the other buildings where the old flower market was housed. However, the Boston Center for the Arts was in no hurry to take title to the market buildings and the flower dealers were in no hurry to move. The florists were not relocated until 1971. From the point of view of the Boston Center for the Arts, the BRA delays were to their advantage, in fact, it appears that the Boston Center for the Arts did not have the capacity to develop the property without the extensive delays on the part of BRA. Hence, we have a situation where all three parties involved were in no hurry to make the move and it was in the interest of Avis, the flower dealers, and the Boston Center for the Arts to delay the relocation of the flower markets for as long as possible.

There was one major delay that almost resulted in the removal of the flower markets from Boston to Waltham. When BRA was attempting to turn the land over on Albany Street to the flower exhange, it had done no test borings. Contractors who were to put up the new structures for the flower market were unwilling to give firm price estimates for construction because they were fearful of the subsoil conditions. The estimates were all subject to adequate subsoil conditions. The lack of clarity over costs led the flower exchange to look at property off of Route 128. In fact, the flower market signed an agreement to move to Waltham subject to a rezoning change. A more liberal use of test borings would have been appropriate. HUD procedures in approving usual site preparation costs add to the difficulty in a project area with poor subsoil conditions.

3. Market Related Factors

The South End appears to be operating under extremely strong market conditions for not only market rate housing but for housing for low and moderate income families. It appears that any units, whether they be for affluent families or for low and moderate income families, can be absorbed rapidly. Capable developers have been participating in the construction of new housing as well as in the rehabilitation of the housing stock. Since the community is involved in the selection of a developer, delays are experienced while the community decides among the many developers that appear interested in the various development parcels available in the South End. With intense developer interest and strong community input, the quality of the architecture and land and site planning for the various projects stands high.

The market for land has not been a source of delay for residential development. However, market factors have affected disposition of non-residential land. The rapid decline of population has reduced the viability of retail facilities. Parking facilities are limited and the present street pattern does not favor industrial development, particularly given the fear of vandalism.

4. National Program Related Factors

A most significant delay results from the difficulty of coordinating acquisition of property with the development of subsidized housing. The funding for urban renewal projects is made independently of the funding for the subsidized housing programs. A major change of strategy in the development of subsidized housing within urban renewal projects would call for the allocation of funds for subsidized units as part of the approval of the Loan and Grant application. Then, there would be no delays in FHA processing due to a shortage of federal funds. In addition, it would then be possible to provide streamline processing for developers within renewal projects. Specifically, HUD should be able to indicate to potential sponsors that it may 1) speed up processing by conducting the needed technical reviews simultaneously, 2) make an early decision on the feasibility of the project and after that devote its efforts and skills to insuring that the project went forward to completion, 3) maintain tight schedules for both HUD and the sponsor. If such a policy were implemented, it would become possible to coordinate the production of subsidized housing with the acquisition of land and relocation of tenants. The failure to coordinate development of FHA housing within the South End resulted in there being a large number of sites for FHA housing that lay vacant between 1966 and 1969, while the community was concerned about the lack of housing for low and moderate income people.

The subsidy structure and income limitations on subsidized housing severely limit the use of FHA housing as a relocation resource. Tenants for a particular unit must have incomes within a very narrow range. If their income is higher, they are ineligible. If it is lower, they cannot afford the rent. Whereas the availability of some rent supplement units allows for tenancy for a limited number of low income tenants, there is a class of potential tenants who fall between the two. That is, they do not qualify for the rent supplement units and cannot afford the regular 236 rents. Greater flexibility in income levels and rent levels would make the subsidized housing a major relocation resource.

The present moratorium on construction of subsidized housing is having an impact on the completion of the project. There is much competition between those who promote low income housing and those who prefer unsubsidized development. In the absence of subsidy funds, the SEPAC may block the development of higher income housing. Specific delays will occur in those parcels for which the Emergency Tenants Council is the designated developer, and no disposition is possible in the absence of subsidy funds.

The reorganizations of HUD have affected the working relationships between BRA and HUD. The move of the HUD regional office to Boston and the creation of a local area office created a less predictable and more cumbersome decision-making process within HUD. Staff in the area office have little experience in engineering or development. Engineers in BRA complain that there are now no area office engineers in HUD and that decisions are made by ignorant bureaucrats. Rulings by the area office are sometimes over-ruled by the regional office. The delay in getting an amendatory through HUD in 1970 and 1971 delayed project improvements for at least a year.

The proclaimer apparatus to get minor plan changes approved by HUD has proved in practice to be unwieldly and unworkable. The attempt to get minor plan changes approved by area HUD has been the source of much conflict. Local developers are particularly disdainful of the area office. One housing developer said, "The area office is terrified of both the regional and federal office and is reluctant to move on anything." The area office has reacted slowly to approving proclaimers. One proclaimer, rejected as being a major plan change by the area office, was consequently reviewed and found acceptable by the regional office. The resulting delay affected disposition of land to the Emergency Tenants Council. There is a sense locally that the plan through the South End needs major changes. It is difficult to make minor plan changes for the proclaimer process and to make a major plan change to be approved by both City Council and HUD for it causes extensive delays.

More flexibility is required to deal with the South End plan. Without some flexibility, the BRA is locked into an urban renewal strategy in the South End which becomes almost impossible to implement, given the nature and orientation of the SEPAC and the failure of transportation planning in Boston.

Table V-7

DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

BOSTON - SOUTH END PROJECT

Types of Factors (See Previous Text)

(E) Signifies Exogenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors
(MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors
(NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors

Stage during which factor was significant
1 - Pre-planning
2 - Planning
3 - Execution

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE: Somewhat Important (A)	Important (B)	Very Important (C)	Crucial (D)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE: Definitely Unavoidable (A)	Probably Unavoidable (B)	Possibly Avoidable (C)	Probably Avoidable (D)	Definitely Avoidable (E)
• (E) State's Racial Imbalance Law prevented school construction -- delayed many facets of project and affected project strategy.	3				●	●				
• (E) Environmental and historical review.	3	●					●			
• (E) Decline of industrial production in urban centers (suburbanization of industry).	3		●				●			
• (E) Rising crime rate.	3		●			●				
• (LMR) Contradiction in project goals: (a) rehabilitate townhouses; (b) provide housing for existing low income population.	2,3				●			●		
• (LMR) Size of project and diversity of users increased political complexity in decision making.	1,2,3				●					●
• (LMR) Difficulty of fostering industrial development in predominantly residential project. Industrial area should have been outside of project.	1,2,3				●					●
• (LMR) Competitive haggling among community organizations for designation as developer of housing parcels.	2,3			●			●			
• (LMR) Hesitation of board to evict tenants to be relocated.	3		●					●		
• (LMR) Failure/difficulty to utilize newly constructed subsidized housing as relocation resource.	3		●				●			
• (LMR) Reluctance to rescind designation in case of nonperformance by developers.	3	●							●	
• (LMR) Lack of flexibility in timing of reuse appraisals and rigid disposition price for small parcels for desirable development. (i.e. reuse appraisals may cost more than disposition proceeds.)	3		●				●			
• (LMR) Delays in planning and implementing project improvements.	2,3			○					○	
• (LMR) Difficulty of disposition of small parcels to private developers where one townhouse was demolished. (No ready mechanism for building new townhouse.)	3		●						●	
• (LMR) Failure to take test borings where poor subsoil conditions affect development costs and land value.	3		●							●
• (LMR) Hardship acquisitions provide quilt work pattern of acquisition and leads to less efficient staging, particularly in absence of sufficient project funds.	3		●			●				
• (LMR) Change of HUD Regional Office from New York to Boston and creation of Area Office created less predictable decision-making process.	3		●					●		

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

BOSTON - SOUTH END PROJECT
(continued)

Types of Factors (See Previous Text)

(E) Signifies Exagenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Lacal Management Related Factors
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Stage during which factor was significant
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FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE: Somewhat Important (A)	Important (B)	Very Important (C)	Crucial (D)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE: Definitely Unavoidable (A)	Probably Unavoidable (B)	Passibly Avoidable (C)	Probably Avoidable (D)	Definitely Avoidable (E)
• (LMR) Requirement impased by Project Area Committee ta provide relocatian within project boundaries.	3			●			●			
• (LMR) Project Area Committee veto on developer designation.	3	●					●			
• (LMR) Excessive reliance on far-reaching transportation plans and difficulty of coordinoting with State Transportatian Department.	1,2,3				●				●	
• (LMR) Unreality af projected costs of rehabilitation.	2,3			●					●	
• (LMR) Law estimate of project improvements in original budget as part of grantsmanship.	2,3			●				●		
• (LMR) Excessive reliance an dynamism of individual leaders.	3			●			●			
• (LMR) Unclear decisian-making process after 1967; conflicts between site office and central office in decisians that affect developers.	3			●					●	
• (LMR) Rapid turnover of BRA staff at all levels: five chief administrators of BRA and seven project directors over project's histary.	3			●				●		
• (LMR) Ineffectual administrotian of rehabilitotion grants and loans, (exacerbated by shortages of federol funds).	3			●					●	
• (LMR) Slowness af FHA appravol af payment to contractars increases contractar costs and estimates.	3		●							●
• (LMR) Difficulty of transfer to title of tax-foreclosed properties fram city's Real Property Department to BRA.	3			●					●	
• (MARK) Lack of availability af low income housing units as relacatian resource.	3			●		●				
• (MARK) Vandalism affects market for industrial parcels.	3			●		●				
• (MARK) Parking facilities and present street pattern nat suitable for industrial development.	3			●			●			
• (MARK) Decline in population reduces marketability af sites designated for commerciol use.	3	●					●			
• (MARK) Blight removal successful, but na current reuse adjacent ta elevated transit line until it is removed.	3				○	○				
• (NPR) Failure to provide predictable or rational level af funds and changes af rules af funding game.	2,3	●						●		

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

BOSTON - SOUTH END PROJECT
(continued)

Types of Factors (See Previous Text)

(E) Signifies Exogenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors
(MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors
(NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors

Stage during which factor was significant
1 - Pre-planning
2 - Planning
3 - Execution

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE (Somewhat Important / Important / Very Important / Crucial)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE (Definitely Unavoidable / Probably Unavoidable / Possibly Avoidable / Probably Avoidable / Definitely Avoidable)
• (NPR) Inability to combine realistic schedule of project improvements with federal funds; most recent amendatory pays for administration and interest and little more.	3	●	●
• (NPR) Gamesmanship of non-cash credits lead to a project of inappropriate size.	3	●	●
• (NPR) Frequent changes of guidelines: environmental, historical, proclaimers.	3	●	●
• (NPR) Difficulty of coordinating acquisition of property with development of subsidized housing. (FHA delays)	3	●	●
• (NPR) Rigidity of income limits for tenants in different types of subsidized housing seriously affects usefulness of newly constructed subsidized housing as a relocation resource.	3	●	●
• (NPR) Difficulty of proclaimer apparatus.	3	●	●
• (NPR) Lack of engineering and developer expertise in area HUD.	3	●	●
• (NPR) FHA's stringent parking regulations less applicable to South End where the automobile is less essential.	2,3	●	●

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Table V-8

EXOGENOUS DELAYS -- SOUTH END PROJECT (Mass R-56)

FACTOR NUMBER	V. IMPACT MATRIX (Page 1) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
1	INCREASED USE OF AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES	-- /	-- /	A /	- /	+ /	- /	0 /	0 /	- / A	+ / O	- / -	0 / O
2	RADIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	-- /	-- /	A /	- /	+ /	- /	0 /	0 /	- / O	+ / O	- / -	0 / O
3	CIRCUMFERENTIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	- /	-- /	- /	- /	0 /	- /	0 /	0 /	0 / O	0 / O	- / O	0 / O
4	DECLINE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION	-- /	- /	- /	+ /	+ /	0 /	0 /	0 /	+ / +	- / O	- / O	0 / O
5	INCREASED AIR TRAVEL	0 /	- /	- /	- /	0 /	- /	0 /	0 /	0 / O	0 / O	- / -	0 / O
6	RESISTANCE TO URBAN EXPRESSWAYS	0 /	- /	- /	0 /	0 /	+ /	0 /	-- /	A / +	A / +	-- / -	- / O
7	HIGH-LEVEL TOTAL HOUSING PRODUCTION	- /	- /	- /	-- /	-- /	- /	0 /	0 /	- / O	- / O	0 / O	0 / O
8	SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAMS	A /	- /	+ /	-- /	++ /	+ /	++ /	-- /	- / -	++ / ++	- / -	++ / A
9	OUTLYING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING	- /	- /	- /	+ /	- /	0 /	0 /	- /	+ / +	- / O	0 / O	0 / O
10	RISING DEPENDENCY AMONG PUBLIC HOUSING FAMILIES	- /	- /	- /	-- /	-- /	- /	- /	- /	- / -	-- / O	- / -	- / O
11	EXCLUSIONARY HOUSING LAWS	- /	+ /	+ /	- /	+ /	+ /	- /	+ /	- / A	+ / ++	- / -	- / O
12	UNEQUAL HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT	0 /	0 /	0 /	- /	- /	0 /	0 /	0 /	- / --	- / -	- / -	- / -
13	INCREASED SIZE OF NEW HOUSING UNITS	0 /	0 /	- /	+ /	+ /	+ /	0 /	0 /	+ / O	+ / O	0 / O	0 / O
14	RAPID CHANGES IN HOUSING TECHNOLOGY AND STYLES	- /	- /	0 /	+ /	+ /	+ /	0 /	0 /	+ / O	+ / O	- / O	0 / O
15	RACIALLY-SEGREGATED HOUSING MARKETS	- /	- /	- /	- /	A /	- /	0 /	- /	- / O	A / +	- / O	0 / O
16	MINORITY-GROUP EXPANSION	- /	- /	- /	- /	A /	A /	- /	0 /	- / O	A / O	- / O	- / O
17	RACIAL DESEGREGATION (in South only)	- /	- /	- /	- /	A /	- /	- /	0 /	- /	A /	0 /	0 /
18	RACIAL DISORDERS	- /	- /	- /	- /	- /	++ /	- /	-- /	-- / -	- / O	- / -	- / -
19	RISING URBAN CRIME RATES	- /	-- /	- /	-- /	-- /	+ /	- /	- /	-- / -	- / -	-- / --	- / -
20	MORE ADULT-ORIENTED HOUSEHOLDS	+ /	+ /	+ /	++ /	+ /	+ /	+ /	0 /	+ / ++	+ / +	+ / O	+ / O
21	CHANGE TOWARDS MORE CASUAL AND LEISURE-ORIENTED LIFE STYLES	- /	- /	0 /	-- /	- /	- /	- /	0 /	-- / A	- / -	- / O	- / A
22	RELATIVE DECLINE IN PERCEIVED QUALITY OF CENTRAL-CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS	- /	- /	- /	-- /	-- /	+ /	- /	0 /	-- / -	-- / -	- / -	- / -

SOUTH END

SOUTH END

FACTOR NUMBER	V. IMPACT MATRIX (Page 2) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF THE RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
23	LOOSE MONETARY CONDITIONS	O	O	+	+	+	O	++	+	+ / ++	+ / O	+ / +	++ / ++
24	TIGHT MONETARY CONDITIONS	O	O	−	−	−	O	−−	−−	− / −−	− / O	− / −	−− / −−
25	RED-LINING	O	O	O	O	−	A	−	O	−	−−	−−	−−
26	RISING REAL INCOMES AND CONSUMPTION STANDARDS	+	−	+	+	+	+	O	O	+ / +	A / O	+ / O	+ / +
27	FISCAL SQUEEZE ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS	O	−	O	−	O	A	−	−−	−− / −−	− / −	− / −	− / O
28	OUTLYING SHOPPING CENTERS	−−	−	−	−	O	−	O	O	− / O	− / O	−− / −	O / O
29	INCREASED USE OF OFFICE SPACE	++	+	++	+	+	+	++	O	+ / ++	+ / O	+ / O	O / O
30	INVOLVEMENT OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN REAL ESTATE	O	O	+	+	+	+	++	−−	O / O	O / O	O / O	+ / O
31	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY NEEDS	−	A	+	−	−	+	+	+	− / O	O / −	A / −	+ / O
32	NON-BRANCH BANKING	A	O	++	O	O	++	+	+	O	O	−	+
33	LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL OR INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES	A	+	++	+	O	++	+	+	+ / ++	O / +	++ / O	+ / +
34	ANTI-GOVERNMENT ORIENTATION OF LOCAL LEADERS	−	−	O	−	−	−−	−	−−	− / −	− / +	− / −	− / −
35	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF URBAN GROWTH	−−	−−	−	++	O	+	O	O	++ / A	A / A	− / −	O / O
36	CONTINUED AGING OF OLDER BUILDINGS	+	A	++	++	+	+	O	O	++ / −	+ / +	+ / −	− / −
37	OBSOLESCENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE	−	−−	O	−	O	+	−	−−	− / −	O / O	−− / −	− / −
38	FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTS AND LACK OF REGIONAL PLANNING	O	−	O	O	O	−	−	+	O / A	O / O	− / −	− / O

LEGEND

++ MAJOR STRENGTHENING IMPACT

\+ SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT MAJOR, STRENGTHENING IMPACT

O NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

A AMBIGUOUS IMPACT

− SIGNIFICANT BUT NOT MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

−− MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

Prepared By REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

ACCELERATING FACTORS

BOSTON-SOUTH END

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE
Types of Factors (See Previous Text) (E) Signifies Exogenous Factor (LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors (MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors (NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors	Stage during which factor was significant 1 - Pre-planning 2 - Planning 3 - Execution	Somewhat Important / Important / Very Important / Crucial (A B C D)
• (E) State law permits tax agreements with developers.	3	C
• (NPR) Ability to borrow from project to project cushions uncertainties of Federal spending.	3	C
• (LMR) Attempt to start acquisition of land and designate developer at the same time.	3	B
• (LMR) Attempt to get new construction on least desirable land first -- to make remainder more attractive.	2,3	B
• (LMR) Maintaining high quality design of new construction.	3	D
• (LMR) Realistic parcelization.	2	C
• (LMR) Early land acquisition developed housing for relocation resource available near start of project execution.	1,2	C
• (LMR) Close relationship between City Hall and BRA -- in city where mayors support is vital for any major decision.	2,3	D
• (LMR) High quality planning operation with real support of community.	1,2	C
• (LMR) Initial dynamism of leaders.	1,2,3	D
• (LMR) Assigning responsibility to an individual to keep on top of everything for a particular developer (ex. Stewart Forbes and Boston Center for the Arts).	3	B
• (LMR) Relationship between BRA and Public Facilities Department.	3	B
• (MARK) Increasing value and desirability of land.	2,3	D

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VI. WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT

A. Summary Data on Project

The Washington Park Project is a 502-acre residential project in a predominantly black neighborhood three miles south of Boston's Central Business District. Its purpose was the preservation and expansion of the residential character through rehabilitation. Removal of blight required the clearance of 30 percent of the 8,800 residential units. In addition to project improvements of lights, streets, water and sewer, the plan called for the construction, for local non-cash credit, of a courthouse, police station, YMCA, Boys Club, four elementary schools, two branch libraries, a health center, and park facilities. Three of the four schools have not been built, resulting in a problem in gaining sufficient non-cash credits to close the project. Several of the parcels designated for parks have been turned down by the Parks Department. There are several hundred properties in need of rehabilitation, and the number is currently increasing more rapidly than rehabilitation is occurring. There are a number of vacant and abandoned shells in the project area, many of them accounted for by an infill public housing developer that went bankrupt.

The latest revised budget for the project is $68 million, $30 million from federal grant and the remainder in non-cash local grant-in-aid. Excess local share credits over $15 million were to be pooled for credit to other projects. The failure to build three schools has thwarted the planned excess of local share credits.

TABLE VI-1: Statistical Summary of Urban Renewal Project City of Boston, Mass.

1. Project Number: Boston R-24

2. Project Name: Washington Park Project

3. Management Type: NDP _____ Conventional X

4. HUD Project Classification (I-XII): Residential

5. Distance from CBD: 3 miles

6. Project size: 502 acres

7. Renewal mode: Predominantly rehabilitation (30 percent clearance)

8. Total Dwelling Units :

To be cleared	2,502
To be rehabilitated	5,164
To be retained without treatment	-0-
Treatment not determined	1,195

9. Total Federal Grant: $30 million

   Basis: 2/3 X 3/4 _____

10. Local Non-Cash Grants-in-Aid: $37.6 million

Washington Park



boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

Washington Park

Functional Pattern

Washington Park



key

- RESIDENTIAL
- COMMERCIAL
- OPEN SPACE
- INDUSTRIAL

boston
massachusetts
Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

Washington Park

Land Use Plan

0 500 1000

Table VI-2

PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS
WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT

Gross Project Size	502 Acres
(-) Streets/Public Rights-of-Way	107
Net Project Area	395 Acres

	Initial Land Use		Proposed Re-use		Proposed Acquisition		Current Disposition Plan	
	Acres	% of Net Project Area	Acres	% of Net Project Area	Acres	% of Initial Land Use	Acres	% of Total
Residential Total	330	84 %	100	30	100	30	75	50
Public	0	0	2.2	1			2.2	1
Private	330	84	100	30	100	30	73	49
Nonresidential	66	16	35	53	35	53	58	38
Commercial	23	6	14	61	14	61	12	8
Industrial	5	1	2	40	2	40	2	1
Institutional/Open Space	38	10	19	50	19	50	44	29
Streets and Public R-O-W	107		101		17	16	18	12
Project Total	502				151	30	151	100

Source: BRA Records.

B. Project Area Dynamics

1. Characteristics of the Population

The Washington Park Project lies in the heart of Roxbury, an inner city ghetto in Boston about four miles south of the Central Business District. The project area and surrounding model cities neighborhood have experienced a 42 percent reduction in population since 1950, a decline from 122,000 in 1950 to 71,000 in 1970. There was, at the same time an increase in the non-white population. Within the project area, the proportion of non-whites increased from 45 percent in 1950 to 71 percent in 1970, while in the surrounding model cities area, the proportion of non-whites was 74 percent in 1970. The area has been in the throes of a rapid transition toward an exclusively non-white resident population.

The income distribution for 1970 is remarkably similar to that of 1960, showing a dollar increase in the decade, but a considerable decline in actual family purchasing power. Relative to the rest of Boston, the income in Washington Park was declining rapidly. The family income in the project area was nearly identical to that of the surrounding model cities neighborhood. Income and employment trends were affecting the two areas in the same ways, and the economic forces that have fostered deterioration in the area surrounding Roxbury are still operating in Washington Park.

The combination of a rapid decline in population with a decline in real family purchasing power has led to disaster for many area retailers. Many retail outlets along Blue Hill Avenue, just outside the project area, and along Washington Street are now boarded up. The new Washington Park Shopping Center has not been a profitable venture for either developers or retailers mainly because the population and real income declined in a way not foreseen in the market studies of 1962 and 1965.

The most active years of the renewal project coincided with a reduction in population in Roxbury; the change to a predominantly black population; an increase in the number of welfare families; and a reduction in real income. The project area was thus redeveloped in direct opposition to the forces that continue the deterioration of the surrounding area.

2. Land Use

Roxbury is primarily a residential area, with a commercial center at Dudley Square and commercial strips along major streets. To the south of the project lies Franklin Park, location of the Boston Zoo. The part of the project that lies closest to Franklin Park contains some beautiful frame

Table VI-3

WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

	1950	1960	1970	1950-1960	1960-1970	Proportion of Boston, 1970
Total Population	32,750	26,200	20,100	(-) 20%	(-) 23%	3%
Negro Population	8,200	18,500	18,300	125%	(-) 1%	17%
% Negro Population	26%	71%	91%			
Population Over 65		2,900	1,950		(-) 33%	
% Over 65		11%	10%			
Median Income		$5,023	$6,928		(+) 38%	
% Under $3,000		29%	17%			
% Over $10,000		8%	29%			

Source: BRA Research Department.

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houses along tree-lined streets. East and west of the project are badly deteriorated residential areas with frame houses and three-deckers, Boston's most serious area of housing abandonment, and a number of vacant lots.

Roxbury became a part of Boston in 1868. It experienced successive waves of ethnic groups: first, Irish, then Jews, now blacks. The migrations moved into Washington Park from the north, and the southern part of the project area was best maintained. The street facing Franklin Park is lined with attractive apartment buildings, and nearly half of the tenants of these buildings were white in 1970. However, a couple of these apartment buildings are now boarded up. Since 1970, many of the white tenants have moved out.

The original plan for the 186-acre part of the project called for 25 percent clearance of the residential structures. The members of the Washington Park Steering Committee had pushed for 60 percent clearance. Physical deterioration of buildings was proceeding so rapidly that more clearance was deemed necessary when the final plans were prepared than was true at the time of the Survey and Planning application. With the expansion of the project area from 186 to 502 acres, a much higher proportion of clearance was to occur in the original 186-acre tract.

3. Social Organization

The politics of community participation in the urban renewal process were less complex than in the other projects examined. Local leaders were active in the urban renewal committees and were strongly in favor of urban renewal as a mechanism of improving the neighborhood. These leaders worked hard to develop support for the renewal project.

The individuals most influential in the renewal process were upper middle class blacks living in the southern part of the project area. They saw renewal as a means of removing the blighting influences from the neighborhood. A neighborhood organization, Freedom House, took the lead, during the late 1950's, in developing community support for the renewal project. Starting in 1954, it had organized block associations. The block associations, initially were involved in clean-up campaigns or opposing liquor licenses. By 1959, there were 27 such block associations. Roxbury Community Council (RCC) was another organization that had representatives from 65 Roxbury organizations, including welfare organizations, neighborhood groups, and churches. During the planning and pre-planning period, there was some competition between Freedom House and RCC, but both groups supported the Boston Planning Board's proposal for the 186-

acre project, and both groups represented the more middle class members of the black community.

The groups that were to be most affected by renewal, the poor families living in the worst housing units, had little capacity for participation in community politics of the early 1960's. These families had moved into the middle Roxbury area in great numbers during the 1950's because of the availability of low rent housing, usually in dilapidated structures. Earning less than $3,000 per year, they were not involved in the existing organizations in the area. New to the area, their presence was resented by the middle class black residents. In fact, the rapid influx of very poor families was seen as a major blighting influence, and the organized community groups, wishing to stabilize the area, opposed the construction of public housing. Unlike the politics of the South End, there was no community organization that saw itself as the champion of the lower income black population. The community leaders were anxious that relocation housing be available for lower income families that were displaced, but were not the least concerned that these families had a right to stay in the neighborhood.

In addition to the lower income families, there was an established blue collar population: property owners and families with low but steady income that was somewhat higher than public housing limits. This population shared a middle class life style and came out in broad support of renewal.

> "Combining the leadership and organizational skills of an upper-class elite with the basically sympathetic views of a broad spectrum of less affluent, less articulate residents, would most likely produce a solid prorenewal coalition."[1]

During the planning period, the only two organizations that were concerned with local participation were the RCC and Freedom House. The RCC was a somewhat cumbersome organization representing social agencies and welfare groups, while Freedom House was a smaller organization controlled primarily by two prominent local citizens. Although there was competition over which group would get renewal funds for local participation, both groups were in fundamental agreement over the goals of renewal.[2] The leaders of Freedom House, Otto and Muriel Snowden, made an all out effort to sell renewal to the entire community. Freedom House set up the Washington Park Steering Committee consisting of 25 local leaders. BRA's

[1]Langley Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969, page 152.

[2]Ibid., p. 165.

interaction in the community during the planning period was a process of educating the members of the steering committee to the renewal process rather than negotiation between an official agency and local community representatives.

During the planning period, no significant voice of opposition was raised against renewal. The only organized opposition was to the proposed cross-town Highway, which was to demolish a number of substantial houses in good repair. The opposition was not to renewal, but to one element of the plan.

The setting for the plan enabled the BRA to engineer local consent for the renewal plan with hardly a token expression of opposition. This was possible through a process of excluding the poor blacks from participation in the planning. During the period 1959-1966, which included the planning period and completion of most of the demolition and relocation, it was possible to operate a program in such a fashion. After the riots of 1967, it would not have been possible to have brought about the massive relocation of poor families that occurred 1963-1966 without lively political op position. Given the strong support for renewal by the organized community, the BRA had a free hand to proceed to a fast moving execution of the renewal plans.

4. Building Conditions

In 1958, the Boston Planning Board had sponsored a survey which indicated that only one house in twenty in the original 186-acre project area would require clearance, while the remainder could still be rehabilitated. However, the area was deteriorating quickly with the rapid influx of poor black families and the out-migration of middle class families of both races. In 1959, plans for a renewal project were announced. By late 1961, less than four years after the 1958 survey, a BRA study came to the conclusion that it was most feasible to clear 55 percent of the dwelling units. A very rapid deterioration of the physical structures in the area resulted from the double force of population transition combined with the announcement of a renewal plan.

BRA policy simply did not tolerate any clearance level higher than 30 percent after the debacle of the West End Project a few years earlier. The enlargement of the project area to include the sound structures toward Franklin Park made it possible to allow the project to remain a rehabilitation project, although over half of the units in the original area required clearance.

Overall in the project area, there were 8,861 dwelling units. The final plan called for clearance of 2,502 dwelling units and the rehabilitation of 5,164 dwelling units. There was to be no significant change in land use except for the elimination of the commercial strip along Warren Street and the concomitant construction of shopping centers on both sides of the project.

5. Transportation

The Washington Park Project is currently served by the Orange Line MBTA elevated along Washington Street down the entire western periphery. Buses on Warren Street feed into the rapid transit stop at Dudly Square at the northern tip. The Orange Line provides excellent transportation to downtown Boston and connects with other rapid transit lines.

The project area is not well planned for automobile and truck access. Driving downtown, one must drive through one of the congested streets in the South End. The project is not in proximity to any freeways. The proposed crosstown Highway was to provide better access to the Southeast Expressway two miles to the east or the proposed highway down the southwest corridor. It is dubious that any of these highways will be constructed. The one segment of the crosstown Highway within the project boundaries was constructed, providing a little utilized six lane roadway cutting through the middle of the project. Plans now call for demolition of the elevated rapid transit and its removal to a corridor a half mile west of the project area. Such a move would reduce accessibility of the project from the downtown area, but would allow for the disposition of several parcels left along Washington Street.

C. Project History

A chronology of key dates in the planning and execution of the Washington Park Project is included in Table VI-3. A graphic presentation of the activities in the execution stage is provided in Exhibit VII-1. The following discussion focuses on events that affected the planning and execution of the project.

1. The Pre-Planning Stage

The pre-planning stage for the Washington Park Project was a period in which local groups became interested in renewal as a means of preserving the neighborhood and placing pressure on the city to develop a renewal project within the area.

Washington Park Project-Chronology

PRE-PLANNING	1949 December	• Freedom House incorporated
	1954	• Roxbury Community Council forms to deal with renewal • Freedom House begins to organize block associations
	1958	• Boston Planning Board proposes 186-acre renewal project
PLANNING	1959 March	• BRA approves S&P application and submits to HUD • Lloyd Sinclair, Project Director
	April	• City Council approves S&P application
	1960 August	• HUD approval of S&P advance
	1961 Spring	• BRA makes application for GNRP for Roxbury • Freedom House funded for community organization of project • Project boundaries revised from 186-acres to 502-acres • Robert Rowland, Project Director
	1962 April	• Amended application for S&P advance
	June	• HUD approves amended application for S&P
	Summer	• Establishment of Citizens Urban Renewal Committee
	December	• Early land adquisition starts

Washington Park Project-Chronology (continued)

EXECUTION	1963		
	January	•	Public meeting in Washington Park endorses plan
		•	LUMS Study supports shopping centers on Warren Street and Washington Street
		•	Application for Loan and Grant, Part I and Part II
	February	•	Local Approval of Urban Renewal Plan
	April	•	BRA opens site office
	May	•	HUD approval of Loan and Grant, Part II
		•	Tad Tercyak, Project Director
	December	•	58 percent of land acquisition completed
		•	Banks pool $6 million for Washington Park rehabilation
	1964		
	Spring	•	Market study on shopping center parcel on Warren Street supports development of projected size
		•	Charlane I opens; first subsidized housing in Washington Park
		•	Supreme Markets ousted as developer of shopping center in dispute over design
	1965		
		•	Demolition and relocation pass 50 percent completion
		•	Racial Imbalance law passes
		•	ABCD funded for Community Action Program
	1966		
	January	•	Amendatory of $8 million approved
		•	Acquisition 95 percent complete
		•	Sam Thompson, Project Director
		•	First 312 Rehabilitation Grant
		•	BURP rehabilitation experiment begins

Washington Park Project-Chronology (continued)

EXECUTION (continued)	1967		
	March	•	Model Cities plan submitted for Roxbury and North Dorchester
	June	•	HUD approves public housing tower, first public housing in area
		•	HUD approves grant for neighborhood center
	Summer	•	Riots in Roxbury
		•	Shopping center opens on Warren Street
		•	A&P and Woolworths pull out of shopping center on Washington Street and developer fails to get financing
	1968		
	Februray	•	Community Committee on Housing forces BRA to take responsibility of relocation from developers in relocation controversy
	March	•	BRA approves design of Civic Center and Library
	April	•	Roxbury Library Committee petitions stop of bids on Civic Center
	June	•	Opening of swimming pool, ice rink
	1969		
		•	Shopping center refinanced
		•	Blairs Foodland closes -- Washington Park market
		•	Ernest Berry, Project Director
	1970		
		•	Matt Curry, Project Director
	1971		
	March	•	Amendatory application made and approved for 5.6 million
		•	Freedom House dropped for community organization

Washington Park Project-Chronology (continued)

EXECUTION (continued)	1973 March	• Amendatory application for $586,696 • Marvin Hightower, Project Director

Source: BRA Records, Interviews, Newspapers

Initial momentum for urban renewal was developed within the community itself by Freedom House and the Roxbury Community Council (RCC). In 1954, Freedom House started forming block associations to work for neighborhood improvement.

At first, the block associations focused on the planting of trees, improved garbage collection, snow removal, and paving of streets. By 1958, Freedom House and the block associations concluded that it was necessary to establish contacts with Boston's political structure in order to focus attention upon the needs of the Roxbury community. In 1958, the Roxbury Community Council and Freedom House came together to back the proposal of the former Boston Planning Board for a pilot urban renewal project in a 186-acre section. The proposal was approved by the City Council in 1959 and given HUD approval in August of 1960.

The long time residents of Washington Park saw renewal as a means of maintaining an integrated neighborhood. The RCC attempted to get resolutions of support for a renewal plan from all of its member organizations and agencies. The application for the Survey and Planning Advance came as a response to the organized pressure for renewal from Roxbury.

From the point of view of Boston planners, the 186-acre project was chosen as an area that was deteriorating most rapidly. If the blight in this one area could be checked, it was felt that the neighborhoods to the south could be protected. At the same time that the 186 acres was selected, a Survey and Planning application was made for a larger 1,000-acre area. The larger project, which included the smaller one, was not funded.

2. The Planning Phase

The planning phase lasted from the submission of the Survey and Planning application in 1959 until final HUD approval in 1963. During the planning period, housing conditions deteriorated rapidly in the originally defined 186-acre area. When Edward Logue become redevelopment administrator in 1960, he was not entirely enthusiastic about the project. He wrote of it:

> "This can be an attractive project if it is part of an overall area program."

He understood that as a single project, it would not play a sufficient role in the stabilization of Roxbury. It could not stand alone. Nevertheless, as redevelopment administrator, this was to be the first project for which he was to obtain federal funds.

In 1961, in Logue's attempt to make the Washington Park Project part of an overall strategy for Roxbury, BRA made an application for a GNRP for Roxbury. The BRA was making plans for the project in an attempt to get it into execution in the fall of 1961. However, as the planning progressed, it became apparent that more clearance was required than was considered desirable: 55 percent of the area required clearance. The decision was made to enlarge the size of the project so as to keep the relative amount of clearance below 30 percent. The amended application for Survey and Planning Advance for the 502-acre project was submitted in April 1962 and approved by HUD in June.

The planning pace was from this point rapid. Within eight months, the applications for Loan and Grant, Parts I and II, had been locally approved and submitted to HUD simultaneously in January 1963. HUD approval came May 1, 1963.

During the planning period, efforts were made to ensure the cooperation of the community. From the outset, there was general agreement between the BRA and the newly formed Citizens Urban Renewal Action Committee (CURAC). There were a few minor disputes, such as the preferred locations of a school and the dislocations caused by the proposed crosstown Highway. The major planning problem was to obtain the consent of the groups affected by a plan that in terms of land use was straight forward. The plan called for the demolition and rebuilding of housing, and the development of new community services: libraries, parks, ice rink-swimming pool, a boys club, and shopping center. Issues that might have come up, such as the construction of public housing or availability of relocation housing for the poor, were barely mentioned.

In December 1962, early land acquisition started. A large number of parcels were taken by eminent domain totalling about 40 acres, almost a quarter of all land acquired. The acquisition of this land six months before final HUD approval gave an early start to demolition and relocation, and made it possible to have the first new units open to residents in 1964, less than a year and a half after the project received its funding.

3. Execution

HUD approval of the Loan and Grant was May 1, 1963. The BRA put a local project team into Washington Park that was highly skilled. There was strong support from the community, particularly from Freedom House, and conditions were optimal for an immediate execution of the project.

a. Acquisition

Altogether, BRA acquired about 150 acres in the Washington Park Project. Forty acres were acquired in an early massive land acquisition; the land was taken by eminent domain on December 5, 1962. During the year and a half after HUD approval, an additional 85 acres were taken. Hence, at the end of 20 months, over 80 percent of the land to be acquired had been acquired and after three years, it was 95 percent complete. The commitment was to proceed as rapidly as possible. The pace was greatly accelerated by the ability to take land prior to price negotiation with the owner.

b. Relocation

Relocation proceeded swiftly. During the first twenty months of project execution, 50 percent of the families were relocated. The BRA was pushing to clear a major section of the sites designed for new schools, facilities, and housing. There was a cooperative push from the relocation office, Freedom House, and city agencies, in an attempt to provide services to families that needed relocation. By the end of 1964, some of the first units constructed were ready for occupancy, providing the first relocation resources within the project. However, during the first year, the relocation was usually to other areas.

Overall, it appears that relocation proceeded with little antagonism. Those who had to move for the most part accepted their fate with resignation. During one relocation crisis, it is said that Ed Logue came to Washington Park and sat up all night. The agency pushed hard to achieve its relocation objectives and according to most reports, executed it well. The BRA's relocation director won the respect of local leaders.

After 1964, the pace of relocation was slower but steady. It took six years to achieve 90 percent of the relocation case load. However, there is no indication that this relocation significantly held up the pace of land disposition.

c. Demolition

Demolition proceeded very much at the same pace as relocation, proceeding very rapidly for the first two years and gradually slowing down until it was 85 percent complete in 1967. After 1967, the

KEY COMPONENTS OF EXECUTION STAGE

Washington Park

Boston, Mass.



pace of demolition slowed, as BRA's push to complete Washington Park diminished.

d. Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation proceeded at a slow rate during the first three years of the project. In 1963, under pressure from BRA and the city government, a group of banks pooled $6 million for rehabilitation in Washington Park. This was an important development in an area that had been generally red-lined at least since 1958. Using conventional financing, about 25 percent of the houses were rehabilitated during the first three years. In 1961, the first 312 rehabilitation grants were made in Washington Park and the pace of rehabilitation picked up, and passed the 50 percent completion mark in 1967. At the present time,rehabilitation is said to be over 90 percent complete, although many houses certified as complete five or ten years ago, are currently in a state of ill repair.

In October of 1967, HUD announced the Boston Rehabilitation Program (BURP), which was to rehabilitate 2,000 units in Roxbury within eight months. Of the 2,000 units, 800 were for Washington Park and 1,200 units for the Roxbury area surrounding Washington Park. In conjunction with BURP, BRA agreed to accept responsibility for the relocation of 800 families from Washington Park. However, no provision whatsoever was made for the relocation of the 1,200 families outside of Washington Park. In December of 1967, large numbers of families were thrown out of their housing to begin the rehabilitation in the area outside of Washington Park. This created a storm of community protest over relocation. In April of 1968, a fact-finding committee on BURP and the Citizens Housing and Planning Association of Metropolitan Boston, Inc. published recommendations for a humane relocation plan. At this time, additional funds were secured to cover moving expenses and relocation payments for displaced BURP tenants. Relocatees were guaranteed the right to return to rehabilitated units and developers committed themselves to offer no units on the private market until the needs of displaced families were met. However, many tenants were simply thrown out on the market prior to the new program and the resulting outcry from the community was aimed not only at HUD, but also at BRA.

e. Public Facilities

The development of public facilities progressed the most slowly of all and is currently only 45 percent complete. During 1965, the Racial Imbalance Law was passed. This law, combined with the emerging regulations from the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, prevented the construction of three of the four schools planned for Washington Park. The original strategy for the project had been based on the development of new schools and public facilities which were to maintain the attractiveness of the area to many of the middle class residents. The failure to build schools and develop the park served to expedite the migration of middle income families out of the area.

The failure to build public facilities may have accelerated the downward trend of the area and contributed to the failure to dispose of some commercial properties.

f. Project Improvements

Project improvements proceeded at a very slow rate. It took over five years from 1963-1968 for project improvements to reach 40 percent completion. In 1969, a new engineering staff was placed on the renewal team, and major contracts were let for water and sewer. During 1973, the final streets and lighting were put in completing the project improvements.

g. Land disposition

Land disposition progressed quickly, following closely the pace of relocation and demolition during the first four years of the project. Within four years (by 1967) approximately two-thirds of the total land had been disposed. Following 1967, land disposition proceeded at an ever slower rate, achieving 85 percent completion by 1973.

The bulk of the land for disposition in Washington Park was for residential usage, and the largest parcels were devoted to FHA housing, subsidized under the 221d(3) program. The subsidy provided sound housing at prices competitive with the surrounding area and ensured a strong market. As long as the subsidy could be provided, there was no difficulty in disposing of the bulk of the land. It is interesting to speculate on the likelihood of disposing of the land in the absence of a housing subsidy program. Given the cost of housing, the prices

PATTERN OF LAND DISPOSITION (DEEDED) BY RE-USE CATEGORY

Washington Park

Boston, Mass.



of housing in the neighborhood, and neighborhood characteristics, there was only a very limited market for new unsubsidized housing, particularly in the northern part of the project area. The bulk of the land could not have been sold. Consequently, the disposition of land was made possible only by the subsidy of the 221d(3) program.

The pace of disposition depended upon the readiness of sponsors to develop FHA housing, the availability of subsidy funds, and the processing by FHA. The BRA proceeded with urgency to attempt to have FHA housing built on the land that it had cleared. Although the 221d(3) program was more oriented toward private profit-oriented sponsors, the BRA made the decision to turn to local non-profit groups, particularly churches, to sponsor housing in Washington Park. This required a great deal of extra work for BRA, which, in the words of the project director of 1963-1965, acted as the developer for the non-profit sponsors.[1] The BRA turned to the churches for a number of reasons. Private developers were somewhat leery of the Washington Park area, which had been red-lined since at least 1958 and was considered an area of rapid deterioration. No private developers appeared who were interested in the area. The BRA decided to go directly to the churches and sell them on the idea of becoming sponsors. Furthermore, the BRA could then more closely control the pace of development.

In December 1963, the first major housing parcel was disposed and in 1964, four giant parcels were sold, accounting for 16 percent of the land that was planned for disposition. Three of these were for housing, including the parcels near the shopping center and Academy I on the western edge of the project. The fourth parcel was for the YMCA, which quickly went into construction.

In 1965, the only major disposition was the six-acre parcel to Blair Associates for the construction of the Washington Park Shopping Center. The renewal plan called for the removal of the commercial strip along Warren Avenue and the development of a shopping center at the corner of Warren Avenue and the new crosstown highway which is now called Martin Luther King Boulevard.

[1] Interview with Thaddeus Tercyak, November 1973.

The shopping center on the corner of Warren Street and Martin Luther King Boulevard was developed with few delays. An initial competition for its development was held in 1964, and three developers submitted proposals. Supreme Foods won the design competition and was tentatively designated as the developer; however, after receiving the designation, Supreme Foods attempted to change its design to reduce costs in a way that was considered unsatisfactory by BRA. When Supreme Foods refused to meet the design criteria of its original proposal, it quickly lost its designation as developer, and the BRA named Blair Associates as developer in early 1965. The developer stated that there were no delays at all in the transfer of land and that his relationships with BRA were excellent with the exception of their architect. The BRA architect came out with a lot of changes that affected many aspects of the project. The developer did not like the changes and said, "The building looks more like a factory instead of a nice retail structure." The design did not affect the cost, but affected the attractiveness of the development. He appealed to the project director and the development administrator to accept his design without those changes required by the BRA architect. The developer got a clear and quick decision -- either he would develop it BRA's way, or they would lose the project, whereupon, the developer did it BRA's way. In consequence, although there was a dispute over the design, there was little delay.

There was a LUMS Study for the development of commercial parcels in the project in late 1962. In December of 1964, the BRA commissioned another market study for the particular parcel where the shopping center was to be developed. The market studies concluded that market demand justified the construction of the proposed center as well as a smaller center on the opposite edge of the project. It based its study on the 1960 census figures, and did not adequately consider the continued decline of population or the steady deterioration of the surrounding area. However, there were two major factors that affected the viability of the shopping center which probably could not have been foreseen in 1964. First, the proposed crosstown highway that was to expand the market area was never built outside the project boundaries. Secondly, heavy rioting occurred in surrounding Roxbury during the spring of 1967 which accelerated the outward migration of middle class residents and the general reduction of population.

Land clearance for the shopping center took place during 1965 and early 1966. Project construction proceeded on schedule for an open-

ing in the summer of 1967. The shopping center was developed in accordance with the marketability in the land study of early 1965. During the construction period, all space in the shopping center was sold; however, the riots in Roxbury started during the spring of 1967, almost immediately before the opening of the center and several of the tenants backed out. The project had difficulties right from the start. In 1969, Blair Food Stores closed and the project was refinanced by the partner of the originally designated developer.

A second shopping center had been planned for the intersection of Washington Street and Martin Luther King Boulevard. Delays in the development of this shopping center can be judged today as appropriate. The present population of the area will not support a shopping center at that site. Since the site is adjacent to the elevated Orange Line, it is not appropriate for housing. There appears to be no re-use for the site until the Orange Line is relocated. The stores in the Washington Park shopping center are having difficulty. There is a large Zayre's store which apparently is staying primarily because it has a 25-year lease. The original developer thought Zayre's would happily remove the store if someone would offer them some kind of deal for the space.

In 1966, the pace of land disposition was the greatest. During that one year, 22 percent of the total land to be acquired was deeded to developers. Nine major sites were turned over for the development of FHA projects, mostly sponsored by churches. Included was the massive industrialized housing on Washington Street using precast concrete. In addition, the Boys Club took over its parcel and two smaller industrial parcels adjacent to Dudley Square were deeded.

In 1967, a parcel adjacent to the shopping center was sold to the housing authority for the construction of housing for the elderly. The city also was deeded a school site for the one new school that was built in the project, and the recreational area for development of a hockey rink - swimming pool facility.

In 1967, two major things happened that were to bring the execution of the project, which had proceeded with extraordinary speed for the first four years, to a screeching halt. The first of these was the Roxbury riots, which had the immediate effect of stopping the development of the second shopping center and of commercial disposition in general, and secondly, the departure of Edward Logue from the

BRA. In the words of the head of Freedom House, "BRA lost all interest in Washington Park, and the project died."

Very little happened during 1968 and 1969. The parcels deeded in the early years were developed and housing was made ready for occupancy. St. Joseph's Church was deeded land for one other massive FHA project, and in 1969, the tower for public housing for the elderly was deeded. By this time, the bulk of the land was disposed and what remained were problem sites or sites designated to developers who could not get sufficient funding to complete development schemes. In 1970 and 1971, nine smaller parcels were deeded for infill housing. These quickly went into construction, but following bankruptcy by the developer, most of these parcels were not completed and became vandalized shells. In 1973, ten years after the project went into execution, the Parks Department finally managed to take title to five parcels. The refusal of the Parks Department to earlier approve several of these sites had delayed the needed development of recreational facilities.

h. New Construction

The pace of new construction followed closely the pace of land disposition and had reached over 75 percent completion by mid-1972. New construction has been sluggish since 1969, indicating the slowness of land disposition since 1967. The major construction left is on sites not yet deeded, notably the school sites alluded to above.

Summary

By the end of 1969, most of the new housing construction had been completed. Acquisition, demolition and relocation were virtually completed and land disposition and new construction were approaching 75 percent. However, public facilities had only reached 25 percent partly because of the failure to complete new schools and park projects. Project improvements for water and sewer, streets and lighting were only half completed. Since 1969, project improvements have been virtually completed and the remaining 221d(3) subsidy housing construction has been completed. In the absence of construction of public schools, the local share non-cash credits are insufficient. One major site designated for housing is located along Washington Street and has no present re-use market until the elevated transit line is removed. For the last year or two, the project director has served primarily a public relations position, answering community complaints with regard to trash and rubbish on vacant sites.

Table VI-5

SUMMARY OF ELAPSED TIME
WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT

	Months
Pre-Planning	
First Official Action to Submission of First Survey and Planning Application	12
First Submission of Survey and Planning Application to HUD Approval	17
Planning	
HUD Approval of First Submission to Amended Application for Survey and Planning	21
Amended Application to HUD Approval of Survey and Planning	2
HUD Approval of Amended Survey and Planning Application to Local Approvals of Plan	7
Local Approvals of Plan to Loan and Grant Application, Parts I and II	0
Application for Loan and Grant to HUD Approval	4

Execution	CUMULATIVE TIME IN EXECUTION TO PERCENTAGE COMPLETION				
	25%	50%	75%	100%	November 1973
Acquisition	2 mo.	4 mo.	16 mo.	144 mo.	100 %
Relocation	14	30	58	--	98 %
Demolition	12	30	47	84	100 %
Rehabiliation	45	55	73	--	94 %
Public Facilities	66	--	--	--	45 %
Project Improvements	42	72	96	--	96 %
Land Disposition	27	56	92	--	85 %

Source: BRA Records.

D. Project Analysis

An analysis of the Washington Park Project execution must be divided into two time phases: the period before the summer of 1967 and the period from 1967 to the present. The first four years of the project represent technical excellence in project execution which may serve as a model, speeding up all phases of a project. By 1967, four years after HUD approval, land disposition was 61 percent complete and other phases of the project were moving ahead rapidly.

The extraordinary early success in project execution does not mean that the project itself, as an urban renewal project, is successful. The project is mostly completed with the exception of problems that are beyond the province of the renewal agency, resulting from failure to build the planned schools and make the planned changes in transportation. As one drives through the project area, signs of blight and deterioration are abundantly visible:

1. A surrounding area in which deterioration is progressing rapidly
2. A number of "infill" sites for public housing on which partly constructed units stand vacant and vandalized
3. An older solid apartment building on Franklin Park recently boarded up
4. The deterioration of many houses certified as sound five or ten years ago
5. A number of empty parcels littered with refuse, old tires, or overgrown
6. A shopping center whose viability in the long run is doubtful

The irony of the Washington Park Project is that the technical execution was excellent, while the project itself must today be judged a failure. It is a failure because its future is tied into an area that is still declining. It was to be the first of a number of projects in Roxbury. The Washington Park Project as a single project was fighting trends for that area of the city that are simply overpowering. As a single project standing by itself, its long term prospects are poor. To maintain it as an area of standard housing will require a continuous input of funds and effort. The city, the BRA, and the FHA have apparently no plans to provide the services or funds that would be required to maintain the area because the BRA and the city government are involved in other areas of the city.

Despite the dismal prospects for the project and its lack of success in stemming the blight of the surrounding area, the swift execution during the first four years of the project was extraordinary and may provide insights into the prerequisites for rapid land disposition in a poor inner city residential neighborhood.

In order to dispose of land rapidly in a low income residential project, the following conditions must be available:

1. Availability of subsidy funds on a predictable basis
2. A policy of relocation that meets the needs of the residents and does not stir up community opposition
3. Strong support for the project from the organizational structure of the project area
4. A sense of urgency within both the renewal agency and the city government that can overcome problems

It is instructive to note that all these factors were in effect while the bulk of the land disposition was made in 1964-1967. Success in disposition of residential land was limited to the processing of applications by FHA and the financial viability of housing sponsors. Acquisition of land proceeded on a massive basis during the first three years of the project and relocation proceeded smoothly. The community wanted homes constructed quickly and the urgency to construct housing was present throughout the BRA. The inter-office memoranda dealing with parcels constantly mentioned the urgency of proceeding rapidly. The strong sense of obligation to the community was translated from BRA to the housing sponsors and also to FHA.

BRA decided to develop non-profit sponsors with local neighborhood ties, primarily churches; but the churches initially had no commitment to the construction of housing and no housing expertise. BRA literally had to "beat the bushes" to develop non-profit sponsors for the area.

BRA project personnel went to church leaders and encouraged them to develop housing. In the attempt to encourage the churches to sponsor housing, BRA was very much helped by the fact that it had maintained its credibility with the community. During the massive relocations that followed the rapid acquisition of land, organized opposition to BRA relocation policies never developed. According to one community leader BRA's Chief Administrator, "would stay up all night and sit with families being relocated." In the process of relocation, BRA was very much helped by the support of the churches and of Freedom House. Although Freedom House had had no responsibility in its contact with BRA for relocation, it assisted the relocation process and pushed social agencies to assist those families being relocated. Under pressure from BRA and the community groups, several churches agreed to sponsor housing.

The first developer of FHA housing in Washington Park was the Charles Street Church. The church had no members of its staff who were knowledgeable about housing or housing development. The church became a housing sponsor only after considerable

encouragement from BRA. As in the case of other church developers, BRA provided the necessary expertise. BRA selected the architect, prepared the necessary forms for FHA, obtained the required permits from the city and pressured FHA to process the applications rapidly. The first units in Charlane I were opened in late 1964. The rapidity with which the first FHA units were constructed in Washington Park is quite remarkable.

In the preparation of the projects, BRA was very concerned about maintaining a rent schedule which could be afforded by residents of the area. The rent levels established were below the maximums allowed by HUD. The rent levels were too low to assure adequate management and maintenance. The difficulties of maintenance were aggravated by the fact that FHA did not allow rent increases until 1970. In addition, the church attributed problems in maintenance to shoddy construction which should have been caught by city or FHA inspectors. Extensive repairs during the first three years of the project gives evidence in support of their claim. It is apparent that in the mid-1960's, HUD was not sufficiently cognizant of the problems of managing housing for low to moderate income residents. In the case of unskilled, non-profit sponsors, HUD gave little or no assistance to the whole question of project management. Charlane I and many of the other FHA projects in Washington Park have been operating on the brink of foreclosure for years. However, the problems with the financing of these projects appears to lie more with FHA than with BRA. The Charles Street Church sponsored two additional projects. Charlane I, an apartment, consisted of 92 units. Charlane II was built with 38 units, all of which were 100 percent rent supplement. Rent supplement units are specifically for low income tenants who meet the income requirements of Public Housing as opposed to most 221d(3) tenants who are of moderate income.

The church had particular difficulty in managing these 38 units. The availability of counseling for tenants in the rent supplement units might have made Charlane II a more workable project. Charlane III was a 42-unit rehabilitation project. Throughout the development of the three projects, BRA provided support and direct assistance to the Charles Street Church. A spokesman for the church gave no examples of delays in the projects caused by BRA.

The Washington Park Project is a good example of accelerating factors during the first years of execution. Its speed of execution was acheived by the early land acquisition in 1962, which resulted in more rapid development of the first housing units which could then be used as a relocation resource. In addition, the BRA had extraordinary clout with city agencies in obtaining necessary permits for new construction. This was due to the very close association between the mayor and the redevelopment administrator.

The delay causing factors did not become dominant until 1967. From the point of view of project completion, the most crucial delay was the failure to build three of the four schools planned for the area. By 1965, the sites for the four schools had been acquired, but the same year, the state of Massachusetts passed the Racial Imbalance Law. This law forbade the construction of racially segregated schools. In 1967, the BRA managed to deed one of the sites to the city for the construction of the Trotter School, a magnet elementary school that drew from a wide area and, therefore, met the racial balance test. The other schools' construction has remained blocked and it appears likely that they will never be built.

The schools in the area have a poor reputation. Aside from the Trotter School, the the schools are antiquated and in a poor state of repair. The failure to provide decent educational facilities within the area served to make it increasingly unattractive to middle income residents, who proceeded to leave the project at an increasing rate. It is difficult to see how the failure to build the schools in the project area could have been avoided. However, the failure to provide better educational facilities to area residents probably was avoidable. And it was this failure to provide acceptable schooling that had such a negative effect on the area. The stopping of construction of the schools within the project area was appropriate, given the rulings from courts and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The three large sites that lie overgrown and littered are detrimental to the neighborhood. However, no alternative plans for development have been formulated.

In addition, funds for the construction of schools were to have been used to provide a major portion of local share credits for the project. The failure to construct the schools results in a deficit in the local share contributions, rather than the planned surplus that was to be used to help close out other projects. Therefore, a priority for the area is to improve the quality of education. To the extent that the construction of new schools outside the boundaries of the project provide educational facilities for area residents, it would be desirable to allocate local share credits to the project.

After 1967, there was a rapid turnover of staff at all levels of BRA. Due to the reorganization of the BRA, the project had a series of project directors who had less power to accomplish their goals. Despite a shortage of funds, no new amendatory application was made between 1967 and 1971, when HUD approved an increase of $5.6 million to the Loan and Grant. In 1971, an engineer became project director, and he devoted himself to completing the project improvements. The bulk of the disposition and new construction had already been completed. However, the delays in project improvements did not result in delays in land disposition. But to the extent that the failure to complete streets and lights added to the neglected appearance of the area, the flight of middle class residents was accelerated, and long run prospects for the area diminished.

Similarly, the lack of coordination with the Parks Department led to delays in park development. Title was not transferred on five major park parcels until 1973, about ten years after the project was funded. Such delays were uncharacteristic of the BRA prior to 1967, when Ed Logue was able to exert pressure from the major's office. The Parks Department refused to accept responsibility for continual maintenance of the parks and the BRA was left holding the parcels. Aside from the park parcels themselves, the delay in park development did not hold up the disposition of other land.

The re-use appraisals for the remaining parcels are in many cases more than five years old. It has been particularly difficult to stimulate developer interest in the few remaining commercial sites, and the price uncertainty does not facilitate such interest. There is no apparent market for the second planned shopping center on the western boundary of the project. The rapid population decline of the area makes its proposed commercial re-use inappropriate at this time. At the same time, a residential re-use is precluded by the presence of the elevated transit line. There is no market for such a site until planned removal of the transit line is achieved. In addition, the poor truck access to the area makes it undesirable for industrial use. Hence, the remaining site along Washington Street should be held until the BMTA line is removed, whereupon, it may be used for housing development.

Almost all the land held by BRA is accounted for by the school sites and the parcels along Washington Street. There are a few other small sites. For one parcel, the Montessori School is the proposed developer, but it has not yet obtained the requisite funding. The BRA still expects to deed the lot to the Montessori School and is, in effect, holding the land until the school can raise the funds. The lot is a small rocky promontory that presents great site problems.

Another small 8,500-square-foot lot is planned for development as a tot lot adjacent to the St. Joe's FHA Housing Project. St. Joe's and the BRA have been haggling over a $500 difference in price. The church claims that they were promised the lot for $250 and the re-use appraisal defines the value at $750. The two organizations are at an impasse. The HUD imposed price rigidity for a tiny lot for a non-profit development appears entirely unwarranted. However, the tot lot is a needed amentiy for the housing in the area.

Summary

The Washington Park Project was a mammoth project in which land disposition moved very rapidly during the first four years. Thereafter, land disposition proceeded more slowly partly due to BRA staff turnover, partly due to racial unrest

and the 1967 riots, and partly due to the inability of BRA to deed parcels to the city for schools and parks. The major remaining parcels are the three school sites and parcels along the Washington Street elevated transit line. As it is now probable that two of the three schools will not be built, alternative plans for these sites should now be developed. Also, the parcels along Washington Street should be held until the elevated transit line is removed.

DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

BOSTON - WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE (Somewhat Important / Important / Very Important / Crucial)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE (Definitely Unavoidable / Probably Unavoidable / Possibly Avoidable / Probably Avoidable / Definitely Avoidable)
Types of Factors (See Previous Text) (E) Signifies Exogenous Factor (LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors (MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors (NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors	Stage during which factor was significant 1 - Pre-planning 2 - Planning 3 - Execution		
• (E) States Racial Imbalance Law prevented school construction -- delayed many facets of project and vacant school sites currently blight the area.	3	Crucial	Definitely Unavoidable
• (LMR) Rapid turnover of BRA staff at all levels -- project slowed down after 1967.	3	Very Important	Possibly Avoidable
• (LMR) Design review of projects resulted in shopping center delay.	3	Somewhat Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Delays in planning and implementing project improvements.	3	Very Important	Definitely Avoidable
• (LMR) Lack of coordination and communication with Parks Department.	2,3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Lack of flexibility in getting re-use appraisals.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Disposition price rigidity for small parcels for desirable non-profit developers. (ex. St. Jaes Park)	3	Somewhat Important	Possibly Avoidable
• (MARK) Lack of availability of low income housing as a relocation resource.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (MARK) No market for several commercial sites attributable to rapid population decline in surrounding area as well as in project boundaries.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (MARK) Blight removal successful, but no desirable re-use adjacent to elevated transit line until it is removed.	3	Crucial	Definitely Avoidable

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Table VI-7

EXOGENOUS DELAY--

WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT (Mass R-24)

FACTOR NUMBER	V IMPACT MATRIX (Page 1) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
1	INCREASED USE OF AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES	-- /	-- /	A /	- /	+ /	- /	0 /	0 /	- / -	+ / O	- / -	0 / -
2	RADIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	-- /	-- /	A /	- /	+ /	- /	0 /	0 /	- / -	+ / O	- / -	0 / O
3	CIRCUMFERENTIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	- /	-- /	- /	- /	0 /	- /	0 /	0 /	0 / -	0 / O	- / -	0 / O
4	DECLINE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION	-- /	- /	- /	+ /	+ /	0 /	0 /	0 /	+ / O	- / O	- / O	0 / O
5	INCREASED AIR TRAVEL	0 /	- /	- /	- /	0 /	- /	0 /	0 /	0 / O	0 / O	- / O	0 / O
6	RESISTANCE TO URBAN EXPRESSWAYS	0 /	- /	- /	0 /	0 /	+ /	0 /	-- /	A / +	A / O	-- / O	- / O
7	HIGH-LEVEL TOTAL HOUSING PRODUCTION	- /	- /	- /	-- /	-- /	- /	0 /	0 /	- / -	- / -	0 / -	0 / -
8	SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAMS	A /	- /	+ /	-- /	++ /	+ /	++ /	-- /	- / -	++ / ++	- / +	++ / A
9	OUTLYING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING	- /	- /	- /	+ /	- /	0 /	0 /	- /	+ / O	- / O	0 / O	0 / O
10	RISING DEPENDENCY AMONG PUBLIC HOUSING FAMILIES	- /	- /	- /	-- /	-- /	- /	- /	- /	- / O	-- / O	- / O	- / O
11	EXCLUSIONARY HOUSING LAWS	- /	+ /	+ /	- /	+ /	+ /	- /	+ /	- / -	+ / +	- / -	- / -
12	UNEQUAL HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT	0 /	0 /	0 /	- /	- /	0 /	0 /	0 /	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / --
13	INCREASED SIZE OF NEW HOUSING UNITS	0 /	0 /	- /	+ /	+ /	+ /	0 /	0 /	+ / O	+ / +	0 / -	0 / O
14	RAPID CHANGES IN HOUSING TECHNOLOGY AND STYLES	- /	- /	0 /	+ /	+ /	+ /	0 /	0 /	+ / -	+ / +	- / -	0 / O
15	RACIALLY-SEGREGATED HOUSING MARKETS	- /	- /	- /	- /	A /	- /	0 /	- /	- / -	A / A	- / -	0 / -
16	MINORITY-GROUP EXPANSION	- /	- /	- /	- /	A /	A /	- /	0 /	- / --	A / O	- / -	- / -
17	RACIAL DESEGREGATION (in South only)	- /	- /	- /	- /	A /	- /	- /	0 /	- /	A /	0 /	0 /
18	RACIAL DISORDERS	- /	- /	- /	- /	- /	++ /	- /	-- /	-- / --	- / O	- / --	- / -
19	RISING URBAN CRIME RATES	- /	-- /	- /	-- /	-- /	+ /	- /	- /	-- / --	- / -	-- / --	- / -
20	MORE ADULT-ORIENTED HOUSEHOLDS	+ /	+ /	+ /	++ /	+ /	+ /	+ /	0 /	+ / -	+ / -	+ / -	+ / O
21	CHANGE TOWARDS MORE CASUAL AND LEISURE-ORIENTED LIFE STYLES	- /	- /	0 /	-- /	- /	- /	- /	0 /	-- / -	- / A	- / -	- / -
22	RELATIVE DECLINE IN PERCEIVED QUALITY OF CENTRAL-CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS	- /	- /	- /	-- /	-- /	+ /	- /	0 /	-- / --	-- / --	- / --	- / --

WASHINGTON PARK

WASHINGTON PARK

Table VI-7

EXOGENOUS DELAY— —

WASHINGTON PARK PROJECT (Mass R-24)

FACTOR NUMBER	V. IMPACT MATRIX (Page 2) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
		CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	CBD LOW- AND MODERATE- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF THE RENEWAL PROCESS	MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
23	LOOSE MONETARY CONDITIONS	O	O	+	+	+	O	++	+	+ / O	+ / +	+ / +	++ / +
24	TIGHT MONETARY CONDITIONS	O	O	−	−	−	O	−−	−−	− / −	− / −	− / −	−− / −−
25	RED-LINING	O	O	O	O	−	A	−	O	− / −−	−− / −	−− / −	−− / −−
26	RISING REAL INCOMES AND CONSUMPTION STANDARDS	+	−	+	+	+	+	O	O	+ / O	A / O	+ / O	+ / O
27	FISCAL SQUEEZE ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS	O	−	O	−	O	A	−	−−	−− / −	− / O	− / −	− / −
28	OUTLYING SHOPPING CENTERS	−−	−	−	−	O	−	O	O	− / −	− / O	−− / −	O / −
29	INCREASED USE OF OFFICE SPACE	++	+	++	+	+	+	++	O	+ / O	+ / +	+ / O	O / O
30	INVOLVEMENT OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN REAL ESTATE	O	O	+	+	+	+	++	−−	O / O	O / O	O / O	+ / O
31	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY NEEDS	−	A	+	−	−	+	+	+	− / O	O / O	A / O	+ / O
32	NON-BRANCH BANKING	A	O	++	O	O	++	+	+	O / O	O / O	− / O	+ / O
33	LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL OR INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES	A	+	++	+	O	++	+	+	+ / O	O / +	++ / +	+ / +
34	ANTI-GOVERNMENT ORIENTATION OF LOCAL LEADERS	−	−	O	−	−	−−	−	−−	−	−	−	−
35	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF URBAN GROWTH	−−	−−	−	++	O	+	O	O	++ / −	A / O	− / −	O / −
36	CONTINUED AGING OF OLDER BUILDINGS	+	A	++	++	+	+	O	O	++ / −−	+ / +	+ / −	− / −
37	OBSOLESCENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE	−	−−	O	−	O	+	−	−−	− / −	O / O	−− / −	− / −
38	FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTS AND LACK OF REGIONAL PLANNING	O	−	O	O	O	−	−	+	O / O	O / O	− / O	− / O

LEGEND

++ MAJOR STRENGTHENING IMPACT

\+ SIGNIFICANT BUT NOT MAJOR STRENGTHENING IMPACT

O NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

A AMBIGUOUS IMPACT

− SIGNIFICANT BUT NOT MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

−− MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

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Table VI-7 ACCELERATING FACTORS

BOSTON-WASHINGTON PARK

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE (Somewhat Important / Important / Very Important / Crucial)
Types of Factors (See Previous Text) (E) Signifies Exogenous Factor (LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors (MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors (NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors	Stage during which factor was significant 1 - Pre-planning 2 - Planning 3 - Execution	
• (LMR) BRA aggressively developed non-profit sponsors of 221d(3) housing, provided packaging, and pushed projects through FHA.	3	
• (LMR) Chief administrator maintained credibility with community leaders ("he would stay up all night and sit with families being relocated.")	3	
• (LMR) All levels of BRA were pushing to expedite rapid development.	3	
• (LMR) Design excellence of new construction facilitated later disposition.	3	
• (LMR) Extraordinary clout of BRA within city to obtain required permits for new construction (prior to 1967).	3	
• (LMR) Dynamism of agency chief administrator.	3	
• (LMR) Planning with redevelopers prior to project execution (example: Boys Club).	2,3	
• (LMR) Early land acquisition, property may be taken with eminent domain prior to negotiation on price.	2,3	
• (LMR) Cooperation with and cooptation of community organizations.	2,3	

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VII. SOUTH COVE URBAN RENEWAL AREA

A. Project Description

The South Cove Urban Renewal Project (Mass. R-92) is a conventional project of residential and non-residential uses in which institutional uses (college, university, hospital) predominate (See Table VII-1). The treatment for the 96.5-gross-acre project has involved approximately one-half clearance, one-half rehabilitation; the purpose being to strengthen the economic viability of the area and support continuation of the existing land use pattern. To date, the total federal grant for the project is approximately $23 million. The local share is approximately $12 million, most of this coming from local, non-cash grants-in-aid provided by 112 credits for the expansion of the Tufts-New England Medical Center in the project area.

As indicated in Table VII-2, approximately 47 percent of the 96.5-acre project was originally in streets and public rights-of-way, leaving a net project area of 51 acres. The original land use pattern included approximately 27.2 acres of private, non-residential (mostly commercial) uses and 7.0 acres of public non-residential (institutional) uses. Thus, non-residential uses totalled about 67 percent of the net project area, the remaining area being predominantly residential.

The original urban renewal plan for this area proposed a significant reduction in private non-residential (commercial) land uses in the area and a corresponding increase in residential and public non-residential (institutional, open space, etc.) acreage. A net reduction in total streets and rights-of-way was also proposed. Private non-residential re-uses were proposed to drop from 53 percent of the net project area to 35 percent, with increases from 33 to 43 percent in residential acreage and from 14 percent to 22 percent in public non-residential acreage. The current disposition plan generally supports the original proposed re-use plan for the area. The net effect of urban renewal should be a reduction in the number of marginal, smaller commercial establishments, small open parking lots, etc., and an increase in the residential and insitutional uses which would strengthen existing neighborhoods and bring increased employment into the area.

Table VII-1 STATISTICAL SUMMARY

City of Boston, Massachusetts

1. Project Number: Mass. R-92

2. Project Name: South Cove

3. Management Type: NDP ____ Conventional X

4. HUD Project Classification (I-XII): VII
   Original character: Mixed land uses, with non-residential uses, including institutional uses (college, university, or hospital) predominating. Proposed re-use: same.

5. Distance from CBD: Adjacent; approximately one mile from center of project area to center of CBD.

6. Project size (Gross Acres): 96.5 acres

7. Renewal Mode: one half clearance, one half rehabilitation

8. Total dwelling units in original area: 1,035
   To be cleared: 281
   To be rehabilitated: 455
   To be retained without treatment: 299
   Treatment not determined: 0

9. Total Federal Grant (latest revised estimate): 7/7/72
   Basis: 2/3 X 3/4 ____ $22,935,959

10. Local Non-Cash Grants-in-aid: $11,939,792
    Local Cash Grants-in-aid: $734,993



boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

South Cove Project

Illustrative Site Plan

0 200 400 800



Key

RESIDENTIAL

COMMERCIAL

OPEN SPACE

INSTITUTIONAL

COMMUNITY FACILITIES

boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

South Cove Project

Land Use Plan

0 200 400 800


Railroad
Bay Village
Castle Square
New Housing
Entertainment
Don Bosco Tech School
New Quincy School Site
MBTA
Tufts NE Medical Center
Chinese Community
boston
massachusetts
Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study
South Cove Project
Functional Pattern
0
200
400
800

Table VII-2

LAND USE CHARACTERISTICS
SOUTH COVE URBAN RENEWAL AREA (MASS. R-92)

	Acres	Percent
Gross Project Size	96.5	100.0
Less Streets/Public Rights-of-Way	45.5	47.2
Net Project Size	51.0	52.8

Uses	Initial Land Uses		Originally Proposed Re-Uses (Total Plan Area)		Initially Proposed for Acquisition		Current Disposition Plan	
	Acres	% Gross Project Area	Acres	% of Total	Acres	% Initial Land Use	Acres	% of Total
Residential	16.8	32.9	23.4	43.4	5.1	30.4	8.1	--
(Public)								
(Private)	(16.8)	(32.9)	(23.4)	(43.4)	(5.1)	(30.4)	(8.1)	--
Private Non-Residential	27.2	53.3	18.8	34.9	10.9	40.0	4.1	--
(Commercial)	(24.9)	(48.8)	(17.3)	(32.0)	(10.1)	(40.6)	(4.1)	--
(- Office)								
(- Retail)								
(- Hotel)								
(- Other)								
(Industrial)	(2.3)	(4.5)	(1.5)	(2.9)	(0.8)	(34.8)	(0)	--
Public Non-Residential*	7.0	13.7	11.7	21.7	0.7	10.0	7.1	--
Other (Mixed Residential/Commercial)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	--
Subtotal	--	--	53.9	100.0	16.7	32.7	19.3	--
Streets and Public R-O-W	--	--	--	--	5.5	12.1	Data Not Available	
Total Gross Project Area	51.0	100.0	53.9**	100.0				
Acquisition/Disposition Inventory					22.2	23.0	--	--

* Includes institutional, open space, public facilities, and community services.
** Gross reduction in streets and rights-of-way.

Source: South Cove (Mass. R-92) Loan and Grant Application, Parts I and II and BRA Records.

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B. Project Area Dynamics

The South Cove urban renewal area lies immediately south of the Central Business District retail and entertainment sections; the Park Square commercial area; the garment district; and the Boston financial center. Many of the land uses within the South Cove area are an extention of these land use patterns. The boundary on the south and east is the Massachusetts Turnpike and on the west is Clarendon Street.

The South Cove project area is a logical gathering place for activities requiring a location near but not necessarily within the CBD or a location that will effectively serve the Boston region by the proximity to transportation facilities. Included among these uses are:

- Residential uses for a diversity of groups
- Motion picture distribution and theatre supply houses
- Hospital, health service, research and medical center facilities
- Public elementary and private technical schools at the secondary level
- Office and retail facilities
- Theatres, movie houses
- Restaurants, miscellaneous eating and drinking places
- Semi-public facilities and institutions
- Off-street parking

1. Key Trends

Basic objectives of the urban renewal plan for the area were the removal of weaknesses which would have a negative impact on the marketability and development of land and the creation of a viable and supportive environment for the expansion and redevelopment of existing land uses. Major weaknesses in the area which might have affected the long-term stability of the area but which were considered in project development can be briefly described as follows:

a. Structural Conditions

When the urban renewal plan for the area was initiated, a substantial proportion of the area's structures were in a dilapidated, unsound condition. Many of these structures have been removed and replaced by standard units or have been rehabilitated. However, additional deteriorating and unsound structures remain, primarily in the south central portion of the project. It is desirable that these structures be demolished shortly, removing further negative impact on future development plans.

b. Street Pattern

A substantial proportion of the original project area -- approximately 47 percent -- was taken up by streets and rights-of-way. Two separate grid systems intersected in South Cove, creating an almost unworkable roadway system. A number of project improvements have been completed to improve the street system, including the straightening and widening of Tremont Street, the widening of Washington Street, and the closing of Broadway Street throughout most of the area. A recent contract has been let for future road widenings and sewer construction in the eastern portion of the project.

c. Other Factors

Other improvements proposed for the area included the removal of the elevated rapid transit lines through the area and its replacement with new underground lines and stations; the construction of a new elementary school to replace the outdated Quincy School then being utilized; and the development of vacant land being used primarily for open parking lots. These improvements have not been completed.

2. Physical Planning Features

The potential for continued viable development in South Cove is partly due to its critical position adjacent to the increasingly dynamic Back Bay-Prudential Center area; its proximity to the traditional CBD, for which future redevelopment plans are now being drawn; and direct service by major land transportation facilities. Strong points in South Cove support long term stability and help to establish marketability of selected disposition parcels and a range of development opportunity in the area. Principal strengths in the South Cove area, identified originally in the LUMS Study for the project area, prepared in 1965 by Robert Gladstone and Associates and reexamined and updated for the purpose of this study, include the following:

a. Location

Proximity to the heart areas of the city as described above. As is shown in Chapter II of this report, during the past decade the city core has experienced significant expansion in office space construction and a corresponding increase in downtown employment. These require increased supportive services, residential and entertainment facilities, etc., all of which are a part of the South Cove land use pattern.

b. Accessibility

Accessibility to the region and to other parts of downtown Boston from the South Cove area is provided by the Central Artery and the Massachusetts Turnpike which intersect at the southeastern corner of the project. These roads are supplemented by an extensive system of major thoroughfares into and through the area. Accessibility is of major importance to several principal land users in the South Cove area, including the garment industry; the theater district and related commercial establishments; motel facilities; and institutions such as the Tufts-New England Medical Center and Don Bosco Technical High School, which serve a regional rather than local clientele.

3. Institutional Aspects

a. Tufts-New England Medical Center

Key units in a hospital-health services complex and the medical and dental educational institutions of Tufts University have combined to form T-NEMC. At the time of project initiation, this substantial health and research facility employed nearly 3,000 persons. Substantial plans for expansion of these facilities have been programmed for the area, including student and employee housing, facilities for medical offices, and a new hospital. As a result of this expansion, the present staff, visitor, patient and student populations are expected to increase substantially, supporting complementary development in the area.

b. Bay Village Neighborhood

The low density residential area situated at the project's west end demonstrated a remarkable vitality even prior to initiation of the urban renewal plan. Extensive private rehabilitation had already taken place, upgrading the area without benefit of any specific public action. Bay Village was further enhanced by the installation of project improvements in the area -- attractive lighting, brick sidewalks, etc. This neighborhood, which houses several hundred households, is one of the few potentially family-oriented sections within the core area which might provide resources and stabilization for middle income ownership units.

c. Chinese Community

Traditionally, the eastern section of the South Cove project area has provided residential facilities for Boston's Chinese community. A long established pattern of settlement plus the focus of the community's commercial enterprise in the adjacent "Chinatown" district has and continues to attract residents to this area. Like the Bay Village neighborhood, the Chinese community provides stabilization for the South Cove area. A ready market for new commercial development federally assisted moderate cost housing exists as members of the Chinese community, displaced by the Central Artery and Massachusetts Turnpike construction and urban renewal action, wish to return to suitable housing within the community.

d. Don Bosco Technical High School

This is the only Catholic vocational high school in metropolitan Boston. The student body of the school, numbering close to 1,000 persons, is drawn from the entire area. The school expansion permitted as a result of urban renewal actional not only increased the size but also the caliber of the facilities.

e. Entertainment Facilities

Major elements of the downtown entertainment complex, including legitimate theaters, movie houses, restaurants as well as other eating and drinking places are located in South Cove. These facilities provide convenient and attractive uses which add to the area-wide attractions of this project.

f. Honky Tonk Bars

A large number of bars, taverns and clubs, previously located in the area primarily along Tremont Street, were eliminated as a result of project actions.

In summary, the location of the South Cove Project area within downtown Boston and the inherent viability of many of the existing uses in the area, if provided the proper support, contribute significantly to the potential marketability of the area.

4. Population and Housing Characteristics

Table VII-3 (following) outlines major population and housing characteristics of the South Cove Project. Several important factors relating to the market dynamics of the area can be noted from the table.

The total population of the project area decreased significantly between 1960 and 1970, as did the total number of housing units in the area. This trend was a result of land acquisition and demolition by T-NEMC prior to urban renewal and of actions taken by the BRA. However, during this same time period there was an overall increase in non-white population in the area, i.e. Chinese. This increase in Chinese population illustrates the viability of the Chinese community in Boston and the continued movement of Chinese into the residential area south of Kneeland Street from the original area of Chinese settlement which extends north from Kneeland to the CBD. New housing made available on urban renewal land in the Chinese community since 1970 has been readily absorbed, demonstrating a continued demand for housing by members of the Chinese community, displaced by renewal action, highway construction or new immigrants to Boston.

The increase in the proportion of children in the area infers an increase in family orientated households and, consequently, the stabilization of the residential communities. This is supported by the proportionate increase in owner occupied housing units. Representative data for 1970 on family income, value of owner occupied units, and distribution of monthly contract rents indicate a diverse population, typical of urban residential neighborhoods. In general, population and housing data indicate a continued marketability of residential and related land uses.

5. Dominant Area Functions

The urban renewal plan for the South Cove was developed with the basic objectives of supporting existing land use patterns in the area. The impact of these major land uses on the future of the South Cove has been outlined above in relation to the marketability of the project. Following is a brief description of the history of dominant area functions and a summary of their relationship to the urban renewal process.

a. Tufts-New England Medical Center (T-NEMC)

Five separated but associated medical facilities have combined to form the Tufts-New England Medical Center, the largest single land use in the South Cove area. The five entities forming T-NEMC include: (1) Tufts University School of Medicine; (2) Tufts University

Table VII-3 POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS
SOUTH COVE URBAN RENEWAL AREA

	1960	1970	Percent Change 1960-1970
Population			
Total Population	3,456	2,712	-21.5%
% Negro	1.5%	2.0%	
% Other Non-White	28.6%	39.0%	
% Under 14 Years	9.0%	13.0%	
% Elderly (65 years or more)	13.3%	13.0%	
Housing			
Total Housing Units	1,794		
% Vacant Units	N.A.		
% Owner-Occupied	7.6%		
% Renter-Occupied	78.9%		
Total Occupied	1,552		

Income Distribution - 1970

Family Income	Number of Families	Percent
Under $5,000	86.8	25.8%
$ 5,000-$ 9,999	130.7	38.9
$10,000-$14,999	73.5	21.9
$15,000-$24,999	35.0	10.4
$25,000+	10.2	3.0
Total	336.2	100.0%

Monthly Contract Rent - 1970

Monthly Rent	Number of Units	Percent
Less than $40	50	5.0%
$ 40-$ 59	73	7.3
$ 60-$ 79	153	15.4
$ 80-$ 99	134	13.5
$100-$119	174	17.5
$120-$149	193	19.4
$150-$199	147	14.8
$200-$299	60	6.0
$300+	10	1.0
No Cash Rent	17	1.7
Total Units Reporting	994	100.0%

Value of Owner-Occupied Units - 1970

Value	Number of Units	Percent
Less than $5,000	1	2.3%
$ 5,000-$ 9,999	5	11.6
$10,000-$14,999	5	11.6
$15,000-$19,999	4	9.3
$20,000-$24,999	2	4.7
$25,000-$34,999	6	14.0
$35,000-$49,999	14	32.6
$50,000+	6	14.0
Total Units Reporting	43	100.0%

Source: 1960 Data - South Cove Urban Renewal Documentary, based on 1960 Census; 1970 Data - U.S. Census, Fourth Count Summary Data, Planning District and Block Group.

School of Dental Medicine; (3) Boston Dispensary and Rehabilitation Institute; (4) Boston Floating Hospital for Infants and Children; and (5) Pratt Clinic - New England Center Hospital. The Boston Dispensary, founded in 1796 as the first organized medical service in New England, was one of the first developments in the South Cove area. Later, the area was developed with additional medical facilities; residential and related uses; the garment and leather industries, which could no longer afford the higher rent districts adjacent to the CBD; and theater and entertainment facilities. At the time that urban renewal was first considered for the South Cove area, the medical center complex had been closed in on all sides by dense development which restricted the center in its efforts to expand and improve its facilities. During the 1950's and early 1960's, the medical center complex acquired several pieces of land in the vicinity of its existing structures in an attempt to meet its space requirements. However, such purchases had to be made on an opportunity basis and did not result in an optimum property layout. Indeed, one major purchase resulted in the acquisition of the Wilbur Theater by T-NEMC (in addition to several adjacent properties). However, the medical center may not convert or demolish this building but must continue to lease it for theater usage.

In January 1961, T-NEMC established a planning office to study the needs of the medical center and to translate these needs into a 25-year master plan for development. Medical center planning was coordinated with BRA renewal planning in the hope not only of insuring orderly expansion of T-NEMC but also of guaranteeing satisfactory development of surrounding uses, particularly the Chinese community and Don Bosco Technical High School.

A cooperation agreement between T-NEMC and the BRA was negotiated and signed in 1966, requiring T-NEMC to comply in its expansion plans with the objectives of the urban renewal plan and also requiring the BRA to make available to T-NEMC as needed several parcels necessary to completion of their building plans. This open-ended cooperation agreement is presently being renegotiated.

The T-NEMC complex is to extend roughly from Tyler Street on the east to Tremont Street on the west and from Stuart and Kneeland streets in the north to Oak Street in the south. Several existing uses will remain in this area, including several garment buildings on Kneeland Street, the theaters and churches and Don Bosco Technical High School. To date, T-NEMC has developed several structures

including the new Tufts University School of Dental Medicine on Kneeland and Washington streets and a large parking garage, also on Washington. T-NEMC has been directly involved in the urban renewal process in South Cove since its inception and is now actively involved in working out with BRA a new cooperation agreement involving the immediate disposition of remaining land committed to the center and enabling the close out of the project prior to completion of the T-NEMC master plan.

b. The Chinese Community

Boston's Chinatown is one of the largest in the United States and serves as the social and commercial center for Chinese-American residents and immigrants throughout New England. However, the Chinese community within the South Cove Project area comprises only a portion of the total Chinese community in Boston. When the Chinese originally settled in Boston in 1890, they occupied the area around Beech Street, north of Kneeland, and reaching east through the area now occupied by the Fitzgerald Expressway (the Central Artery). Chinatown was originally a desireable residential area developed because of its convenience to the downtown area. The low rents and low land values subsequently came about as large space users, generally considered undesireable in residential neighborhoods, began to encroach upon the area. After 1860, the garment industry, displaced from the growing retail area along Washington Street and other areas of the city by rising land values, entered this residential community from the west and the north. Today the garment industry occupies a substantial amount of space in Chinatown, including several large structures along Kneeland Street. The garment industry was followed in 1899 by the construction of the elevated transit line along Beech and Washington streets, further depressing rental and land values. The Irish, central European Jews, Italians, and later the Syrians lived in this neighborhood; they were replaced by the Chinese.

By 1950, the Chinese community occupied most of the low rent housing remaining in the South Cove and downtown areas. The condition of the housing continued to decline, and the encirclement by incompatible land uses was almost complete. The future viability of the area was further threatened by the construction of the Central Artery, which in the 1950's removed approximately three blocks from the Chinese residential community on the east, and the continued acquisition of land by T-NEMC. This was the status of the

Chinese community in South Cove prior to urban renewal treatment.[1]

Boston's Chinatown remains a close-knit, self-contained community; its residents still dependent to a large extent on traditional methods of livelihood. The Beech Street area contains many Chinese restaurants, shops, and laundries which offer the primary sources of employment to area residents without a knowledge of English.

The traditional source of power both within the community itself and in relation to the Chinese population throughout New England has been the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, composed of 11 Chinese organizations and headquartered in a six-story building built by the Association on the northeast corner of Kneeland and Hudson streets in the early 1950's. The BRA worked continuously with the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association in the planning of the South Cove Urban Renewal Project. The urban renewal plan was presented to the Association for review and approval prior to public presentation, and in recognition of the needs of the Chinese community, several disposition parcels were "earmarked" for re-use for facilities such as housing and a community center. Early in the planning stages, the BRA began to work with the Chinese Urban Renewal Committee of the Benevolent Association, urging them to act as non-profit sponsors of moderate income housing in the urban renewal area and later helping them to coordinate the actions of the developer, architect, and FHA.

The BRA is continuing to work with the Chinese community in its attempts to complete land disposition in the area and finish the project. It is hoped that with the present lack of additional urban renewal funding available from the federal government, the BRA will not ignore the needs of this community in an attempt to close out the project immediately.

c. Bay Village

Bay Village is located on the western side of the project area and is bounded generally by Broadway, Tremont, Arlington, and Piedmont Streets. This residential neighborhood contains some of the oldest dwellings in Boston and has undergone extensive, impressive rehabilitation and restoration prior to urban renewal in the area. Rehabilitation of the area was further supported by the completion project improvements -- new streets, lighting, bricked sidewalks -- in the area and the removal of imcompatible land uses.

[1]Rhoads Murphy, "Boston's Chinatown," Economic Geography, 1952.

While there has not been much project activity within the Bay Village area itself, residents of the community, mostly middle and upper income professional people and confirmed "urban villagers," have been aware of urban renewal efforts going on around them. BRA has maintained informal contact with this group, soliciting their review and actively working to obtain approval on proposed developments adjacent to the community. This has been necessary particularly in regard to the height and proposed re-use for the smaller parcels along Tremont Street, including Parcel R-7.

C. Project Chronology

A chronology of key events on the initiation and execution of the South Cove Urban Renewal Project is included in Table VII-4, herein. A graphic presentation of activities in the execution stage is provided in Exhibit VII-1. This section is a history of the project in terms of key milestones of events listed in the chronology, focusing primarily on the timing of local and federal interest, the the funding in the pre-planning and planning stages, and on events that affected the marketing and disposition of key parcels in the execution phases.

1. The Pre-Planning Phase

This phase can generally be described as extending from that time when Tufts-New England Medical Center (N-NEMC) first began planning for future expansion in the South Cove area to the completion of an application for a Survey and Planning Advance under the Urban Renewal Program. Generally, this occupied a period from about 1955 to '962. In 1960, the mayor announced "The 90 Million Dollar Development Program for Boston" and the newly formed BRA filed and HHFA approved applications for planning advances for the preparation of ten General Neighborhood Renewal Programs, including the Downtown GNRP which encompassed the South Cove area. The Downtown GNRP did not encompass renewal areas which were being given top priority by the mayor and the BRA director (the Government Center and Washington Park Projects were both in advanced planning stages at this time). Briefly, the objectives of the Downtown GNRP can be stated as follows:

- Rehabilitation of the CBD
- Reconstruction of deteriorating residential structures in South Cove
- Improvement of public facilities, elimination of excess streets in the South Cove, improved circulation in and out of the CBD
- South planning for T-NEMC expansion

Table VII-4 CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS RE SOUTH COVE (PROJECT MASS. R-92)

PRE-PLANNING	1955-60	
		• Tufts-New England Medical Center initiates plan
	1957	
		• Renewal, originally a department within the Boston Housing Authority, becomes a separate, quasi-public agency.
	1959	
		• Mayor John F. Collins elected.
	1960	
		• Urban Renewal Agency merged with City Planning Commission and Boston Redevelopment Authority established.
	September	• Mayor announces "The 90 Million Dollar Development Program for Boston."
	October	• Edward Logue appointed administrator of BRA for 90 days to set up structure for carrying out $90 Million Program, to secure federal planning grants covering the city, to expedite the planning of the Government Center Project.
	December	• BRA filed and HHFA approved applications for planning advance funds totaling $2,037,250 for the preparation of 10 General Neighborhood Renewal Plans, including the Downtown GNRP which encompassed South Cove.
	1961	
		• Edward Logue appointed Development Administrator of BRA.
		• PREPARATION OF APPLICATION FOR SURVEY AND PLANNING ADVANCE FOR SOUTH COVE.
	1962	
		• Preliminary meetings held with Chinese community, BRA, FHA to initiate studies on the need for and feasibility of construction of new housing for Chinese community residents.
	November	• APPLICATION FOR SURVEY AND PLANNING ADVANCE SUBMITTED TO HHFA.

PLANNING

1964

Jan. - July	•	Initiation of surveys into the housing needs of the Chinese community; studies of the types of housing that could be built to fulfill these needs.
October	•	HHFA APPROVAL OF $700,000 SURVEY AND PLANNING ADVANCE FOR SOUTH COVE URBAN RENEWAL AREA, MASS. R-92.

1964-65

	•	Preparation of Urban Renewal Plan

1965

	•	LUMS Study for South Cove Urban Renewal Area prepared by Robert Gladstone and Associates, Economic Consultants, Washington, D. C.
	•	General plan for the city of Boston, 1965-1975, adopted.
March	•	Chinese Urban Renewal Committee of the Chinese Benevolent Association holds meeting at which they unanimously vote that BRA plans for future development in the Chinese community sound proper and express interest in developing several parcels including R-2 and R-2a for moderate income housing.
March	•	BRA submits list of potential developers to Chinese Urban Renewal Committee.
March	•	APPLICATION FOR LOAN AND GRANT, PART I.
May	•	HUD APPROVAL OF LOAN AND GRANT, PART II.
June	•	Chinese Urban Renewal Committee selects Development Corporation of America (DCA) as developer, Ted Stake, architect. Development and design planning begin.
June 3	•	URBAN RENEWAL PLAN SUBMITTED TO CITY COUNCIL.
June 29	•	PUBLIC HEARING ON URBAN RENEWAL PLAN
July 26	•	URBAN RENEWAL PLAN APPROVED BY CITY COUNCIL.
July 29	•	URBAN RENEWAL PLAN APPROVED BY MAYOR
August 27	•	STATE APPROVAL OF URBAN RENEWAL PLAN

1965-1967

	•	Preparation of a CBD Urban Renewal Plan by the BRA (with the assistance of the Committee for the Central Business District). This included plans for the redevelopment of Park Square, South Station, as well as the CBD.

PLANNING	1966		
	Jan. - Feb.	•	Logue submits requests for authorizations from the BRA Authority to begin acquisition in South Cove of various parcels related to disposition Parcel R-2 and also to prepare contract documents and advertise for bids for site preparation work in conjunction with disposition Parcel R-2.
	March	•	BRA tentatively designates the Chinese Urban Renewal Committee as developer of Parcel R-2 on basis of preliminary architectural designs.
	March	•	APPLICATION FOR LOAN AND GRANT, PART II.
	June	•	LOAN AND GRANT CONTRACT APPROVED BY HUD.
	July	•	PROJECT EXECUTION BEGINS WITH LAND ACQUISITION, RELOCATION, PROPERTY REHABILITATION.
EXECUTION	1966		
	April	•	PROPERTY REHABILITATION COMMENCES IN BAY VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD
		•	PROJECT EXECUTION COMMENCES WITH LAND ACQUISITION, RELOCATION
	1967		
	July	•	DEMOLITION AND SITE CLEARANCE BEGUN.
		•	BRA tentatively designates Morgan Memorial (Goodwill Industries) as developer of housing (Parcel R-5) following filing of letter of interest.
	1968		
		•	Frank Sawyer, owner, tentatively designated redeveloper of disposition Parcels C-4, 5, 6 on Stuart Street.
		•	Statler-Hilton tentatively designated as developer of Parcel C-8, proposed for garage, retail re-use.
	January	•	BRA learns from HUD that funding is not available for the proposed CBD Urban Renewal Project. Proposals for several mini-renewal projects downtown were submitted, although no funds alloted for the Park Square area.
	March	•	PROJECT IMPROVEMENTS BEGUN.
	July	•	LAND DISPOSITION BEGUN WITH TWO SMALL RESIDENTIAL PARCELS (R-7a,b) IN BAY VILLAGE
	September	•	NEW CONSTRUCTION BY DEVELOPERS COMMENCES

EXECUTION

October	•	Construction of $11.2 million rapid transit tunnel into area begun by MBTA extending through downtown theater district to existing Washington Street-Stuart Street tunnel.
1969		
	•	Disposition of Parcel P-6 to Tufts-New England Medical Center.
1970		
	•	Disposition of Parcel C-3 to John Philopolus Assoc.-Construction of The 57 Building begun.
June	•	BRA issues developers' kit and advertizes nationally for redevelopment proposals for Park Plaza from private developers.
December	•	Submission of budget amendatory request increase in relocation grant -- not acted upon.
1971		
	•	Disposition of two residential Parcels -- R5-5a and R2-2a to limited dividend sponsors for construction of moderate income housing.
	•	Disposition of Parcels P-8-12 to designated developer, Tufts-New England Medical Center.
	•	FHA issues firm commitment for Section 236 funding for Massachusetts Pike Towers (Parcels R-5,5a) and construction begun.
	•	Tentative designation of developer for housing for the elderly, Parcel R-7, Bay Village.
March	•	BRA Board accepts director's recommendation that Boston Urban Associates be designated as developers of major priority parcels within the Park Plaza area.
May-June	•	Submission and approval of budget amendatory showing increase in estimate of local, non-cash grants-in-aid from $4,839,705 to $6,725,242, based on most recent T-NEMC estimates of 112 credits. Also there are increases in total project capital grant from $11,507,235 to $13,870,584.
1972		
	•	Revised plan for T-NEMC expansion submitted to BRA.

EXECUTION

March-July	•	Submission and approval of budget amendment to obtain increase in Project Relocation Grant from $357,848 to $3,712,956.
August	•	BRA Board rescinds tentative designation of Statler-Hilton as developer for Parcel C-8.

1973		
January	•	Application for budget amendment to move $25,000 from contingency funds to Item - 7: Relocation and Community Organization in project expenditure budget to permit BRA to hire full-time consultants to deal with problem of relocation of Pine Street Inn.

Legend:

- Actions directly affecting progress of South Cove Project.
- Actions collateral to South Cove Project.

Sources: BRA records, interviews, BRA annual reports, HUD Form 6000.

Initially, the Downtown GNRP was broken into two major renewal areas -- the CBD and South Cove. Pre-planning for the South Cove area continued until the application for Survey and Planning Advance was submitted to HHFA (now HUD) in November 1962.

Even during the pre-planning stage of the South Cove Project, the BRA was involved in establishing contact with project area interests. The master plan for the expansion and reconstruction of Tufts-New England Medical Center was made part of the urban renewal plan and negotiations were begun in the pre-planning stages. As early as March 1962, members of the BRA staff, FHA, and various community leaders met with the Chinese Benevolent Society and discussed ways to study and determine the housing needs of the Chinese community and the feasibility of providing for these needs within the context of the urban renewal program.

2. The Planning Phase

The planning phase is dated from the filing by BRA of the application for Survey and Planning Advance with HHFA (now HUD) to the final approval of the Application for a Loan and Grant, Part II. This stage extended from November 1962 to June 1966. It included the following principal stages:

a. HUD Initial Approval Stage

This was the period during which the HHFA regional and central offices were reviewing Boston's application for Survey and Planning Advance. After several budget revisions, the application was approved in October 1964. While this appears to be a lengthy time for approval, the BRA used this time to initiate surveys of housing needs in the Chinese community, carry on negotiations with T-NEMC, and generally start planning activities which were required for the preparation of an urban renewal plan.

b. Physical Planning Stage

This period extended from HUD's approval of the application for Survey and Planning to the completion and public presentation of the urban renewal plan for South Cove in June 1965. During this period, most of the physical planning activities, land use and marketability studies, appraisals, project cost estimates, relocation plans, and other documents were prepared.

The BRA continued to work actively with the Chinese community. In March 1965, prior to submission of the urban renewal plan to the City Council, the Chinese Urban Renewal Committee announced their support of the plan and their intent to develop one or more parcels for housing and community services. During later states, the BRA assisted them in carrying out their objectives.

c. Local Approval Stage

Completion of the urban renewal plan for the South Cove area initiated the formal review and approval stage at the local level, including public hearings on the plan on June 29, 1965; approval by City Council and the mayor one month later; and approval by the State Department of Community Affairs in August 1965.

d. HUD Final Approval Stage

This stage dates from the time that HUD received the completed application for a Loan and Grant, Part I in March 1965 to approval of the Part II application (which contains evidence of local approvals plus the final budget) in June 1966. As indicated above, there was an "overlap" period during which HUD was reviewing the Loan and Grant, Part I and BRA was preparing the urban renewal program for submission for local approval. BRA used much of the time between local approval of the urban renewal plan in the summer of 1965 (which followed HUD approval of the Part I application) and the approval of the Part II application in the spring of 1966 to obtain at least tentatively designated developers for some of the sites.

3. Execution

Technically, all execution activities commenced in June 1966 with HUD approval of the Loan and Grant, Part II. As can be seen in Exhibit VII-1, the execution activities proceeded more generally in a sequence, with acquisition, relocation of families and individuals, demolition and rehabilitation being initiated immediately and then followed more slowly by project improvement, disposition and new construction, and the completion of public facilities. These activities are discussed individually below:

a. Acquisition

Acquisition of certain parcels throughout the South Cove urban renewal area began immediately after Loan and Grant, Part II approval (July 1965), based on acquisition appraisals and authorizations ob-

KEY COMPONENTS OF EXECUTION STAGE
ANNUAL PROGRESS CHART

Urban Renewal Area R-92

South Cove, Mass.

Exhibit VII - 1



tained during the planning stages. Much of the early acquisition process was closely related to the requirements for land assembly where commitments had been previously arranged. For example, all necessary pa cels in disposition parcels R-2 and R-2a were acquired in 1966-67, thus completing a major step in making the land available for disposition to the tentatively designated developers -- the Chinese Urban Renewal Committee. Disposition parcels committed to Tufts-New England Medical Center and Don Bosco High School were also acquired in the early years of project execution -- i.e. July 1966 - June 1968. It should be noted, however, that the initial strategy in executing the South Cove urban renewal plan was generally to obtain quickly many of the parcels designated for acquisition (with the exception of some parcels to be turned over to T-NEMC in the later stages of their master plan), to relocate families and business where necessary and to prepare the land for marketing, street widenings, etc.

In general, parcels that remain for acquisition in the South Cove area are parcels which comprise sites to be disposed of to Tufts-New England Medical Center. The original cooperation agreement drawn up with T-NEMC at the time the urban renewal plan was prepared specified that land committed to T-NEMC would not be turned over by the BRA until it was needed. The master plan for Medical Center expansion schedules completion of construction in 1987, indicating that much of the land would not be needed until at least the 1980's -- much later than the time generally allotted for completing land disposition in an urban renewal program. Other sites yet to be acquired include conditional acquisition parcels along Stuart Street, which will not be acquired until a developer is obtained, and sites with extreme relocation problems -- i.e., the present site of the MBTA line elevated tracks into the area; the Old Quincy School on Tyler Street, which cannot be vacated until the new school is built; and the Pine Street Inn, a transient housing facility for indigent men. The remaining parcels to be acquired total just over two acres.

As shown on Exhibit VII-1, computed back from the current 20.0 acre acquisition inventory, acquisition was very rapid at first, with more than one-half of the total inventory being acquired during the first year of project execution and nearly 70 percent acquired by the end of two years. Since that time, acquisition has proceeded slowly because of problems such as the removal of the MBTA tracks and the Racial Imbalance Law. As of July 1, 1973, approximately 72 months into project execution, acquisition was 78 percent complete. This was an average acquisition of about 2.2 acres per year.

b. Relocation

Progress in the relocation of families and individuals closely paralleled acquisition activities during the first two years of project execution, but accelerated rapidly ahead of it after about 30 months. Thus, about 80 percent of household relocation was complete after 36 months of execution, compared to only two-thirds of acquisition. Relocation of households (total workload 585 families and individuals) was substantially complete (94 percent) by November 1973, 75 months into execution. Business relocation was begun later than family relocation, approximately one year after project execution was begun. Business relocation proceeded rapidly at first, with close to 50 percent of a total workload of 235 relocated after 36 months project execution. However, as of July 1973, only 70 percent of the businesses had been relocated, compared to more than 90 percent of all households in the area. Many of these businesses remaining to be relocated are situated on parcels to be turned over to T-NEMC at a later date.

c. Demolition

Demolition activities, which would normally be expected to follow slightly behind relocations, have not proceeded as rapidly as expected. In some major disposition parcels, demolition has been held up due to the relocation and acquisition problems mentioned above. Also, in some instances, BRA has acquired a property, relocated its occupants, and then turned the property over to a community group at a nominal rent for interim use until the land is required for disposition to the developers. Thus, as shown on Exhibit VII-1, as of July 1973, demolition activities were approximately 50 percent complete, compared to 78 percent completion for business relocation and 94 percent for residential relocation.

d. Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation activities in the South Cove area have proceeded somewhat slowly, but steadily, since the beginning of project execution. The results of this rehabilitation, much of it privately financed, is most evident in the Bay Village portion of the project area. T-NEMC has een responsible for the rehabilitation of several non-residential buildings within their complex. Based on a total of 274 structures to be rehabilitated, a total of 85 or 31 percent had been completed as of June 1973, or 72 months into project execution.

e. Public Facilities

The major public facilities planned for South Cove were the fire station in Bay Village, completed in 1971, and the new Quincy Elementary School, which has not yet been started. (A state-imposed moratorium has been placed on the construction of "racially imbalanced" schools on urban renewal land. The use of urban renewal land, assembled through federal funding for the construction of racially imbalanced schools would be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.) As of July 1973, approximately 47 percent of the total public facilities to be completed in conjunction with the South Cove Project had been completed (based on dollar value of construction). The remainder will not be completed until the Quincy School is built.

f. Project Improvements

The major investments in project improvements in the South Cove area have been street relocations and widenings, carried on in conjunction with site preparations for the construction of the 57 Building on Stuart and Tremont streets and with construction by the Tufts-New England Medical Center.

Site improvements -- sidewalk construction, lighting, etc. -- were also completed in Bay Village. As of July 1973, approximately 47 percent of all project improvements scheduled for South Cove had been carried out. This did not encompass improvements to be included as local non-cash grants-in-aid. Subsequent to this time, the BRA received approval of a $5.6 million bond issue from City Council to carry out one of three major street and sewer construction contracts remaining in the area.

g. Land Disposition

Land disposition can be considered the key indicator of progress toward the completion of any urban renewal project. The disposition line on Exhibit VII-1 represents that proportion of the total land area in the current disposition inventory that was sold at any stage during project execution. As can be seen the progress in land disposition (and new construction) has, lagged behind other execution activities, particularly acquisition, relocation, and demolition. This was particularly true during the earlier stages of execution. The first land sale (a small parcel) did not take place until September 1, 1968, more than two years (26 months) after initiation of execution activi-

PATTERN OF LAND DISPOSITION (DEEDED) BY RE-USE CATEGORY

Urban Renewal Area R-92

Exhibit VII - 2

South Cove, Mass.





RESIDENTIAL	R-2
COMMERCIAL	C-2
PUBLIC & SEMI-PUBLIC	P-3
AREA OF SQ. FEET	1,252
NEW ROW TO BE ACQUIRED	
PROPOSED M.B.T.A. UNDERGROUND EASEMENT	
PARCEL BOUNDARY	
PROJECT BOUNDARY	
PUBLIC VEHICULAR EASEMENT	

Not to be Acquired

Acquired and Disposed

Acquired but not yet Disposed

To be Acquired

boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

South Cove Project

PRESENT DISPOSITION STATUS

Land Disposition Map

0 200 400 800

ties. The first major land sale was in July 1969, three years after execution began. This was one of twelve parcels committed to T-NEMC during the preparation of the urban renewal plan.

In terms of progress, only about 4 percent of the total land in the disposition inventory had been sold during 42 months of project execution; 25 percent after 58 months; and approximately 45 percent after 66 months. At the time of our study, approximately 73 months into project execution or by July 1973, the proportion sold still remained at 45 percent. This was equal to a disposition rate of approximately 62,500 square feet (1.43 acres) per year since the beginning of project execution.

Throughout most of the land disposition process and even in the planning stages, the BRA made commitments or has named (and retained for lengthy periods of time) tentatively designated developers for many sites in the South Cove area. Land committed may not be sold until a much later date; and tentative designations may be rescinded. However, the amount of land so designated, added to the amount actually available result in the amount available for marketing at any one time. A brief list of major parcels in South Cove committed or designated at any time during the disposition process, and their current status, is given below. This list in particular points out the time lag that may exist between tentative designation or commitment of a parcel and actual disposition to a developer. An accompanying map demonstrates the present status of all disposition parcels in the South Cove area.

- C-3 — Now the 57 Building; tentatively designated developer, 1968; sale of parcel January 1970, 72,205 square feet.
- P-2, P-11 — Committed to T-NEMC by cooperation agreement in conjunction with original urban renewal plan, 1965; P-8, 9, 10, 11 sold mid-1971, 12,880 sq. ft.; P-6 sold July 1969, 26,700 sq. ft.; remaining in committed parcels -- 91,970 sq. ft. or 11 percent of the total current disposition inventory.
- R-2 — Tentatively designated developer, 1966; sold April 1971, 103,680 sq. ft.
- R-5-5a — Tentatively designated developer, 1968; sold May 1971, 98,426 sq. ft.
- C-8 — Tentatively designated developer, 1968; tentative designation rescinded mid-1972, 21,860 sq. ft.

- C-4, 5, 6 — Tentatively designated developer, 1968; tentative designation rescinded, 1972, 29,008 sq. ft.
- P-12 — Committed to Don Bosco Technical High School at the time of urban renewal plan preparation, 1965; sold to Don Bosco, June 1970, following completion of the MBTA tunnel under the property, 41, 200 sq. ft.

Several additional parcels were generally understood to be committed at the time of final preparation of the urban renewal plan, although these have not yet been assigned to a tentatively designated developer.

- R-1 — 19,335 sq. ft. (Chinese Community)
- P-1 — 16,926 sq. ft. (Chinese Community)
- P-13 — 82,334 sq. ft. (New school site)

In summary, at the time of commencement of project execution and two years prior to the sale of the first disposition parcel, a total of 445,120 square feet of land area or approximately 50 percent of the current disposition inventory were formally or informally committed to a potential developer or sponsor. Throughout the disposition process in South Cove, the total land available (not committed or sold) has fluctuated greatly. Even at present, much of the land not sold is under tentative designation, including the remaining parcels committed to T-NEMC (P-2, 3, 4, 5, 7); the public park or plaza (P-14); the new Quincy School site (P-13; the site for proposed housing for the elderly (R-4); and smaller commercial and mixed commercial-residential sites (C-3b, C-1).

Additional understanding of the land disposition process is indicated in Exhibit VII-2, The Pattern of Land Disposition by Re-Use Category. (Neither the base for the current disposition inventory nor the data for disposition by re-use category include any significant data for streets and public rights-of-way, as the data were not readily available from comparable sources.) As indicated in this exhibit, disposition for residential uses and private institutional uses has proceeded most rapidly. Together, these two land use categories comprise more than half the current total land disposition inventory. The remaining area to be disposed will be divided almost equally among commercial re-uses and public facilities and other public areas. Commercial disposition has proceeded at approximately the same rate as disposition in the renewal area, and disposition for public facilities has proceeded most slowly.

For the purpose of this analysis, institutional land uses have been defined as those relating to private institutions which are Tufts-New England Medical Center and the Don Bosco Technical High School, and institutions of the Catholic Church. Public land uses include the new Quincy School site for which the Chinese Benevolent Society is the tentatively designated developer; public park areas, the fire station; and other sites reserved for community uses. The distinction is made primarily because the larger institutions -- i.e. T-NEMC and Don Bosco Technical High School -- had master plans for expansion which were coordinated with the official urban renewal plan for the area.

In all re-use categories, land disposition has proceeded unevenly; the land disposition pattern by re-use category showing accelerated progress as disposition of one parcel (or a group of related parcels) occurs, then maintaining a plateau until additional land is sold. The first disposition of land for institutional usage took place in 1969, with the sale of Parcel P-6 to T-NEMC for the construction of the dental school. Much later, in 1971, following the completion of the new MBTA tunnel under the properties, Parcel P-12 was sold to Don Bosco Technical High School and Parcels P-8, 9, 10, and 11 to T-NEMC. Construction of the new buildings planned by these institutions has proceeded on schedule. However, no further disposition of land for institutional usage (all parcels are committed to T-NEMC) has occurred since that time. Disposition of land for institutional re-use is currently about 59 percent complete.

Progress on the disposition of residential re-use parcels is currently about 58 percent complete or about the same as that for institutional re-uses. Like the disposition of institutional re-use parcels, disposition of residential re-use parcels has progressed somewhat sporadically, possibly due to the size of the parcels involved and the complexity of coordinating sponsor, developer, architect, and financing. Disposition for residential re-uses began slowly with the sale of two small parcels (R-7d) in the Bay Village area, the first land disposition sale after commencement of project execution. In 1971, two large sites were sold to limited dividend sponsors for the construction of moderate income housing under the Section 221(d)3 and 236 FHA programs. Major residential sites remaining to be disposed include the following:

- R-7 — A small, narrow site with sloping terrain on the border of Bay Village; BRA currently negotiating with Mass. Association for the Blind for the development of housing facilities on this site.

- R-4 — Proposed for elderly housing adjacent to the New Quincy School; BRA presently negotiating with tentatively designated developer.
- R-3, 3a, 3b — Large site that cannot be cleared prior to removal of MBTA elevated line, relocation of Pine Street Inn.
- R-1 — Present site of YMCA temporary sports bubble which may be moved to the old Quincy School site after completion of new school facilities; proposed for market rate housing for Chinese community.

Progress on the disposition of commercial re-use parcels has proceeded very slowly. Most of the total of 41 percent disposition to date being the sale in 1970 of the largest commercial Parcel, C-3, to John Philopolus, Inc., owners of the 57 Restaurant, an old Boston restaurant located on this site, the present development includes the 57 Restaurant in new surroundings, a Howard Johnsons Hotel and Coffee Shop, a large parking garage, and two movie theatres. While the area is an extension of the CBD with many core area functions, it does not maintain the prestige for office, retail, or even restaurant development that are found in other areas surrounding the CBD (Back Bay, Beacon Hill, etc.). However, with the possibility of the Park Plaza development, once marginal commercial sites or parking lots that have remained vacant since the initiation of the project may become more marketable. Developer kits are being prepared for Parcels C-8 and C-4, 5, 6 and advertizing should begin shortly. Other small commercial sites within the South Cove area also may have marginal marketability. Disposition of these sites has also been affected by the desire of the BRA to sell them to neighborhood businessmen displaced by urban renewal, many of whom have limited financial capabilities for development. However, one of these sites, Parcel C-1 in the central portion of the renewal area, has a tentatively designated developer and may be sold shortly.

Approximately 11 percent of the disposition land for public re-use has been completed to date. This has consisted solely of the disposition of Parcel P-16 in the Bay Village area to the Department of Public Works for the construction of a new fire station, completed in 1971. Disposition of the additional public use parcels shown on the accompanying map has been delayed for a variety of reasons. For example, the moratorium on the disposition of land for the construction of the new Quincy Public School (Parcel P-13), delays the use of the old Quincy School site and building by the YMCA and the

Chinese Community Services organization. The disposal of land to the Church of All Nations (Parcel P-15) has been delayed by lack of funds; the construction of the community park (P-14) by design problems. Delay-causing factors in land disposition in the South Cove will be discussed more fully in the following section.

h. New Construction

New construction is, in effect, a measure of land take-down as the developer will not usually purchase a site until he is ready to start construction. Thus, it is the last activity which will take place in the urban renewal process. Technically, it is beyond the scope of this study to address new construction, as a project may be closed out upon completion of land disposition. However, as indicated on the time line chart of project execution, new construction has proceeded somewhat in relation to land disposition. By mid-1973, the total cost of new construction in place was approximately 21 percent of the projected total. As the date on which the chart is based refers to current cost of total construction to take place in the project area, this cannot be considered a very accurate form of measurement, as costs will rise considerably in the future. However, it does demonstrate that a substantial amount of major construction in the project area remains to be done in the future.

In summary, the South Cove Project, as shown on Table VII-5, by mid-1973 had been in planning and execution for 119 months and in execution for 73 months or 6.08 years. While the project is perhaps only midway through execution, BRA has proposed that, with hardship funding from HUD, the project could be closed out by December 1974. Major problems to be worked out would include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

1. Renegotiation of the original cooperation agreement with Tufts-New England Medical Center, possibly including provisions to lease to T-NEMC all disposition sites originally committed to them in the urban renewal plan. As T-NEMC would not require the sites for plant expansion for several years, the medical center would act as landlord and property manager for the present tenants of the building. Parcels would be deeded upon the completion of approved development. Relocation funds for present property tenants and demolition fees would be placed in escrow, to be used at the time when T-NEMC would require the land for new construction.

2. Disposition of the site for the New Quincy School.

3. Removal of the MBTA elevated line through Parcels R-3, 3a, 3b, now proposed for housing, or replanning of the site for uses compatible with the tracks.

4. Marketing of several major and innumerable smaller commercial properties.

Given the scale of the project, it is possible that the above could be completed within a year's time, with proper and competent planning and administration. The urban renewal plan has brought significant improvements to the South Cove area. With a few exceptions, the original plan is commendable and should not be abandoned (although it may be improved) to achieve early close-out.

TABLE VII-5 SUMMARY OF ELAPSED TIME OF URBAN RENEWAL PROCESS - SOUTH COVE, MASS. R-92

		Months	Years
Preplanning		23	1.92
Planning			
HUD Initial Approval		23	
Physical Planning		8	
Local Approval	3	15*	
HUD Final Approval	15		
Execution (Cumulative to 7/73)		73	6.08
Planning and Execution (to 7/73)		119	9.92

	Cumulative Time to Indicated Percentage Completion				% Complete by 72 mos. (7/73)
	25%	45%	67%	95%	
Acquisition (Acq./yr.= 109,844 or 2.52A)	8 mos.	15 mos.	30 mos.	-	78%
Relocation	9 mos.	15 mos.	25 mos.	7 mos.	94%
Demolition	23 mos.	-	-	-	53%
Rehabilitation	41 mos.	-	-	-	31%
Public Facilities	44 mos.	66 mos.	-	-	47%
Project Improvements	22 mos.	66 mos.	-	-	47%
Land Disposition (Disp./Yrs.=62.467 or 1.43A)	58 mos.	66 mos.	-	-	45%
New Construction	-	-	-	-	21%

*Overlap
Sources: BRA Records; HUD Form 6000

D. Analysis of Delay Causes and Accelerating Tactics

Any real estate development project is in itself an inherently complex process. Urban redevelopment, by the very nature of the areas treated and the necessity of operating out in the open is further complicated by the required co-ordination of a variety of public agencies and private developers. Finally, urban renewal under the Federal program operates within the context of a myriad of legislative and administrative guidelines established since the creation of urban renewal in 1949. Thus, within any project extending over a long period of time, there will be delays; and there will be factors which accelerate the completion of the process.

This section discusses some of the principal delays and accelerating tactics used by BRA to expedite the South Cove Urban Renewal Project. These are identified and evaluated in tables VII-6 and VII-7, included herein. Delay causes, for convenience, are grouped into four categories as follows:

- National Program Related Causes -- these refer to national program requirements of the urban renewal program and related government-regulated activities which may constrain the behavior of local public agencies and/or developers in ways that cause delays.

- Local and Market Related Factors -- these are strictly local factors -- socioeconomic, political, or otherwise which may affect the marketability of the project.

- Local Management Related Causes -- these are actions or policies of local public agencies relating to the administration of the urban renewal process.

- Exogenous Factors -- these are fundamental economic and social trends, forces, and changes of society in general that may influence the marketability of the project.

Delay-causing factors outlined in Table VII-6 are evaluated in terms of their impact on the length of time to effectuate land dispostion as well as their impact on the relative marketability of the project and/or parcel. A judgment is also made as to whether the delay cause was definitely or probably avoidable or unavoidable at the time, given the circumstances under which the delay occurred. Accelerating tactics are outlined in Table VII-7 and are evaluated according to their relative significance in speeding up the land disposition process.

1. National Program Related Factors

In general, although HUD procedural requirements did cause some delays in the total urban renewal process for the South Cove area, these did not have a significant effect on the marketability of land within the project. More significant causes of delay were related to FHA cost limits, feasibility requirements and review of developers/sponsors of FHA insured and/or subsidized housing. HUD- and FHA-caused delays were manifest at several stages in the urban renewal process and had varying impacts, as described below.

a. Lengthy HUD Review in the Initial Approval Stage

As described in the project chronology, HHFA (now HUD) had Boston's application for Survey and Planning Advance under review and evaluation for 23 months, from November 1962 to October 1964. During this period, technically no physical planning was to take place on the South Cove Project. While the exact reasons for this long review period could not be determined, it is known that two budget revisions of the plan were submitted and subject to review at that time.

Given the "grantsmanship" capabilities of the BRA development administrator Ed Logue, the support of the mayor, the good relationships between the BRA and HHFA, and the competent BRA planning staff, it would seem that this approval could have been more expeditious. Nevertheless, it is recognized that, although HUD was under no legal obligation to grant subsequent approvals to finance an urban renewal project for which a survey and planning advance had been approved, there was always a tacit understanding that the reservation grant would be set aside at the time of survey and planning grant approval. Therefore, it was understandable that HUD take a reasonable time in approving the Survey and Planning Advance.

With the understanding that the Survey and Planning Advance would be forthcoming (and the reservation for an urban renewal grant would be made), BRA used this period to develop a working relationship with the Chinese community and other major interest groups in the renewal area. During this period, BRA worked with representatives of the Chinese community in initiating studies of housing needs of the residents and determining ways of meeting these needs. These relationships with the renewal community were carried on throughout the planning process.

b. Lengthy Time for HUD Final Approval

The urban renewal plan for the South Cove Project area was completed and submitted for local approval within eight months of the approval of the Survey and Planning Advance. However, the total time of HUD review in the final approval stage, from submission of the Loan and Grant Application, Part I to HUD approval of the Loan and Grant, Part II was 13 months. This period overlapped the three month period for local and state approval of the urban renewal plan. Again, BRA used this time to continue working with the community groups in the urban renewal area. Even prior to the final approval of the Loan and Grant, Part II, BRA had tentatively designated the Chinese Urban Renewal Committee of the Chinese Benevolent Society as developers of housing on Parcels R2-2a in the southeast corner of the project.

Given the momentum behind the renewal planning at the time, the delays in the planning stages of the South Cove Urban Renewal process had little, if any effect on the marketability of land in the project.

c. Lengthy Negotiations with FHA to Obtain Approval of Applications for Funding for Subsidized Housing

More significant than the delays caused by HUD requirements of the urban renewal process were delays encountered by developers in applying for and obtaining FHA funding for moderate income housing. In general, the cost per unit for construction of housing under either the Section 221 d (3) or the Section 236 program was not adequate when dealing with filled land, which most of South Cove consists of. This is true even given the use of maximum allowable income limits and rents. In Tai Tung Apartments in particular (Parcel R-2), the developer and architect were involved in redesigning the building several times and in negotiating with BRA to provide costly site preparations in order to meet FHA cost limits. (Further negotiations were required to convince FHA that the excessive parking requirements generally expected to be fulfilled were not applicable for this particular site and the urban population to be served.) In both Tai Tung Apartments and Mass. Pike Towers (Parcel R-5, 5a), the non-profit sponsors found it necessary to form limited divided corporations with the selected developer to maintain the financial capabilities to carry out the

project. All design changes, sponsor changes, etc. were subject to lengthy reviews by FHA, delaying completion of final plans for redevelopment and, therefore, land disposition.

2. Local and Market Related Factors

Delay causes in this category relate to factors of timeliness of marketing, scale of project or parcels being marketed, re-use appropriateness, and similar factors affecting site marketability within the local context.

a. Slowness in Marketability of Commercial Re-uses within the South Cove Area

The South Cove Urban Renewal area is a CBD fringe area containing a mixture of a variety of land uses, including an extension of CBD core facilities such as entertainment (theater), light retail, commercial, and some office space. The South Cove area also contains two strong residential neighborhoods and several major institutions, working to expand and remain in the area. Thus, while community support and plans for institutional expansion result in a fairly strong existing market for residential, institutional and public re-uses, the market for commercial uses is somewhat more marginal. It depends, in part, on future residential and institutional development, on an increase in the area's population and competition with nearby areas such as the CBD core, Prudential Center and Back Bay. While several major residential and institutional sites in the South Cove area have been marketed, the marketability of commercial land use has been limited to the sale of one site (Parcel C-3,3a,b). It is interesting to note that the LUMS Study prepared for the South Cove area generally recommended that this site be developed with retail and office space including a considerable amount of parking. However, it has been successfully developed as a hotel-restaurant complex, with considerable parking and two movie theaters. The successful development of this site has probably done much to enhance the marketability of other commercial sites along Stuart and Kneeland streets, the northern boundary of the project.

The slowness of the marketability of other commercial sites in the South Cove area can be related to other factors which interact with the marginal marketability of the site and create delays in land disposition.

(1) BRA Desire to Dispose of Smaller Commercial Parcels to Neighborhood Businessmen

The policy to give priority in the disposition process to area residents, displaced by urban renewal action, is noteworthy. It may also result in delays in land disposition because many small businessmen, restauranteurs, etc. are unable to obtain the financing necessary to support even the small development proposed. Several proposals for development of Parcels C-1 and C-2, along the proposed public plaza or park in the central part of the project, have not been completed due to lack of financial feasibility.

(2) "Land-banking" of Larger Commercial Parcels on Stuart Street

Two commercial parcels on Stuart Street (C-8 and combined Parcels C-4, 5, 6) were each held for approximately four years by the tentatively designated developer before tentative designation was rescinded by the BRA Board. While this delay in land disposition may seem very significant in terms of both the length of delay and the size of the parcels involved, it may have been justifiable to some extent, although probably avoidable. In the case of Parcels C-4, 5, 6, the tentatively designated developer was the owner of the parcels. The parcels were being used for ground level and sub-ground level parking. As the most profitable re-use at that time for the site would probably be parking, the incentive for development was lacking. Statler-Hilton, the tentatively designated developer for Parcel C-8, also saw little advantage, in terms of market, in developing the property.

(3) Appropriateness of Re-use

Some question has been raised regarding the appropriateness of commercial re-uses in Parcels C-1 and C-2, adjacent to the proposed public plaza in the center of the project. The original LUMS Study assumed that Parcel C-2 would probably be taken over by the adjacent Charles Theater for expansion. It was thought that Parcel C-1 would be an ideal site for convenience shopping and possibly a restaurant, as it would be

near the subway stop of the Forest Hills line to be relocated beneath the plaza. Currently, the idea of a subway stop has been abandoned and the Charles Theater long ago withdrew from any negotiations for Parcel C-2. Since the park has not been built on this site, the marginal marketability of commercial uses at this location has been reduced. However, BRA is presently working with tentatively designated developers for both Parcels C-1 and C-2. One proposal for Parcel C-2 adjacent to Bay village, T-NEMC and the theater district, is for mixed apartment and commercial uses which may be the most appropriate re-use in terms of marketability and financial feasibility.

b. Uncertainty of the Future Park Plaza Development

Park Plaza is a large, multi-use and multi-million dollar high-rise development planned for construction in the Park Square area along the southern border of the Boston Common and just north of the South Cove Urban Renewal area. Originally planned as part of the elaborate CBD Urban Renewal Plan, which was never funded by HUD, Park Plaza is now proposed for development by a private developer, with BRA exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire and purchase land that cannot be obtained through negotiations with the present owners. The proposed Park Plaza development will include a large luxury hotel; a major department store and specialty shops; luxury housing facing the common; and restaurants, parking, etc. appropriate to its downtown location. The development of Park Plaza has been under negotiation with the BRA, the mayor's office, the developers, and representative citizen interests for several years. At present, the future of the development is uncertain and decisions regarding Park Plaza now seem to be at the mercy of a few "political gamesmen". However, Park Plaza could be expected to have a positive effect on the marketing of the remaining commercial parcels in the adjoining South Cove area, which until recently, was somewhat marginal.

3. Local Management Related Factors

A number of causes of delay as well as accelerating factics are a result of local management, administrative decisions, and policies regarding the urban renewal process. Several decisions made during the preparation of the South Cove Urban Rnewal Plan resulted in what may

be regarded as unrealistic delays in carrying out project execution, particularly in completing land disposition within a reasonable period of time. These dealy-causing factors (and accelerating tactics proposed by BRA) were then followed by other local management-related delay factors which have been evident primarily during project execution.

a. Open-Ended Cooperation Agreement with Tufts-New England Medical Center

At the time of the preparation of the South Cove Urban Renewal Plan, the BRA entered into a cooperation agreement with Tufts-New England Medical Center to reserve certain designated disposition parcels within the urban renewal area for T-NEMC. These were to be made available for disposition to T-NEMC, as they were required for construction, in compliance with the medical center's master plan for development and plant expansion into the mid-1980's. BRA would maintain control over design, site selection and layout, and interim uses for the T-NEMC plan. The plans already have been redrawn showing alternative ways of dealing with the site of the MBTA elevated tracks, depending on whether or not they are removed. At present, less than one-half of the land reserved for the medical center in the urban renewal plan has been sold. Should the original cooperation agreement between T-NEMC and the BRA remain in effect, the South Cove Project could not be closed out until the early 1980's.

At present, BRA is negotiating with T-NEMC to rework the cooperation agreement, allowing BRA to lease the remaining committed parcels to T-NEMC immediately, with T-NEMC acting as landlord for the present tenants until the land is required for use as specified in their master plan. T-NEMC is qualified to act as property manager, as they presently own and operate several major properties in the South Cove. Of course, relocation and demolition and site preparation funds would have to be held in escrow until needed by T-NEMC to prepare the parcels in question for construction. HUD concurrence would also be required.

b. Possible Overplanning of New Quincy School Site

Apparently, when initial planning for South Cove was underway in the mid-1950's, the new Quincy School was conceived to house facilities for three functions. First, there would be a traditional, albeit innovative elementary school. Secondly, recreational and physical education facilities to be used by the school during the day and made available to the community under the auspices of the YMCA during the evenings and on weekends. Thirdly, housing, possibly sponsored by T-NEMC, was proposed as an integral part of the Qunicy School complex. Such a unique planning and design concept (the three uses were to be structured vertically in a single building, the housing on the upper floors over the school and the YMCA facilities in the basement levels) required funding, lengthy planning, and agreement among a number of parties: the school, the YMCA, and T-NEMC. Current plans for the school site still call for a school and for housing for the elderly to be built by another developer on a separately acquired but adjacent parcel. Even with this arrangement, solutions to boundary and design problems were complex. Now, disposition of the site and construction of the new Quincy School has been halted temporarily by a moratorium on school construction in Boston, a result of the court's racial imbalance ruling. Possibly, if planning delays had not been so extensive, construction could have begun before the court ruling against construction of racially im-balanced schools was implemented.

c. BRA's Reluctance to Recind Designation for Non-Performance

"Land banking" of certain commercial parcels in the South Cove could have been justifiable, based on the somewhat marginal market at that time for commercial re-use in the area. However, once tentative designation has been made, the BRA is reluctant to rescind this designation unless another potential developer has been contacted. There are few, if any, BRA deadlines that the tentatively designated developer is required to meet in the submission of his final working drawing, evidence of financial capability, etc. The only pressure on the developer would be from the market -- a principal tenant who might withdraw, or a promise of financing if construction is begun by a certain time. Possibly, if BRA had required the submission of plans for Parcel C-8 or Parcels C-4, 5, 6 sooner and the developer had not complied,

tentative designation would have been revoked, the parcel readvertized, and another developer obtained. This is particularly true for Parcel C-8, for which there were originally several unsolicited proposals, none of which were seriously considered.

d. Required Cooperation of a Variety of City, State, and Federal Agencies During the Urban Renewal Process

As in other areas of the city, the BRA may have placed undue reliance on transportation plans for the area in drawing up and executing the South Cove Urban Renewal Plan. The assembly of several disposition parcels was dependent on the MBTA carrying out plans to relocate the Orange line under the urban renewal area, remove the elevated tracks from the area, and open a subway stop for the Forest Hills line under Parcel P-4, the proposed central plaza for the neighborhood. While the MBTA tunnel was completed fairly rapidly, allowing Don Bosco Technical High School and T-NEMC to move ahead with proposed expansion plans, the tunnel is not in use. The MBTA elevated tracks, running through Parcels R-3,3a,b (proposed residential development) and P-4 (to be developed by T-NEMC) have not been removed. T-NEMC has recently developed alternative plans for development of Parcel P-4 and the adjoining properties. Disposition of Parcels R-3,3a,b will be delayed indefinitely if the tracks are not removed from the site or an alternative disposition plan drawn up.

The lengthy and eventually fruitless negotiations with the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority over the purchase of highway rights-of-way in the southeastern corner of the project to enlarge Parcel R-2 caused extreme delays in disposition. Again, BRA seems to have placed undue reliance on the cooperation of agencies outside their jurisdiction. Following failure of the negotiations with the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, Parcels R-2 and R-2a had to be reparceled; the project redesigned, and appropriate BRA and FHA approvals obtained. Further delays occurred in the disposition of this land for Tai Tung Apartments. Again, the site preparation and construction costs, a result of the filled land site, were found to be too costly for the building as redesigned.

e. Lag in Project Improvements

There have been some delays in carrying out project improvements in the South Cove area, particularly street widenings, lighting, etc. in the eastern portion of the project area. However, the project improvements required were extensive, and the project improvements in the Bay Village neighborhood did lend support to private rehabilitation efforts.

4. Exogenous Factors

A major factor affecting land disposition within the South Cove urban renewal area has been the court imposed moratorium on school construction in Boston. This factor has been entirely outside the control of the BRA. At present, BRA disposition of urban renewal to the Boston School Committee for the construction of a new school which would, according to certain criteria, be racially imbalanced, would be held in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An appeal of the "racially imbalanced" designation for the new Quincy School will be made. At present, the delay in disposition and construction of the new school is causing a chain reaction in the assemblage and disposition of other parcels in the project area.

Other exogenous factors - i.e., socioeconomic trends and forces affecting society in general - have had some impact, however small, in causing delays in land disposition in the South Cove area. These trends are discussed more fully in Chapter II-b. Key elements relating specifically to Boston and South Cove are identified in Table VII.

DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

SOUTH COVE URBAN RENEWAL AREA, PROJECT MASSACHUSETTS R-92 (continued)

Types of Factors (See Previous Text)

(E) Signifies Exogenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors
(MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors
(NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors

Stage during which factor was significant
1 - Pre-planning
2 - Planning
3 - Execution

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE: Somewhat Important (A)	Important (B)	Very Important (C)	Crucial (D)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE: Definitely Unavoidable (A)	Probably Unavoidable (B)	Possibly Avoidable (C)	Probably Avoidable (D)	Definitely Avoidable (E)
• (MARK) Irregualr site layout and terrain, small lot size, and low height limitations for parcel R-7 in Bay Village, making appropriate redevelopment costly	2,3			●		●				
• (MARK) Desire of BRA to dispose of small commercial parcels to neighborhood businessmen coupled with inability to find developer with financial support to build on marginal commerical site.	2,3			●			●			
• (NPR) Uncertain funding and therefore uncertain staging of future expansion of T-NEMC.	3		●				●			
• (NPR) Inability of tentatively designated developer, after lengthy negotiations, to obtain FHA funding for proposed housing development.	3		●				●			
• (NPR) Lengthy negotiations with FHA to obtain funding for subsidized housing.	3		●				●			
• (NPR) Redesign of building, stripping of amenities, negotiations with BRA on provision of costly site improvements for filled land site, and renegotiations with FHA to permit per unit costs of construction for Tai Tung Apartments (R-2) to meet 221 d (3) units.	3		●				●			
• (NPR) Unusually lengthy time for HUD review and initial approval of survey and planning advance.	1	●					●			

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DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

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(E) Signifies Exogenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors
(MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors
(NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors

Stage during which factor was significant
1 - Pre-planning
2 - Planning
3 - Execution

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE (Somewhat Important / Important / Very Important / Crucial)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE (Definitely Unavoidable / Probably Unavoidable / Possibly Avoidable / Probably Avoidable / Definitely Avoidable)
• (E) Moratorium on disposition of parcel designated for new elementary school; moratorium a result of state ban on construction of racially imbalanced schools.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Halting of further relocation and staging delays resulting from inability to vacate and dispose of old Quincy School site until new school built.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Open-ended Cooperation Agreement with Tufts-New England Medical Center, not putting specific time limit on BRA holding designated parcels for future disposition to T-NEMC.	2	Very Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Delay in removal of MBTA elevated tracks in southern portion of area.	3	Important	Probably Unavoidable
• (LMR) Frequent turnover in BRA personnel involved in administering South Cove Project, particularly project directors.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Reluctance of BRA and Massachusetts Turnpike Authority to rescind tentative designation from any developer without having another potential developer for site.	3	Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Lack of incentives and/or deadlines from BRA which would require developer to move ahead with planning expeditiously after tentative designation.	3	Very Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Lengthy and eventually fruitless negotiations with Massachusetts Turnpike Authority over purchase of highway row in southeastern corner of project to enlarge parcel R-2.	3	Very Important	Probably Unavoidable
• (LMR) Reparcelization of parcels R-2 and R-2a following failure of negotiations with Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.	3	Important	Definitely Unavoidable
• (LMR) Redesign of Tai Tung Apartments (Parcel 2-A) following reparcelization.	3	Important	Definitely Unavoidable
• (LMR) Elaborate planning concept for the joint use of the new Quincy School, since abandoned. The school still is not built.	2	Somewhat Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Inability of BRA to recognize and plan for possible lengthy delays in relation to potentially difficult relocation problems, problems in dealing with state agencies, transportation agencies, etc. to carry out necessary aspects of urban renewal plan.	2	Very Important	Probably Avoidable
• (LMR) Necessity in dealing with myriad of agencies -- city, state, local, plus community groups and private redevelopers.	3	Very Important	Probably Unavoidable
• (MARK) Uncertainty of Park Plaza development, which could be expected to have a positive affect on marketing of somewhat marginal commercial properties in adjoining South Cove area.	3	Very Important	Probably Unavoidable
• (MARK) Inability to adequately relocate Pine Street Inn, nonprofit transient housing for indigent men, presents parcelization of area for disposition.	3	Important	Definitely Unavoidable
• (MARK) "Land banking," i.e. lengthy holding of primarily vacant land by tentatively designated developer and/or existing owner of urban renewal disposition parcel.	3	Very Important	Probably Avoidable
• (MARK) Delay in forming limited dividend partnership when nonprofit sponsor proves unable to obtain financial support for proposed development.	3	Important	Probably Unavoidable

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SOUTH COVE

FACTOR NUMBER	V. IMPACT MATRIX (Page 2) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF THE RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
23	LOOSE MONETARY CONDITIONS	O /	O /	+ / +	+ / +	+ / ++	O / O	++ / ++	+ / +	+ /	+ /	+ /	++ /
24	TIGHT MONETARY CONDITIONS	O /	O /	− / -	− / -	− / --	O / O	-- / --	-- /	− /	− /	− /	-- /
25	RED-LINING	O /	O /	O / O	O / O	− / O	A / O	− / -	O / O	− /	-- /	-- /	-- /
26	RISING REAL INCOMES AND CONSUMPTION STANDARDS	+ /	− /	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	O / O	O / O	+ /	A /	+ /	+ /
27	FISCAL SQUEEZE ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS	O /	− /	O / -	− / O	O / O	A / O	− /	-- / --	-- /	− /	− /	− /
28	OUTLYING SHOPPING CENTERS	-- /	− /	− / O	− / O	O / O	− / O	O / O	O / O	− /	− /	-- /	O /
29	INCREASED USE OF OFFICE SPACE	++ /	+ /	++ / ++	+ / ++	+ / +	+ / +	++ /	O /	+ /	+ /	+ /	O /
30	INVOLVEMENT OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN REAL ESTATE	O /	O /	+ / O	+ / O	+ / O	+ / O	++ / O	-- / O	O /	O /	O /	+ /
31	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY NEEDS	− /	A /	+ / O	− / O	− / O	+ / O	+ / O	+ / O	− /	O /	A /	+ /
32	NON-BRANCH BANKING	A /	O /	++ /	O /	O /	++ /	+ /	+ /	O /	O /	− /	+ /
33	LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL OR INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES	A /	+ /	++ / ++	+ / ++	O / +	++ / ++	+ / +	+ / +	+ /	O /	++ /	+ /
34	ANTI-GOVERNMENT ORIENTATION OF LOCAL LEADERS	− /	− /	O / O	− / O	− / O	-- / O	− / O	-- / O	− /	− /	− /	− /
35	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF URBAN GROWTH	-- /	-- /	− / -	++ / ++	O / +	+ / +	O / O	O / O	++ /	A /	− /	O /
36	CONTINUED AGING OF OLDER BUILDINGS	+ /	A /	++ / ++	++ / +	+ / ++	+ / +	O / O	O / O	++ /	+ /	+ /	− /
37	OBSOLESCENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE	− /	-- /	O / O	− / O	O / -	+ / +	− / O	-- / -	− /	O /	-- /	− /
38	FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTS AND LACK OF REGIONAL PLANNING	O /	− /	O / -	O / O	O / -	− / O	− / O	+ / -	O /	O /	− /	− /

LEGEND

++ - MAJOR STRENGTHENING IMPACT

\+ SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT MAJOR, STRENGTHENING IMPACT

O NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

A AMBIGUOUS IMPACT

− SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

-- MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

Prepared By REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

EXOGENOUS DELAY-- SOUTH COVE (Mass. R-92)

Table VII 7

FACTOR NUMBER	V IMPACT MATRIX (Page 1) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
1	INCREASED USE OF AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES	--	--	A / A	- / O	+ / O	- / O	O / O	O / O	-	+	-	O
2	RADIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	--	--	A / A	- / O	+ / O	- / -	O / O	O / O	-	+	-	O
3	CIRCUMFERENTIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	-	--	- / -	- / -	O / O	- / O	O / O	O / O	O	O	-	O
4	DECLINE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION	--	-	- / -	+ / +	+ / ++	O / +	O / O	O / -	+	-	-	O
5	INCREASED AIR TRAVEL	O	-	- / O	- / O	O / O	- / O	O / O	O / O	O	O	-	O
6	RESISTANCE TO URBAN EXPRESSWAYS	O	-	- / -	O / O	O / O	+ / +	O / O	-- / O	A	A	--	-
7	HIGH-LEVEL TOTAL HOUSING PRODUCTION	-	-	- / O	-- / -	-- / -	- / O	O / O	O / O	-	-	O	O
8	SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAMS	A	-	+ / O	-- / -	++ / ++	+ / +	++ / ++	-- / O	-	++	-	++
9	OUTLYING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING	-	-	- / O	+ / O	- / -	O / O	O / O	- / O	+	-	O	O
10	RISING DEPENDENCY AMONG PUBLIC HOUSING FAMILIES	-	-	- / O	-- / O	-- / O	- / O	- / O	- / O	-	--	-	-
11	EXCLUSIONARY HOUSING LAWS	-	+	+ / +	- / O	+ / +	+ / +	- / -	+	-	+	-	-
12	UNEQUAL HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT	O	O	O / O	- / -	- / -	O / O	O / O	O / O	-	-	-	-
13	INCREASED SIZE OF NEW HOUSING UNITS	O	O	- / O	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	O / O	O / O	+	+	O	O
14	RAPID CHANGES IN HOUSING TECHNOLOGY AND STYLES	-	-	O / O	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	O / O	O / O	+	+	-	O
15	RACIALLY-SEGREGATED HOUSING MARKETS	-	-	- / O	- / A	A / A	- / -	O / O	- / -	-	A	-	O
16	MINORITY-GROUP EXPANSION	-	-	- / O	- / -	A / A	A / A	- / O	O / O	-	A	-	-
17	RACIAL DESEGREGATION (in South only)	-	-	-	-	A	-	-	O	-	A	O	O
18	RACIAL DISORDERS	-	-	- / -	- / -	- / -	++ / ++	- / -	-- / --	--	-	-	-
19	RISING URBAN CRIME RATES	-	--	- / O	-- / -	-- / -	+ / ++	- / -	- / --	--	-	--	-
20	MORE ADULT-ORIENTED HOUSEHOLDS	+	+	+ / +	++ / ++	+ / +	+ / ++	+ / +	O / O	+	+	+	+
21	CHANGE TOWARDS MORE CASUAL AND LEISURE-ORIENTED LIFE STYLES	-	-	O / O	-- / -	- / O	- / O	- / O	O / O	--	-	-	-
22	RELATIVE DECLINE IN PERCEIVED QUALITY OF CENTRAL-CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS	-	-	- / -	-- / O	-- / O	+ / +	- / O	O / O	--	--	-	-

SOUTH COVE

ACCELERATING FACTORS

SOUTH COVE PROJECT (MASSACHUSETTS R-92)

FACTORS		SIGNIFICANCE
Types of Factors (See Previous Text) (E) Signifies Exogenous Factor (LMR) Signifies Local Management Reloted Foctors (MARK) Signifies Locol Market Related Factors (NPR) Signifies Notional Program Related Foctors	Stage during which factor was significant 1 - Pre-planning 2 - Plonning 3 - Execution	Some-what Impor-tant / Impor-tant / Very Impor-tont / Cru-cial
	STAGE	A B C D
• (LMR) Extensive BRA involvement in coordinating sponsor, devel-lper, architect, FHA, citizen support, etc. involved in initiating and submitting proposals for parcel redevelopment. Particulorly evident in Parcels R-2, R-7; obtaining street closings for Parcel C-3.	2,3	●
• (LMR) Provision of visible project improvements -- street realign-ment, lighting, sidewalk construction -- to encourage private rehabilitotion and development in area. Was particulorly evident in Bay Village. Project improvements have recently begun to lag behind in other areas of project.	3	● (A B C D)
• (LMR) BRA policy, at least at time of project initiation, to do all it could to make proposed necessary redevelopment feasible; i.e. provide certain costly sure improvements for construction of mode-rate income housing.	3	●
• (LMR) Proposed renegotiation of cooperation agreement with Tufts-New England Medical Center.	3	● (A B C D)

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VIII. Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall

A. Project Description

The Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project (Mass. R-77) is a conventional urban renewal project of approximately 104.5 acres. Prior to urban renewal, the area was of a predominantly non-residential character. (See Table VIII-1). The BRA had determined, by a Resolution submitted with the Survey and Planning Application, that predominantly non-residential re-use was necessary for the proper redevelopment of the community. To date, however, residential re-uses have proven most marketable. Treatment for the area involves approximately one-half clearance and one-half rehabilitation of old wharf and warehouse buildings for both commercial and residential re-use. The total federal grant for the project is approximately $32.5 million. The local share is approximately $14 million, mostly in non-cash grants-in-aid.

As indicated in Table VIII-2, approximately 43 percent of the 104.5 acre project was originally in streets and public rights-of-way, leaving a net project area of 59.3 acres. The original project also included an additional water area of 37 acres. The "Tidelands" legislation, developed and passed in the period between 1963 and 1965, enabled the BRA to grant licenses for construction on these commonwealth-owned tidelands or flats adjacent to and between the piers in the project area. The granting of a license required completion of a plan acceptable to BRA and appropriate state and federal agencies. The "Tidelands" legislation, when originally passed, granted licensing powers to BRA for a period of 5 years, at which time the legislation would have to be renewed. When the legislation was finally extended in 1972, significant changes were made, limiting the total tidelands covered to those extending only to the 1930 pierhead line and not permitting filling and development of area between the piers. Thus, the total water area originally included in the urban renewal area has been substantially reduced.

The initial land uses in the project area were primarily private non-residential, consisting of the old brick and granite warehouse and wharf buildings, originally used for storing goods brought into and shipped from Boston harbor. Later, in the late 1800's and early 1900's, when Boston was no longer a major seaport, these warehouses were taken over by small manufacturers, primarily the region's meat, poultry, fruit and produce, and fish wholesalers and retailers. Also, within the project area are the historic Faneuil Hall, Quincy Market, and North and South Market buildings.

The original urban renewal plan proposed almost a complete change in land use for the area. As shown on Table VIII-2, the acreage devoted to private non-residential land uses would be reduced from 95 percent of the net project area to 46 percent, with corresponding increases in residential uses to 34 percent, and in public non-residential uses to 20 percent. The type of non-residential uses were to be changed also. The meat, poultry, fruit and produce, and fish wholesalers would be relocated to new and more efficient quarters. (A few retailers would be allowed to remain - primarily in the lower levels of the Quincy Market Building and Faneuil Hall). Proposed non-residential re-uses included new office buildings, a hotel, and several parking garages. Rehabilitated buildings were to be used for smaller offices and retail establishments.

Initially proposed acquisition was about 60 acres or 60 percent of the project area. This plan included several significant conditional acquisition parcels, including Lewis Wharf, Commercial Wharf and India Wharf, which have not been acquired, but have been developed by their owners. Also included in the original acquisition plan were most of the small, narrow, row structures included in the North and South Market buildings in the Faneuil Hall area. These structures will be retained by the BRA and leased to the redeveloper for a 99-year term. The original acquisition plan, therefore, is significantly larger than the current disposition plan.

It should be noted that at the time this study was being conducted, several aspects of the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall plan were undergoing intensive re-study by a court-appointed committee, consisting of representatives of concerned neighborhood groups, non-profit organizations, and the BRA. While the exact results of this re-study, in terms of changes in proposed land use categories, disposition parcels, etc., have not been specifically enumerated. It is known that a major plan change will be submitted to HUD, decreasing the total acreage to be devoted to non-residential land uses and streets and rights-of-way, and increasing the area allotted for residential land use and public uses and open space.

TABLE VIII-1: Statistical Summary of Urban Renewal Project City of Boston, Mass.

1. Project Number: Mass. R-77

2. Project Name: Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall

3. Management Type: NDP _____ Conventional X

4. HUD Project Classification (I-XII): V - Non-residential exception

   Original character of land: not predominantly residential.

   BRA determined by resolution, submitted with Survey and Planning Application, that predominantly non-residential re-use necessary for proper development of the community.

5. Distance from CBD: Approx. 1-1-1/2 miles from center of CBD. Adjacent to CBD and major office building concentration.

6. Project size: (Gross Acres): 104.5 acres of land; also included in original project area was additional water area of 37.2 A.

7. Renewal mode: one-half clearance; one-half rehabilitation.

8. Total Dwelling Units in

Original Area:	28
-To be cleared	0
-To be rehabilitated	28
-To be retained without treatment	0
-Treatment not determined	0

9. Total Federal Grant (June, 1972): $32,556,383

   Basis: 2/3 X 3/4 _____

10. Local Non-Cash Grants-in-Aid: $11,979,161

    Local Cash Grants-in-Aid: $ 1,976,639


Surface Access Rd.
Power Plant
Central Expwy.
Low Rise Housing
Waterfront Plaza
Special Historic District
Hotel, Recreation, Entertain.
Office Spine
City Hall Plaza
High Rise Housing
boston
massachusetts
Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study
Downtown Waterfront
Faneuil Hall Project
Urban Renewal Plan
Illustrative Site Plan
0
250
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

Key

RESIDENTIAL

COMMERCIAL

OPEN SPACE

INSTITUTIONAL

INDUSTRIAL

boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

Downtown Waterfront
Faneuil Hall Project
Urban Renewal Plan

Land Use Plan

0 250 500 1000


Surface Access Rd.
Power Plant
Central Expwy.
Low Rise Housing
Waterfront Plaza
Special Historic District
Hotel, Recreation, Entertain.
Office Spine
City Hall Plaza
High Rise Housing
boston
massachusetts
Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study
Downtown Waterfront
Faneuil Hall Project
Urban Renewal Plan
Functional Pattern
0
250
500
1000

Table VIII-2

LAND USE CHARACTERISTICS
DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL
(MASSACHUSETTS R-77)

	Acres	Percent
Gross Project Size	104.5*	100.0
Less Streets/Public Rights-of-Way	45.2	43.3
Net Project Area	59.3	56.7

Uses	Initial Land Uses		Originally Proposed Re-Uses (Total Plan Area		Initially Proposed for Acquisition		Current Disposition Plan	
	Acres	% Net Project Area	Acres	% of Total	Acres	% of Initial Land Use	Acres	% of Subtotal
Residential	1.0	1.7	19.7	33.6	0	0	5.8	--
(Public)								
(Private)	(1.0)	(1.7)	(19.7)	(33.6)			(5.8)	
Private Non-Residential	56.6	95.4	27.1	46.2	46.8	82.7	13.7	--
(Commercial)	(52.7)	(88.9)	(27.0)	(46.2)	(46.0)	(87.3)	(13.7)	
(- Office)								
(- Retail)								
(- Hotel)								
(- Other)								
(Industrial)	(2.9)	(4.9)	(0.1)	--	(0.8)	(27.6)		
Public Non-Residential	2.7	4.6	11.9	20.3	1.6	59.3	8.1	--
Other (Mixed Residential/Commercial)	0	0	0	0	0	0	7.0	--
Subtotal	--	--	--	--	48.4	--	34.6	
Streets and Public Rights-of-Way	--	--	--	--	12.0	--	NA	
Total Net Project Area	59.3	100.0	58.7**	100.0				
Acquisition/Disposition Inventory					60.4	59.4	NA***	

* Original total land area of project. Also included in original project was total water area of approximately 37 acres.
** Decrease in land area of project caused by proposed demolition of certain piers and corresponding increase in water area.
*** Initial acquisition reduced substantially be substraction of several major parcels developed by owners, not acquired by BRA.

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B. Project Area Dynamics

The Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Urban Renewal Project is located on the Boston Harbor directly east of the New City Hall and Government Center. It is adjacent to the downtown area and the financial district and is bordered on its northerly inland edge by the thriving Italian community of the North End. Today, the waterfront area is the home of an estimated 1,000 residents and is within a 10-minute walk for 65,000 workers in the city. Its historic buildings, restaurants, and the New England Aquarium host hundreds of thousands of visitors annually.

During Colonial times, the waterfront served as a center for the molasses and slave trade with the West Indies. During the 1800's, the area entered its period of greatest commercial prominence, as the clipper ship trade routes expanded to China. It was during this period (1830-1855) that most of the historic granite wharf structures were built. Following this period of prominence as a great seaport, the waterfront area began to decline. The old granite wharf buildings were turned into warehouses and centers for a variety of retail and commercial facilities, most recently housing hundreds of food wholesalers, retailers, and processors. The urban renewal plan for the waterfront area was initiated by the Chamber of Commerce and a group of influential businessmen who recognized the potential of the area and the need to preserve an important historic district in Boston.

Basic objectives of the urban renewal plan called for: 1) the revitalization of a key portion of downtown Boston; 2) the upgrading of the pattern of land uses adjacent to the North End residential community; 3) the establishment of a functional and supportive connection between the area and its surrounding districts -- the North End, the Government Center, the financial district, and the CBD. It is these surrounding districts, which constitute a major portion of downtown Boston that provide the context for the analysis of the market dynamics of the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project.

1. The Role of Downtown Boston

Like other central cities in major metropolitan areas throughout the United States, Boston serves many functions. These are primarily as follows:

- The retail and distribution center for the metropolitan area
- The office and administrative center for the metropolitan area
- The center of the administration of city, county, and State governments and the location of various State and Federal agencies
- The financial center for the region
- Tourist and convention center
- Entertainment center
- Cultural center

Downtown Boston has the largest concentration of these functions within the metropolitan area and most are within walking distance -- or within easy access by public transportation -- to the waterfront area. Thus, the waterfront area was a logical focus for renewal and redevelopment activities.

2. Key Trends

The major trends within the city of Boston relative to the SMSA have been discussed in detail in Chapter II - City and SMSA Dynamics. The following trends should be noted more specifically as having an impact - either positive or negative - on the marketability of land within the waterfront area.

a. Retail Function of the CBD

As shown in Table II - 7, Retail Sales Volumes - Boston SMSA, Central City, and CBD, while the total retail sales in the CBD increased slightly between 1958 and 1967 (2 percent), it declined significantly in relation to retail sales in the SMSA as a whole. Recently compiled BRA data entitled Economic and Demographic indicators of Growth in the city core, the city of Boston, and the SMSA (See Table II - 1) indicated that retail sales in the city core remained static between 1960 and 1970 while retail sales in the city of Boston as a whole and in the SMSA increased significantly during the same period. Even taking into account the significant increase in office employment in downtown Boston in recent years and an increase in downtown residential population, the BRA projected increase in retail sales in the CBD core -- from $560,000,000 in

1970 to $850,000,000 in 1980 (in constant dollars) seems optimistic.

The traditional CBD retail center in Boston has been along Washington Street, adjacent to the financial district and the Boston Common. In recent years, the opening of specialty shops has diverted some shopping from the CBD to the Prudential Center, Boyleston Street and Newberry Street, west of the Common. The Washington Street retail area was scheduled for treatment as part of the proposed CBD Urban Renewal Plan, a major recommendation of the Downtown GNRP. However, lack of funding prevented the implementation of this project. The possible development of Park Plaza, which will link the Prudential Center - Boyleston Street area with the traditional CBD, and other pending future developments along Washington Street should serve to bolster the downtown retail function so that it would be more than adequate to serve area workers and residents.

b. Office and Administrative Center

The BRA table of Economic and Demographic Indicators of Growth in the City Core, the City of Boston, and the Boston Metropolitan Area (Table II-13) demonstrates that between 1960 and 1970, office space in the city increased from 20.1 million square feet to 28 million gross square feet. Within the city core, office space increased from 16.6 million square feet to 23.7 million square feet. BRA estimates an additional 13 million square feet of office space to be added between 1970 and 1980. However, with the softening of the office market observed in 1972-1973, this appears to be somewhat optimistic.

The increase in office space in the city of Boston has been accompanied by an increase in office related employment. Employment in the categories of finance, insurance, real estate, public service, and services increased by 25 percent or more. Almost all of the new office space was developed within the central core and the majority of the increase in jobs between 1960 and 1970 occurred in the vicinity of the Central Business District extending to the Prudential Center.

Employment has become more concentrated than ever in the downtown area. There are a number of major consequences of of this increased concentration. These were outlined in Chapter II. However, it is important to repeat those which have major significance for the marketability and redevelopment of the nearby waterfront area:

- Increased demand for housing in or near downtown
- Rise in land values and marketability of land within the South End and Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall projects
- An increased need and support for amenities, entertainment, and services by a non-family oriented higher income downtown resident

c. Government Center

During the 1960's, the prominence of downtown Boston as the center for administration of city and state government was greatly enhanced by the development of the Government Center Urban Renewal Project. Major buildings within the Government Center include the new City Hall, two major federal office buildings, a state office building and some construction and rehabilitation for private office use. Another 600,000-square-foot state office building is presently under construction in downtown Boston, with a 1,000,000-square-foot federal office building and a 600,000-square-foot state HEW tower planned and projected for completion between 1976-78. Therefore, government is employing an ever-increasing number of persons in the downtown Boston area.

d. Financial Center

Boston's financial center has traditionally been located east of the CBD, adjacent to the Government Center and Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project. Several major financial institutions have constructed new quarters in recent years including the First National Bank, the Merchants National Bank and Boston Five Cents Savings, among other. Most new construction has continued to be in or adjacent to the existing financial district. Consequently, Boston's financial institutions

can be expected to play a key role in the continued viability of downtown Boston.

e. Tourist and Convention Center

As one of the oldest cities in the United States and the seat of many historic events of the early days of our country, Boston has always been an important tourist center. The presence of many major institutions of higher learning as well as its prominence as a government center makes it an important convention center as well. The BiCentennial celebration should greatly increase tourist travel to Boston. However, it should be noted that in order to capitalize on the economic impact of the BiCentennial, much of the redevelopment proposed for the Waterfront will have to be completed by 1975, most importantly the hotel development, the waterfront park and other project improvements.

f. Entertainment and Cultural Center

Entertainment and cultural facilities are located in and surrounding the downtown Boston area. Many cultural facilities are also associated with the many colleges and institutions in the area. All are readily accessible from the downtown area via public transportation.

In summary, the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project area is located within walking distance of most of the major facilities offered in downtown Boston. Continued growth of the major functions of central city will support most of the re-uses proposed in the project area.

3. Population and Housing Dynamics

Data on population and housing dynamics for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area are limited, due to the minimal residential population in the area at the time of project initiation (an estimated 28 occupied housing units). In 1970, the population had increased to 431 persons, according to the census. All occupants of the area were white, with an estimated 8 percent over 65 years

of age. The present estimated population of the area is 1,000.

Income data for the households in the Waterfront area was not available in 1970. However, a review of rentals in occupied units in the area at the time give some indication of area residents. Of a total of 192 renter occupied units for which data was given, approximately 21 percent were renting for less than $100 per month; 17 percent between $100 and $200; 23 percent between $200 and $300; and 32 percent at $300 or more. Most of the housing constructed or available in rehabilitated structures are luxury units.

An interesting insight into the marketability of luxury housing in the Waterfront area can be gained from an examination of the characteristics of units offered at the Harbor Towers apartment complex. Construction of the Harbor Towers Apartments was begun in early 1969, with initial occupancy in October 1971. At the time of our study (December 1973) more than 81 percent of the 624 luxury one-and-two-bedroom apartments had been rented, an absorption rate of 250 units per year. Rentals in the Harbor Towers Apartments range from an average of $495 per month for a one-bedroom apartment of approximately 1,220 square feet, including heat and air conditioning to $645 for a two-bedroom apartment (1,640 square feet) on an upper floor. Marketing has been extremely successful and absorption rapid, considering the fact that all the units were placed on the market at once and also given the unimaginative design and layouts of the apartments, the lack of indoor parking within the apartment building, and the fact that project improvements - streets, lighting, etc., were not completed until approximately 2 years after initial occupancy. Because of the slow development of the central and southern portions of the waterfront area, the Harbor Towers complex is also somewhat isolated from other residential areas. Convenient shopping and recreational facilities are available on the site. Further evidence as to the anticipated marketability and support for luxury housing in the area is revealed by the recent acceptance of a proposal by the Restudy Committee to change the designated re-use of a major parcel from office to residential.

In summary, existing housing and known population characteristics for the waterfront area indicate a definite market for luxury and semi-luxury housing of the type proposed. Moderate income units have been designated for development in Parcel C-2, including approximately 100 units for the elderly. This housing has been proposed to fulfill the needs of the residents of the

adjacent North End community. This is a stable Italian neighborhood, already over-crowded and subject to the problems of physical decline common to older urban communities. Much of the housing to be developed in Parcel C-2 will be in the form of 3- to 5-flat structures, to be rehabilitated by an owner-occupant. While these structures have been and will be offered for redevelopment proposals, the BRA has for the most part, disposed of those parcels that have been advertized to residents of the immediate area. A majority of the original 12 sites to be sold in Parcel C-2 were purchased by former residents of the North End. While the uncertainty of federal funds for rehabilitation activities in urban renewal areas has limited the financial feasibility of rehabilitation of these units for moderate income households, the BRA has attempted to offset the problem by offering the structures at a nominal sum of approximately $3,000. Nevertheless, the total investment for rehabilitation of a 4-flat structure has been estimated at approximately $75,000. Therefore, it is unlikely that many moderate income units can be made available in rehabilitation units without federal funding.

C. Project Chronology

TABLE VIII-3, included herein, outlines key events in the chronology of the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project from its early conception to the present time. Exhibit VIII-1 presents a graphic illustration of the activities project execution in terms of its various stages defined by key milestones in the chronology. It provides a description of the urban renewal process and pattern of activities in this urban renewal area for comparison with other projects and as a background for the analysis of delay-causing factors and accelerating tactics to follow.

1. The Preplanning Phase

This phase can be defined as extending from that point in time when the Chamber of Commerce began to organize interests to plan for the redevelopment of the Boston harbor to the completion of an application for Survey and Planning Advance under the urban renewal program. Although civic leaders probably began discussing the possibility of renewing the historic waterfront area during the 1950's, actual planning was not begun by the Chamber of Commerce until 1960. Thus, the preplanning phase occupied the period from 1960 to June 1962. During this period, the Chamber of Commerce organized local interests, including bank presidents, company heads, and influential Boston businessmen; set up a Waterfront Division within the Chamber of Commerce; raised $150,000 from the Chamber and interested citizens; and hired a staff to draw up a plan for the waterfront area. The actions of the Chamber of Commerce were a response to Mayor Collin's announced "90 Billion Dollar Development Program for Boston" and a response to the impetus of planning activity for the complete redesign of Scollay Square (now Government Center), adjacent to the Waterfront area in the west. Also during this period, funding was obtained and planning begun on a General Neighborhood Renewal Program for Downtown North, encompassing the waterfront district and Government Center, as well as other areas. While the Government Center Project was given top priority in the Downtown North GNRP, much attention was directed to the Waterfront area as well.

In 1962, the Chamber of Commerce made public its plan for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area. BRA incorporated this plan into the application for Survey and Planning Advance which was submitted to HHFA (now HUD) in June 1962. In December 1962, HUD approved the Survey and Planning Advance, and planning for the historic waterfront area began in earnest.

VIII - 3:

DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL PROJECT CHRONOLOGY SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS

PRE-PLANNING	1957	• Urban Renewal Agency, originally a department within the Boston Housing Authority, becomes a separate, quasi-public agency. • West End Urban Renewal Project receives federal approval and project execution begins.
	1959	• Mayor John F. Collins elected. • Preliminary planning undertaken by renewal agency for Government Center and portion of Washington Park.
	1960	• Urban Renewal Agency merged with the City Planning Commission and the Boston Redevelopment Authority was established.
	September	• Mayor announces "The 90 Million Dollar Development Program for Boston."
	October	• Edward Logue appointed administrator of BRA for 90 days to set up original structure for carrying out $90 million program, to secure federal planning grants covering the city, to expedite the planning of the Government Center Project.
	December	• BRA filed and HHFA approves applications for planning advance funds totalling $2,037,250 for the preparation of 10 General Neighborhood Renewal Plans, including the Downtown and Downtown North GNRP's, the latter of which would encompass the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal area.
	1961	• Mayor Collins requests the Chamber of Commerce to undertake the preparation of a redevelopment plan for the Waterfront area. • Chamber of Commerce forms a waterfront division composed of Chamber members, bank presidents, corporate heads and influential community members; raises $150,000 and hires special staff to prepare Waterfront redevelopment plan.

	1962	• Waterfront division of the Chamber of Commerce makes public results of study and plan for waterfront area. • BRA approves Application for Survey and Planning Advance for Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area, which incorporates Chamber of Commerce plan -- Application forwarded to HHFA. • Prize winning design for new city hall approved by BRA and sale of building site in Government Center to City Hall Commission authorized.
	December	• HHFA APPROVES SURVEY AND PLANNING ADVANCE.
PLANNING	1963	• BRA approves $284,000 contract with Waterfront Development Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of the Chamber of Commerce with membership and staff similar to that of the waterfront division, for preparation of the urban renewal plan for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal area. • Major problems hindering execution of Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal plan recognized and publicized: 1) relocation of several hundred food wholesalers and processing plants; 2) elimination of Union Freight Railroad from center of Atlantic Avenue; 3) removal of certain entrance and exit ramps from Central Artery. Discussion had already begun with Massachusetts Department of Public Works regarding removal of the ramps and commitment expected shortly. • Senator Ted Kennedy announces federal reservation of $17 million in funding for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Urban Renewal Project. • Problem of tidelands ownership and licenses for construction on Commonwealth - owned flats adjacent to piers in the waterfront urban renewal area investigated. Legislation introduced which would permit BRA to grant licenses for construction on these flats upon completion of a plan and approval by BRA, federal and state agencies.

Urban Renewal Disposition Study -- Boston

PLANNING	1964		
	February	•	APPLICATION FOR LOAN AND GRANT, PART I SUBMITTED TO HHFA
	March	•	HHFA APPROVAL OF LOAN AND GRANT, PART I
	April		URBAN RENEWAL PLAN SUBMITTED TO CITY COUNCIL
	May	•	PUBLIC HEARING HELD ON URBAN RENEWAL PLAN FOR DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL AREA
	June 8	•	CITY COUNCIL APPROVES URBAN RENEWAL PLAN
	June 11	•	MAYOR APPROVES URBAN RENEWAL PLAN
	August	•	State Department of Community Affairs approves urban renewal plan.
	August 18	•	APPLICATION FOR LOAN AND GRANT, PART II
		•	Process of relocating food processors and distributors out of urban renewal area begins with initial contacts by BRA, Waterfront Development Corporation; formation of organizations; and preliminary site inspections.
		•	Passage of "Tidelands" legislation which allows BRA to grant irrevocable licenses for development on waterfront tidelands for a period of five years.
	1965		
	January 18	•	HHFA APPROVAL OF LOAN AND GRANT, PART II, DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL, MASSACHUSETTS R-77.
		•	General Plan for City of Boston, 1965-1975, adopted by BRA and City Council.
EXECUTION	1965		
	February	•	PROJECT EXECUTION COMMENCES WITH LAND ACQUISITION, RELOCATION
		•	New Boston Food Market Corporation, formed of area fruit and produce distributors, agree to relocate and build fruit and produce market in Chelsea-Everett area outside city of Boston.
		•	Greater Boston Wholesale Meat Association, Inc., agrees to study relocation site on New Haven Railroad land in South Bay area.
		•	Studies begun on relocating fish dealers from area.
		•	Renovations of Prince Building (old Spaghetti warehouse) begun.

EXECUTION

1965

October

- DISPOSITION OF SITE ON CENTRAL WHARF TO NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM CORPORATION, A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION.
- CONSTRUCTION OF AQUARIUM BEGINS IMMEDIATELY.

1966

May

- BRA gives final approval to preliminary design for three 40-story apartment towers to be built by the Berenson Corporation and its partners.

August

- DEMOLITION OF SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS IN DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL URBAN RENEWAL AREA BEGINS.
- Negotiations begin for taking of Union Freight Rail-Road Line tracks in center of Atlantic Avenue.
- Employers' Group of Insurance Cos, Inc., announces interest in office building site (Parcel D-10)
- New England Telephone Company announces plans to construct $10 million executive office building on State Street from their existing building (Parcel A-6).
- Rehabilitation of Prince Building completed.
- Cabot, Cabot and Forbes invited by BRA to submit proposal for 60 State Street, major office site straddling boundry between Government Center and the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area.

1967

- BRA approves transfer of 24,000 square feet of land in vicinity of Atlantic Avenue and Mercantile Street in Parcel C-2 to State Council of Knights of Columbus for development of apartments.
- Project Director recommends to BRA Board that BRA turn over Union Wharf at north end of project area to fish dealers being displaced. BRA will subsidize site preparations prior to construction of new facility.

1968

February

- Fruit and produce wholesalers move to new distribution center at Beacham Street on the Chelsea-Everett town line.

EXECUTION

1968

- Employers' Group of Insurance Cos., Inc., pulls out from plans to develop Parcel D-10; announce move instead to site at Beacon and Fremont Streets just outside of Government Center area.
- Developers of Harbor Towers receive FHA commitment; cannot begin construction until Atlantic Avenue relocated, site made available for garage.

March-May

- Submission and approval by HUD of Budget Amendatory requesting increase in Relocation Grant from $1,125,000 to $2,526,000.

1969

- BRA approves final design plans and redevelopment proposal for Harbor Towers; construction on Harbor Towers begins.
- New England Telephone Company withdraws as developer of major office site in waterfront area -- Parcel A-6--because of disagreement with BRA on building design.
- BRA tentatively designates the Berenson-Carlyle group, developers of Harbor Towers, as developers of hotel on property between T and Long Wharves (Parcel A-7).
- Parcel A-6, originally to be developed by New England Telephone Company, advertised.
- State Department of Public Works agrees to remove Clinton Street entrance ramp to Central Artery in order to allow assembly of Parcel E-8, proposed garage.

January

- Newly formed Waterfront Residents' Association makes appeal to BRA for recognition as official project area committee (PAC) for the urban renewal area as required by HUD. Negotiations over prospective contract between BRA and official PAC ensue.
- Budget Amendatory submitted and approved by HUD increasing total Federal Capital Grant by $12,551,143 to $30,437,613; also included increase in local non-cash grants-in-aid from $7,372,093 to $11,979,167 and cash local grants-in-aid from $308,007 to $1,976,639.

1970

- Four proposals received in response to advertisement for office building development Parcel A-6.

EXECUTION

1970

- John Carzis submits $17.7 million proposal for restaurant-hotel-marina at Rowes Wharf on both sides of Atlantic Avenue; is tentatively designated developer for site.
- BRA organizes election among residents of waterfront area; citizens vote recognition of Waterfront Residents' Association as official PAC. Further negotiations over contract.
- PAC rejected under proposed contract, with veto power similar to that held by South End Project area committee.
- Waterfront Residents' Association seeks City Council assistance in grievance against BRA in fight for recognition as elected PAC.
- Carl Koch announces plans to market rehabilitated units on Lewis Wharf as condominiums. Also announces intention to submit proposal for development of Sargent's Wharf with moderate income housing (possibly MHFA financing).

March

- Meat wholesalers relocate in new quarters in South Boston.

Fall

- Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes named tentatively designated developers for 60 State Street.

1971

- Union Freight Railroad (4 1/2 mile row plus storage yards at South Station) acquired by BRA.
- Demolition on Long Wharf for hotel site, park.
- Berenson Corporation announces plans for rehabilitation of Long Wharf Custom House Block for apartments, commercial usage.
- Tentative designation given to Thomas White and Waterfront Development Trust (The Architect's Collaborative, designers) for 40-story office building and adjoining apartments and garage for Parcel A-6.
- Spaulding and Slye tentatively designated developers of office and garage structure, Parcel E-8.
- Nation-wide public offering made by BRA for developer to carry out exterior and interior restoration and development of market buildings adjoining Faneuil Hall.

May

- Harbor Towers topped off.

EXECUTION

1971		
May	•	City Council approves $4 million loan for construction in Waterfront renewal area, including $900,000 for utility construction.
June	•	"Tidelands" Legislation comes up for renewal.
July	•	BRA changes tactics on offering of Parcel C-2 for development. Discards six proposals from various developers for development of entire site; instead proposes to offer structures for rehabilitation by individual.
September	•	Fish wholesalers relocated outside urban renewal area.
October	•	Harbor Towers opened for occupancy.
December	•	BRA selects first 11 developers (tentative designation) for rehabilitation of 12 buildings in Parcel C-2 -- 105-147 Fulton Street.
December	•	Lewis Wharf Project, phase I (Koch) given go-ahead by BRA following design review.
1972		
	•	"Tidelands" Legislation extended, but with significant changes placing additional controls on licensing of tidelands for development.
	•	Waterfront Residents' Association continues fight for recognition as official PAC with new project director.
March-June	•	Submission and approval by HUD of Budget Amendatory requesting an increase in the federal relocation grant by $2,103,770 to $4,629,770. This request was spurred on by passage of Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1970.
March	•	BRA approves design plans for rehabilitation of commercial wharf by owners.
April	•	Waterfront residents stage demonstration, halt demolition of 35 buildings in Parcel C-2, Fulton and Commercial Streets.
April	•	Waterfront Residents' Association brings suit against BRA in Federal District Court on three counts.
	•	Judge grants injunction against further demolition developments in the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall urban renewal area.
	•	Buildings in Parcel C-2 placed on National Register of Historic Places.

EXECUTION

1972

October	•	Exterior restoration of North and South Market Buildings begins.
December	•	Cabot, Cabot and Forbes submit final plans for 60 State Street, design review, environmental impact statement having been approved.

1973

January	•	Suit brought against BRA by Waterfront Residents' Association settled out of court by a court-sanctioned Stipulation and Agreement. This agreement set up a North End Waterfront Restudy Committee which would examine specified aspects of the original BRA plan for the area which had come under fire.
April 23	•	Budget Amendatory to Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal plan submitted to HUD, requesting an increase in the project capital grant of $15,000 to provide funds for technical assistance to the community organization participating in a restudy of the project plan. At time of review, submission had not been acted upon.
Spring	•	Advertising of 18 additional parcels in C-2 for rehabilitation by designated owner-occupants.
Summer	•	BRA selects tentatively designated developers for 18 C-2 parcels.
	•	North End Businessmen's Association submits unsolicited proposal to BRA for redevelopment of Sargent's Wharf.
July	•	"The Restudy Committee Plan for Selected Portions of the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Urban Renewal Project" submitted to the BRA.
August	•	"Final Report of the BRA Review Group on the Waterfront Restudy" made public. BRA plans not accepted by the Restudy Committee.
August	•	James Rouse Company, Columbia, Maryland, receives designation as developer of Faneuil Hall markets in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal area.
Aug.-Dec.	•	Continuation of negotiations between BRA and North End Waterfront Restudy Committee to resolve differences on proposed plan for area.
December	•	BRA requests City Council to approve $4 million bond issue to fund remaining project improvements, primarily the park, street installation, and lighting to be carried out in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project.

2. The Planning Phase

The planning phase is dated from the filing by BRA of the Application for a Survey and Planning Advance with HHFA (now HUD) to the final approval of the Application for a Loan and Grant, Part II. This phase extended from June 1962 to January 1965. It included the following principal stages:

a. HUD Initial Approval

This was the brief period during which the HHFA regional and central offices were reviewing Boston's Application for the Survey and Planning Advance. It was approved in December 1962.

b. Physical Planning Stage

This period extended from HHFA approval of the Survey and planning Advance to the completion and public presentation of the urban renewal plan for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area in April 1964. It was during this period that all of the physical planning activities, land use and marketability studies, appraisals, project cost estimates, relocation plans and all other documents required by HUD and local ordinances were prepared. The physical planning and design aspects of the urban renewal plan for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area were carried out by the Waterfront Development Corporation, a non-profit subsidary of the Chamber of Commerce, under contract to the BRA. The Waterfront Development Corporation was made up of members similar to those who had made up the Waterfront division of the Chamber when the original plan was prepared. The Waterfront Development Corporation hired an extremely competent design and planning staff, some of whom later worked at BRA, and who worked with BRA in the development of the urban renewal plan.

The urban renewal plan prepared by the Waterfront Development Corporation differed in some respects from the original Chamber of Commerce plan, although both plans were extremely bold and ambitious, considering the conditions in the area and the problems to be overcome. Both plans conformed to stated city policies and proposals that were known at the time the plans were prepared, including the city's General Plan and specific reports dealing with the waterfront area.

The urban renewal plan for Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area carried forth the strong "urban design" structure for the waterfront as advanced by the original Chamber of Commerce plan, although the plans for highrise towers at both the north and south ends of the project, serving as visual anchors and gateways, were reduced. The highrise complex at the north end was eliminated, probably due to the improbability of the MBTA power generating station being relocated, as well as opposition from North End community residents. The highrise planned for the southern end was moved northward, probably due to the improbability of relocating the U.S. Pierhead Line to create the parcel on which the housing was to be located. Both the original plan and the final urban renewal plan called for a waterfront park along Great Cove, near the central portion of the waterfront. This park would be linked with the historic Faneuil Hall and Quincy Market buildings by a pedestrian walk-way. To the north of the Great Cove and Waterfront park and at the edge of the North End, a sizeable area, extending onto the piers, would be reserved for new and/or rehabilitated housing. The size of this area, as finally included in the urban renewal plan, was smaller than that originally proposed in the Chamber of Commerce plan; several blocks of proposed new housing were apparently deleted at the request of the North End community.

A hotel facility was included in the urban renewal plan along the southern edge of the Cove and park and north of the highrise towers.

Finally, both the original Chamber of Commerce plan and the final urban renewal plan displayed a band along the Central Artery for office/commercial facilities. These functions would have strong ties with Boston's office and financial districts immediately on the other side of the Central Artery. The urban renewal plan also included a small finger of land for office space along the waterfront park, west of the proposed hotel site. (The original Chamber of Commerce plan had called for housing in this area). The change to office space in the renewal plan was apparently in recognition of the strong demand for office space in downtown Boston in the mid-1960's. Indeed, immediately following the public announcement of the funding of the urban renewal plan, Bell Telephone of New England and a major insurance company announced interest in building on sites in this area. However, delays in making the land available, providing project improvements, and/or a more attractive offer resulted in the insurance company developing on One Beacon Street, off Tremont Street.

The telephone company could not meet BRA design criteria, and consequently the site was never developed. The recent re-study of the area suggests revising the plan to include residential re-use, rather than office in the area.

To further complicate an already complex and ambitious design plan, the urban renewal plan called for the removal and relocation of several ramps onto or from the Central Artery within the Waterfront urban renewal area. This reconstruction of the Central Artery's ramps, which required the cooperation of the State Department of Public Works, was proposed to facilitate the "Walk to the Sea", linking the historic Faneuil Hall area and the waterfront park; to permit assembly of at least one major disposition parcel; and to reduce truck traffic from exiting or entering the Central Artery in the urban renewal area. Another road change was the relocation of Atlantic Avenue from its original location along the waterfront to a right-of-way adjacent to the Central Artery through most of the project. This would permit more development along the water, east of the major north-south traffic routes. This proposal also required closing down the Union Freight Railroad, which ran from North Station to South Station along the center of Atlantic Avenue.

c. Local Approval Stage

Completion of the urban renewal plan by the Waterfront Development Corporation and BRA initiated the formal review and approval process at the local and state level. The urban renewal plan for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area was submitted to the Boston City Council in April 1964. A public hearing was held in May, with local government approval by the City Council and the mayor in early June. State approval of the urban renewal plan, not required by federal regulations, was given in August 1964, one week after the application for Loan and Grant, Part II was submitted to HUD. Prior to the beginning of local approval process, the application for Loan and Grant, Part I had been submitted to and approved by HUD (February - March 1964).

d. HUD Final Approval Stage

Technically, the HUD final approval stage encompasses the time required to review and approve the applications for Loan and Grant, Parts I and II and, therefore, would extend from the time of submission of the Loan and Grant, Part I in February 1964 to the date of

approval of the Loan and Grant, Part II on January 18, 1965. Approval of the Part II application signifies authorization of land acquisition and allows the execution process to begin. As indicated above, there was a period of five months between HUD approval of the Loan and Grant, Part I and submission of the Loan and Grant, Part II while local government was conducting its review and approval process. Thus, while the total elapsed time for final HUD approval was eleven months, actually a portion of this was occupied by local approvals. Therefore, the time devoted to HUD review and approval was only six months.

3. Execution

Technically, all execution activities in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal area commenced in January 1965 upon approval of the Loan and Grant, Part II. As would be expected, acquisition and relocation activities were most energetic during the early years of the project execution. Exhibit VIII-1, Key Components of Execution Stage, illustrates the pattern of project execution activities. These are discussed in greater detail below.

a. Acquisition

Acquisition of parcels throughout the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project began almost immediately upon authorization. In acquiring land in the waterfront area, the BRA attempted to follow one or more of several strategies or guidelines which are briefly outlined below.

- In an attempt to keep the cost of land acquisition at a minimum, the urban renewal plan for the waterfront area designated several large parcels for conditional acquisition, i.e. to be acquired by the BRA only if existing owners did not wish to retain the land. Thus, initially, much of the effort in land acquisition was actually spent in negotiations with existing owners of land in the project area in order to obtain their agreement to develop their land in accordance with the urban renewal plan. Particular parcels included the Berenson properties (India and Long Wharves) Lewis Wharf and Commercial Wharf.

KEY COMPONENTS OF EXECUTION STAGE
ANNUAL PROGRESS CHART

Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall R-77

Boston, Mass.

Exhibit VIII - 1



- Also, to keep acquisition costs at a minimum, the BRA attempted to acquire early in the execution phase those properties which would, prior to development, have to be re-zoned from waterfront usage (very low intensity) to business zones (higher intensity usage and, therefore more valuable). Although a zoning plan for the area had been drafted, it had not been approved. The BRA wished to acquire relevant properties prior to approval of the zoning plan to avoid possible negative court decisions. This acquisition strategy affected the early taking of many waterfront properties, including land to be sold for development of the aquarium.

- As in other renewal areas in the city, the BRA would acquire land at any time on the basis of hardship--i.e. would acquire those properties for which the current owners would require the money in order to relocate.

These specific strategies for land acquisition were followed generally within the context of the more comprehensive BRA strategy that land should be acquired as close as possible to the time of disposition so that following relocation and demolition, the land would not remain vacant for any significant period of time. However, in following the other acquisition strategies, the BRA of necessity had to bank land and, in some instances, this land is still being retained.

Among the early parcels acquired in the waterfront area were Central Wharf, the proposed aquarium site, various parcels within the area of the proposed relocation of Atlantic Avenue, and those required for assembly of the major residential, office and hotel sites. Most of the early acquisition sites were on the east side of the Central Artery. Also during 1965, scattered sites were acquired in the North and South Market buildings and in the warehouses in Parcel C-2 in the northern portion of the project area. During the second year of project execution, acquisition continued in Parcel C-2 and the market buildings. In addition, the few parcels in the Blackstone block were obtained as were the major parcels to be utilized in the construction of the waterfront park along Great Cove.

As shown on Exhibit VIII-1, computed back from the current 34.4 acre acquisition inventory, acquisition progress was rapid at first, with 25 percent of the total area acquired within ten months, about

one-half the total area acquired within 18 months, and two-thirds within 31 months. Approximately 80 months into project execution, the progress in land acquisition leveled off at approximately 80 percent complete and has remained at this level, partially because the residents' suit against the BRA resulted in a court order against continuation of project execution for approximately one year. The average acquisition rate in the waterfront area has been about 3.4 acres per year.

b. Relocation

Relocation of the several hundred wholesale and retail establishments scattered throughout the market buildings and warehouses in the waterfront area had been recognized as a major problem in project execution even during the planning stages. In the face of this unusually complex relocation task, the BRA relocation team seems to have performed admirably. After an initially slow start, relocation of the more than 400 businesses in the urban renewal area reached 90 percent completion as of July 1973. Relocation in the waterfront area was a complex, time consuming process. Most of the businesses located in the warehouses and market buildings in the renewal area had been there for years. The businesses consisted primarily of meat and poultry, fruit and produce, and fish wholesalers and small retailers. Previously, studies had been done, indicating that the buildings of these wholesalers and retailers were inadequate and inefficient for the activities for which they were being used; the streets were too narrow for the transportation equipment required. The necessity for relocating the wholesalers was realized by all parties involved, yet stupendous efforts were required. Cooperation had to be obtained among the various wholesalers (many of whom did not even speak to each other) to form a corporation and decide to move. Public agencies, from the federal government down to the local level were involved in arranging the financing, obtaining a site, and developing the mechanisms for the creation of a new distribution center.

Relocation activities began in 1965. The fruit and produce wholesalers relocated in a new distribution center in the Chelsea-Everett area in 1968. The meat and poultry wholesalers were relocated in South Boston in 1970 and the fish dealers relocated further north along the waterfront in 1971.

c. Demolition

Demolition in the waterfront area progressed more slowly than would be expected, given the pace of land acquisition. Possibly it was slowed down initially by relocation problems and the high degree of rehabilitation scheduled throughout the area. Demolition activity, measured as a percent of area to be cleared, was about 81 percent complete as of mid-1973.

d. Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation activities now proposed for the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall area are much more extensive than originally planned. Parcel C-2, the residential area in the northern section of the project, is now scheduled entirely for rehabilitation rather than rehabilitation and/or demolition and new construction. In addition, several conditional acquisition parcels -- Lewis Wharf, Commercial Wharf, and the Custom House block on Long Wharf are being redeveloped by their owners through rehabilitation.

Exhibit VIII-1 indicates that as of mid-1973, approximately 24 percent of all rehabilitation has been completed. Rehabilitation underway includes completion of some residential units and offices in the Lewis Wharf and Custom Block buildings; exterior restoration of the North and South Market buildings; rehabilitation by owner occupants of twelve 3-to 5-flat buildings in Parcel C-2, and 18 more parcels now being offered in the same area. Rehabilitation not yet underway but scheduled for completion includes the exterior restoration of the Quincy Market building (contract to be advertized shortly); complete interior rehabilitation of all three market buildings (to be carried out by the developer lease with Rouse Company, Columbia, Maryland now under negotiation); and innumerable buildings not yet advertized, including the Mercantile Building in Parcel C-2.

e. Public Facilities

Based on the current estimate of the dollar value of public facilities to be constructed, Exhibit VIII-1 indicates that as of July 1963, approximately 80 percent of all public facilities to be constructed in

conjunction with the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project had been completed. Public facilities completed include the Government Center Police Station, the North End Branch Library, and the Fire Station on Cambridge Street, also in the Government Center Project. While these facilities are not located within the boundaries of the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project, the service area for these facilities encompasses the project area. Therefore, credit for these facilities is allocated to the Waterfront Project, based on that proportion of the total service area contained within the project boundaries. These public facilities are indicated for use as credits for local non-cash grants-in-aid for the project.

Additional support facilities to be constructed or provided in the waterfront area include Central Artery ramp adjustments and street and utility work to be carried out by BRA in conjunction with the preparation of certain sites for disposition.

f. Project Improvements

Project improvements in the waterfront renewal area were not begun until July 1967, more than two years after the initiation of project execution. As of mid-July 1973, 101 months into project execution, project improvements were only 27 percent complete, based on current estimates of the total cost of project improvements to be completed. Recently, proposed changes in the urban renewal plan, such as an increase in the size of the waterfront park from under two acres to more than four acres, point to anticipated increased cost of project improvements. In December 1973, the BRA requested an additional $4 million bond authorization from City Council to cover these anticipated increases. If these proposed plan changes and budget increases were taken into account, the proportion of project improvements completed in mid-1973 would be even lower -- approximately 20 percent.

The completion of project improvements in the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project may have had significant impact on the marketability of land in that area. For example, the marketability of proposed non-residential parcels on State Street may have been stronger had project improvements been completed early in project execution. Indeed, the replacement of an ancient and faulty sewer and waterfront system was one of the basic objectives of the urban renewal plan. While the City Council approved the first bond authorization

($8 million) for project improvements in the waterfront area in August 1964, it was in July 1967 that the first contract for project improvements was awarded. This contract was for the installation of a major water, storm, and sanitary sewer system under the relocated Atlantic Avenue from State Street to High Street. Work on this contract was not completed until September 1970. Subsequent project improvements have included the following: construction of a new sea wall between India and Central Wharves; construction of a mini-port between Long and Commercial Wharves; street and sidewalk construction along new Atlantic Avenue and East India Row; and continued replacement of the water, storm, and sanitary sewer system, primarily in the southeastern portion of the project area, but more recently in Parcel C-2 and the vicinity of Faneuil Hall. Another major contract awarded recently is for the construction of a public walkway around Parcel A-4, the New England Aquarium. To date, a total $15 million in bond authorizations for project improvements in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project has been approved by City Council, not including the recent request as yet not acted upon, for an additional $4 million. Yet only $9.2 million of contracts have been awarded.

The reasons for the initial delays and subsequent lags in carrying out project improvements in the waterfront area remain somewhat obscure. Initial delays may be related in part to the lengthy period required for relocation in the project area. Also important have been problems in the coordination of project improvements, with an overall city-wide plan for capital improvements. In addition, coordinating the activities of the developer, the BRA project director and engineer, and the contractor may result in a lag in project improvements. Finally, there are politically-related factors such as the "borrowing" of monies allocated for project improvements in the waterfront area for use for other activities within this project or in other project areas.

g. Land Disposition

Land disposition is, of course, the key indicator of progress toward the completion of any urban renewal project. The disposition line on Exhibit VIII-1 represents that proportion of the total land area in the current disposition inventory which has been sold during each year of the execution process. The progress of land disposition in the waterfront area lags behind most other execution activities, in-

PATTERN OF LAND DISPOSITION (DEEDED) BY RE-USE CATEGORY

Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall R-77

Boston, Mass.

Exhibit VIII - 2





boston massachusetts

Urban Renewal Land Disposition Study

Downtown Waterfront
Faneuil Hall Project
Urban Renewal Plan

Land Disposition Map

cluding new construction. Rehabilitation of waterfront properties is continuing more slowly than land disposition. At present, much of the land remaining for disposition consists of buildings designated for rehabilitation; two major new construction projects planned for the area have already been completed (Harbor Towers, Phase 1, and the aquarium). It is interesting to note that land disposition has also proceeded ahead of project improvements in the area.

The first land sale in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area occurred in October 1965, only 8 months after the initiation and execution activities. A large site at the end of Central Wharf, including land and water, was sold to the New England Aquarium Corporation, a non-profit organization, for construction of an aquarium. Negotiations for this sale had been conducted during the planning stages for the project. The next land sale did not occur until 1969, when several parcels and 40,000 square feet of tidelands adjacent to India Wharf were sold to the Berenson Corporation and Carlyle Construction Company for the development of the Harbor Towers complex. Additional land sales included two small commercial parcels in 1971 and 12 properties in Parcel C-2 in 1972, the latter to be rehabilitated by the owner occupant. In terms of progress, 23 percent of the land had been sold only 10 months into project execution, yet only 32 percent had been sold as of July 1973, over 100 months into execution. This is an average disposition rate of about 1.2 acres (52,650 square feet) per year.

Examination of the total land area sold gives only a partial picture of progress in the land disposition process in the Waterfront area at any one time. The land disposition process of BRA can be briefly described below:

- Preparation of a developer's kit and advertisement of the parcel either locally, if the parcel is small, or nationally, if it involves considerable expertise and financial backing to develop. If a conditional acquisition parcel is involved, it

is first offered to the existing owner, who then must express his intent to develop the land according to the guidelines set forth in the urban renewal plan. In certain instances a particular developer may be invited to submit a proposal for a parcel. Prior to or at the time of advertisement, unsolicited proposals are also received.

- An interested developer, expressing his intent in developing the parcel, purchases a developers kit (usually at a nominal fee) from the BRA, and prepares preliminary plans of its development for submission to BRA within a specified amount of time.
- BRA reviews the proposals received from interested developers and tentatively designates one as the selected developer. The review is primarily on the basis of preliminary plans and designs for the area. The price of the land is reportedly fixed by independent appraisals and, in most instances, is not negotiable.
- The tentatively designated developer than makes a deposit, signs a letter of intent, and prepares his final submission for the BRA. Prior to his final submission, which involves completed working drawings of the proposed building and evidence of financial capability to carry out the work, the developer must go through BRA design review of the building. It should be noted that in this final planning stage there is normally no deadline imposed on the developer by BRA (only HUD guidelines) for submission of his final plans and financial statement. The incentive for the developer to move ahead comes primarily from the market forces, the mortgagors, etc.

In Boston, and particularly in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal area where land disposition has been slow in relation to the potential for development, it is important to note the extent to which land has been reserved for a tentatively designated developer; how long this committment has lasted; and whether or not the land was finally sold. It is also important to note those parcels presently in various stages of disposition.

Several key parcels in the waterfront area, including Parcels A-6 and D-10 on State Street, originally proposed for office re-use, and Parcel A-7, at the western end of Long Wharf proposed for hotel re-use have had one or more tentatively designated developers for a considerable length of time and have not been sold. Soon after project execution in the waterfront area was underway, the New England

Telephone Company announced interest in constructing an executive office building on Parcel A-6; at the same time, the Employers' Group of Insurance Companies, Inc., expressed interest in Parcel D-10. In 1969, the Employers' Group withdrew plans to develop Parcel D-10, moving instead to a more prestigious and readily available site at One Beacon Street. The New England Telephone Company withdrew as developer of Parcel A-6 in 1969, ostensibly because of a dispute with BRA over building design. The site was immediately re-advertised and in 1971, Thomas White was tentatively named developer for a 40-story office tower with an adjoining low rise apartment building overlooking the proposed waterfront park. The inability of the developer to attract a major tenant for the proposed building and the reportedly soft market in recent years resulted in this developer also withdrawing his proposal. Most recently, the court-appointed Downtown Waterfront Citizens' Restudy Committee has proposed that the designated re-use for this site be changed from office to residential. This proposal has been approved by BRA and will probably be part of a major plan change for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area, to be submitted to HUD in the future.

Delays in land disposition were also evident in the development of the Harbor Towers complex on India Wharf and adjacent disposition parcels. In 1966, shortly after commencement of project execution activities in the waterfront area, the BRA invited the Berenson partnership to submit a proposal for residential development of India Wharf and related parcels to be acquired and made available by BRA. Land disposition and commencement of construction did not occur for over two years. However, original members of the Berenson partnership were not interested in developing the land, the existing use at the time being an extremely profitable 1,200 car parking lot. A new partnership was formed for development of the land consisting of the Berenson Corporation and Carlyle Construction Company, New York, New York. Delays also resulted from the length of time required by BRA to relocate a portion of Atlantic Avenue and assemble the parcels necessary for disposition to the Berenson and Carlyle corporations.

Other major disposition parcels within the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project area which have been held at various stages of the disposition process for lengthy periods of time include the historic North and South Market and Quincy Market buildings in the Faneuil Hall area and Parcel E-8, adjacent to the market

buildings on the north. The Quincy Market building, the North and South market buildings which flank it on either side, and Faneuil Hall maintain an important place in the history of Boston and the waterfront area. The urban renewal plan for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area called for the three market buildings to be restored to their original exterior facades. The interior spaces would be leased to a developer and renovated for uses such as restaurants, retail food stores, and retail and small office spaces. The city of Boston would retain ownership of the central Quincy Market building and the BRA would acquire and retain ownership of the structures within the North and South markets with the exception of the three units owned by the famous Durgin Park restaurant.

The BRA has been involved in advertising, reviewing proposals, and negotiating with tentatively designated developers for the historic market buildings since 1970. Originally, the buildings were to be leased to a single developer who would undertake both exterior restoration and interior renovation and management. After nationwide advertising and detailed review of several proposals, the BRA tentatively designated Van Arkle Associates of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as developers of the historic market area. The architectural concept was designed by Ben Thompson of Cambridge. However, the firm failed to obtain the necessary financing for the project, and in the summer of 1972, the BRA began negotiating with the Rouse Company, Columbia, Maryland.

The Rouse Company has also retained Ben Thompson Associates as architect. At present, the Rouse Company has been approved by BRA as developer and manager of the interior spaces of the three market buildings and the surrounding pedestrian walkways and public spaces. Exterior restoration of the North and South Market buildings was begun in mid-1972 under the auspices of the BRA with architectual consultation by Architectural Heritage of Boston. The restoration is being financed by a $2.2 million historic preservation grant from HUD. A similar grant is being sought for restoration of the Quincy Market building.

At the time of our study, the BRA was continuing lease negotiations with the Rouse Company for the North and South Market buildings. Similar lease negotiations were expected to be undertaken with the city regarding the Quincy Market building. The lease hold

agreement being negotiated by the BRA and the Rouse Company is an extremely complex document. The chief disposition officers at the BRA, with the aid of an informal consultant from Harvard, have worked with the Rouse Company in drawing up the agreement. Under the conditions of the lease, the Rouse Company will agree to lease the North and South Market buildings in the Faneuil Hall area and the rights-of-way adjacent to these buildings from the BRA for a period of 99 years. In return, the BRA (i.e. the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project) will receive a nominal rent. In addition, the city of Boston will receive, in taxes, approximately 20 percent of the gross annual income realized by the Rouse Company from the leasing of an estimated 140,000 square feet of retail and 200,000 square feet of professional office space. Construction on the renovation of interior space is expected to begin during the 1974 construction season, with completion scheduled for 18 to 24 months thereafter.

The conditions of the leasehold agreement also state that BRA will participate in project improvements related to the provision of a pedestrian arcade joining the market buildings with surrounding facilities and will provide for and finance (through federal Historic Preservation subsidies or otherwise) the exterior restoration of the buildings. The buildings are being leased rather than sold primarily because the city of Boston does not want to release these historically valuable structures from ownership and control by a city agency. The marketability of the proposed re-uses of the buildings is somewhat marginal, given the assumed high costs of development, and the success of the project depends on attracting and retaining a financially capable, prominent developer such as the Rouse Company. Due to the complexity of the lease, which is unlike any ever before considered by the HUD area and regional offices, the lease will probably go to Washington, D.C. prior to final approval. This may cause additional delays in disposition of these key parcels.

Parcel E-8, adjacent to and north of the historic market area was designated for development as a parking garage in the urban renewal plan for the area. The purpose of the garage was to provide parking for tourists and other persons visiting and working in the area. Initial assemblage of the land was delayed by the inaction of the State Department of Public Works in removal of an entrance ramp to the Central Artery which divided the site. The present tentatively

designated developers became interested in the parcel initially as mortgagor for the owner. Tentatively designated in 1971, Spaulding and Slye, a prominent Boston area development firm, expects firm designation from the BRA for development of an office building and garage early in 1974.

The disposition process as it has been applied in several key parcels in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area is important as background to the analysis of the delay causing factors which follow. Additional understanding or insight into the progress of land disposition in the waterfront area is indicated on Exhibit VIII-2, The Pattern of Land Disposition by Re-Use Category. For the purpose of our analysis, four re-use categories were devised, based on the availability of data from BRA on current disposition inventory by proposed re-use. The data does not include land disposed of for streets and public rights-of-way; land to be disposed of for parks is assumed to be included under residential and residential-related land uses. Land to be disposed of for "other" non-residential uses refers only to the aquarium site and related tidelands. With the exception of land disposed of for the aquarium, land disposition in all categories has been extremely slow. Residential disposition is approximately 12 percent complete, with an additional 18 small parcels within the larger disposition Parcel C-2 scheduled for disposition early in 1974. While much of the land designated for residential re-use remains to be disposed, including park land of more than 4 acres (a proposed plan change recently agreed upon by the BRA and the Restudy Committee), considerable residential development and rehabilitation has successfully been completed on privately-owned sites within the urban renewal boundaries. This would include the two apartment buildings in the Harbor Tower complex as well as the rehabilitated Prince Building and several wharf buildings in the northern end of the project.

Land disposition for private commercial/office development is approximately 10 percent complete at present. This level of completion was reached in 1971, with little opportunity for further disposition after this date due to the court-imposed moratorium on execution activities during most of 1972 and a portion of 1973. The disposition inventory of land proposed for private commerical/office re-use may be reduced considerably, should Parcel A-6 be converted to residential rather than commercial re-use. Parcel A-7, planned

as a hotel site and tentatively designated for development by the Berenson Corporation and Carlyle Construction Company will probably be disposed in early 1974. This re-use category also includes the North and South Market buildings, which should be leased (disposed) in the near future, and Parcel E-8.

To date, no land scheduled for mixed commercial/residential re-use has been disposed. These figures are somewhat misleading, as many sites within the urban renewal area but not scheduled for acquisition have been rehabilitated by the owner. The most noteable of these are Lewis and Commercial Wharves, where large warehouse buildings have been rehabilitated for a mixture of commercial and residential uses. It should be recognized that disposition progress in both Exhibit VIII-1 and VIII-2 is being measured based on the current disposition inventory, excluding streets and major public rights-of-way. If a major plan change should be initiated, it would according to proposals by the citizens' restudy committee include a reduction in the amount of land designated for streets, reduction in land proposed for private commercial/office re-use and a corresponding increase in public open space and residential re-uses.

h. New Construction

In many urban renewal areas, new construction is, in effect, a measure of land take-down, as a developer will usually not purchase a site until he is ready to start construction. It would then be the last activity which occurs in the urban renewal process. In the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall urban renewal area, where much of the land to be disposed involves buildings to be rehabilitated rather than new construction, rehabilitation must also be considered as the final step in the urban renewal process. Thus, as is seen in Exhibit VIII-1, it is not unusual to find new construction proceeding ahead of land disposition progress and rehabilitation lagging behind. By mid-1973, the estimated cost of new construction was approximately 38 percent of the projected total. This progress measure is not considered very accurate or representative, given the uncertainty of future construction costs and plan changes. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the fact that much major construction in terms of hotels and office buildings has yet to take place. New construction on urban renewal land in the waterfront area has consisted primarily of

the New England Aquarium and the parking gargage and related commercial and recreational facilities constructed in conjunction with Harbor Towers.

In summary, the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project, as shown in Table VIII-4, by mid-1973 had been underway for 134 months and in execution for 101 months or 8.4 years. While acquisition, relocation, and demolition activities are reaching completion, all other execution activities are proceeding slowly. The present lact of attention by BRA to this potentially significant area of redevelopment, the pending major plan revisions for the area, and the current study of the Central Artery depression halting any future activity in that portion of the project area seem to indicate that future progress will also be slow. Given the complexity and extremely ambitious original plan for the waterfront area and the changes which have occurred in the area and in the attitudes toward urban renewal on the part of area residents, the city of Boston, and the federal government since the original plan was conceived, it is possible that the overall time taken to date for project execution has not been unduely lengthy. Existing delays, such as the restudy and pending major plan revisions may be unavoidable and in the long run justifiable and desirable. However, because the area has a strong potential for development and marketability, it is felt that many of the delays in project execution have been significant and in many instances, avoidable.

Table VIII-4

SUMMARY OF ELAPSED TIME
OF URBAN RENEWAL PROCESS
DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL

		Months	Years
Preplanning		30	2.5
Planning			
HUD Initial Approval		6	
Physical Planning		16	
Local Approval	5	11*	
HUD Final Approval	6		
Execution			
(cumulative to 7/73)		101	8.4
Planning and Execution			
(to 7/73)		134	11.2

	CUMULATIVE TIME TO INDICATED PERCENTAGE COMPLETION				% Complete by 101 Months (7/73)
	25%	50%	67%	90%	
Acquisition (av. acq. 3.4 a/yr.)	10 mos.	18 mos.	31 mos.	--	79%
Relocation	24	43	65	101	90%
Demolition	58	82	88	--	81%
Rehabilitation	101	--	--	--	24%
Public Facilities	36	45	52	--	81%
Project Improvements	99	--	--	--	27%
Land Disposition (av. disp. 1.2 a/yr.)	10	--	--	--	32%
New Construction	72	--	--	--	38%

* Overlap.

D. Analysis of Delay Causes

Any real estate development project is inherently a complex process. Redevelopment, by the very nature of the areas treated and the necessity of operating in public further complicates the process. Finally, urban renewal under the federal program operates within the context of legislative and administrative guidelines established and revised over time. Thus within any project extending over a long time period there will be delays and, in some instances, factors which accelerate the completion of the process.

In this section are discussed some of the principal factors which have caused delays in execution of the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project. These are identified and evaluated in Table VIII-5, herein. For convenience, delay causes are grouped into four categories as follows:

- National program related causes -- these are national program requirements which constrain the behavior of local public agencies and/or developers in ways that cause delays.
- Local and market related factors -- these are strictly local factors which influence the marketability of sites within the project area.
- Local management related causes -- these are actions or policies of local public agencies relating to the planning, administration, and execution of the urban renewal process.
- Exogenous factors -- these are fundamental economic, demographic, and social trends, forces, and changes in society that influence the marketability of the project.

In Table VIII-5, delay causes are evaluated in terms of their impact on the length of time to effectuate land disposition. A judgment is also made as to the likelihood that the delay cause was definitely or probably avoidable or unavoidable at the time and under the circumstances in which it occurred.

1. National Program Related Causes

HUD itself was a factor in causing delay in the urban renewal process for the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project, particularly during approval stages. These delays were manifest at several stages and had

some, although relatively insignificant, impacts on land disposition as described below.

a Lengthy Review in the Initial Approval Stages

HHFA (now HUD) had Boston's application for a Survey and Planning Advance under review and evaluation for a period of about six months. A redevelopment plan for the waterfront area had been prepared under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce, indicating considerable community support; this plan seemed to conform to stated city policies and proposals for the area that were known at the time the application was prepared. In addition, a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan was being prepared for the Downtown North district, incorporating the waterfront area. Thus, it would seem that HUD approval of the Survey and Planning Advance could have been more expeditious. Nevertheless, it is recognized that HUD was under no legal obligation to grant subsequent funds to finance an urban renewal project for which a planning study had been approved. However, there was a tacit assumption and momentum for continued study and support of the urban renewal project which was set in motion by the approval of a planning advance. Thus, as HUD set forth both a planning advance and a grant reservation at this time, it is probably reasonable that considerable time elapsed as the project competed with others in the northeast region.

Overall, considering the significant planning and study that had been undertaken in relation to redevelopment of the waterfront area prior to the submission of the application for Survey and Planning Advance, the length of time required for physical planning was probably shortened. Therefore, more expedient HUD initial processing and approval may have enabled project execution to begin somewhat sooner and may have enabled some properties to be readied for disposition a few months earlier, thus avoiding marketing problems that may have arisen in the meantime. However, it is felt that overall HUD delays have had little impact on the land disposition process in the long run.

It should be noted that the total time between HUD final approval of the Loan and Grant application, Part I and II, for the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area was 11 months from receipt of the application - Part II. Yet HUD actually completed its review in two stages, covering a total of six months. HUD completed its review and approval of the Loan and Grant Application - Part I in one month,

prior to submission of the urban renewal plan for local approval processing. HUD review and approval of the Loan and Grant - Part II was completed in 5 months and therefore did not represent a delay in the urban renewal process.

b Delays in the Disposition Process Due to Inadequate Guidelines and Incentives for Expeditious Planning by Tentatively Designated Developers

HUD urban renewal guidelines outline technical procedures to be followed by the LPA in carrying out the disposition process, including advertising, preparation of developers' kits, obtaining appraisals for a fair market value of the land, and procedures to be followed in evaluating initial proposals for development. However, once a developer is tentatively designated for a disposition parcel, HUD guidelines (and BRA regulations) do not sufficiently limit the developer in terms of a timetable for final submission. Thus, for these (and possibly for other political reasons) the BRA is reluctant to rescind a tentative designation because of non-performance.

c Lack of Flexibility and/or Understanding by HUD Area Office in Evaluating Changes in Disposition Strategies Suggested by LPA

At the present time, the local HUD area office appears to be open to various accelerating tactics promoted by the BRA for the disposition of urban renewal land in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area. However, there appears to be a lack of competent personnel at HUD capable of accurately evaluating and monitoring the application of these proposals. A case in point seems to be the long-term lease the BRA is presently negotiating with the Rouse Company for the North and South Market Buildings. While the area and regional HUD offices have received a copy of the proposed lease agreement for review, as yet no action on approval has been taken. It is assumed by BRA that, due to the complexity of the agreement, final approval from Washington, D.C., will be required before the lease can be executed. Submission to and review by the central HUD office may lead to further delays in the disposition of these key parcels.

d Lack of Expeditious Review and Response by HUD of Execution Activities Requiring Federal Approval

The lack of expeditious review and response by the area HUD office to submissions from the BRA was one of the major causes of recent delays in project execution in several urban renewal areas. Processing of even routine matters that require HUD concurrence is subject to delays. At present, it is a seemingly planned approach on the part of HUD (as reflected in actions by the area office) to delay or slow down the approval process. Minor plan changes were previously carried out by proclaimer to HUD, supposedly the last step in the process of plan alteration and adjustment. Proclaimers are now treated as requests for HUD concurrence and several weeks or months are added to project execution while BRA staff members assemble the supporting documentation required by HUD guidelines. While the regional HUD office has been somewhat more responsive and understanding in dealing with BRA submissions and requests, dealing with both the HUD area and regional offices requires additional time by the BRA.

2. Local Market Related Factors

Delay causes in this category relate to factors of timeliness, scale, re-use appropriateness, and similar factors affecting site marketability in the local context.

a Delay Due to Inherent Scale and Complexity of the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project

The Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project was bound to experience a prolonged period of marketability due to its inherent large scale, major relocation efforts required to make sites available for disposition, and the complexity of re-uses proposed for the project. This area, which consisted of approximately 100 acres of developed land, had come to maturity during the mid-1800's. Since the early twentieth century it has been deteriorating rapidly, and physical obsolescence is reaching an advanced state. Consequently, it is not unexpected that it should take an extended period to redevelop this area.

Large scale rehabilitation inherently causes delay at every stage of the urban renewal process. It takes longer to plan, acquire, relocate, and prepare sites for disposition. In the Downtown Waterfront- Faneuil Hall area, the problems related to the scale of the project are further complicated by the complexity of the

original urban renewal plan. Specifically, those activities set forth in the plan which can be identified as local market related delay causing factors are outlined as follows:

- Plan for Complete Change in Land Use Throughout the Urban Renewal Area

  The waterfront area was developed during the colonial times as a series of finger-like wharves which were later connected by landfills extending from Faneuil Hall and the Quincy Markets to the harbor. During the 1800's, the area entered its period of greatest commercial prominence. Many of the massive granite structures in the area, now on the National Register of Historic Places, date from this period. As the prominence of the Boston harbor began to decline, these granite structures were converted to warehouses and storage facilities and the wharves fell into disrepair. Recently, these old buildings have been used for food wholesalers and retailers, including the fruit and produce, meat and poultry, and fish industry. The urban renewal plan proposed changing the area from an obsolete warehousing district to an active residential and commercial area which would support the surrounding neighborhoods -- the financial district and Government Center and the North End residential community. The historic buildings would be restored and the attention of Boston residents and tourists would again be focused on the harbor.

  The potential for development and marketability of land along the waterfront has always been great. This was spurred on by the initiation of the plan from the Chamber of Commerce and by the enthusiasm and leadership of the BRA, the city government, and the downtown business community. However, the efforts and incentives needed to attract developers to such an innovative, large scale development have not been maintained. The marketability for sites with certain proposed re-uses has declined since the project was initiated, and the disposition of other sites has not proceeded expeditiously.

- Relocation of Food Wholesalers and Processors From the Area

  With the initiation of plans for redevelopment of the water-

front area, it was recognized that one of the major problems to be faced in the urban renewal process would be the relocation of several hundred fruit and produce, meat and poultry, and fish wholesalers from the area. The obsolescence of the facilities in the market buildings and warehouses in the waterfront area for the type of activities carried on was generally recognized. However, the relocation of the food dealers required stupendous effort and time. Cooperation had to be obtained from the various wholesalers, many of whom would not even speak to each other. Public agencies had to be involved in arranging financing and developing mechanisms for the creation of a new distribution center. Although the relocation problem was recognized at the outset, delays resulting from the time and effort required were probably not considered in the overall development timetable. This resulted in significant delays in carrying out the urban renewal process which may have been avoided.

- Extensive Amount of Land to be Disposed of for Rehabilitation

The arduous task of marketing land within any urban renewal area is further complicated in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area by the fact that many of the disposition parcels consist of structures to be rehabilitated rather than land available for new construction. Compounding this problem is the fact that many of the structures to be rehabilitated have been placed on the National Register of Historic Places, and exterior renovations must conform to certain design codes. The delays in the disposition of rehabilitation parcels in Parcel C-2 do not necessarily relate to the inherent marketability of the parcels. Actually, the parcels are extremely marketable. When the first twelve parcels were offered, 143 responses were received from potential developers. The delays are instead due to the questionable feasibility of rehabilitation of some of the buildings and the problems of finding a financially capable developer. For this reason, the BRA has adopted a policy whereby individual disposition parcles in Parcel C-2 will be offered at an extremely low cost, permitting the owner occupant and developer to spend a maximum amount on the rehabilitation of a 3 or 4 flat structure.

Delays have also ensued due to the lengthy process of finding a financially capable developer for the historic Quincy Market and North and South Market buildings in the Faneuil Hall

area. The problems of the extensive exterior and interior restoration required to rehabilitate these buildings, coupled with the somewhat marginal marketability of proposed re-uses (small offices, boutiques, restaurants, plus existing food retailers) has led to an extensive land disposition process which is still not complete.

b Delay in the Development of 60 State Street Site

60 State Street is a vacant urban renewal site located at the western edge of the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area, straddling the border between that project and the Government Center Project. This 60,000-square-foot site, which is owned partially by the city, BRA, and a prominent Boston developer, has been vacant for several years. It is considered a prime site for office development, being adjacent to the New City Hall and the Government Center complex as well as the traditional Boston financial district. In addition, this site would enhance the marketability of sites on State Street within the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area for general office uses. Also, this site could be a major link in the design and construction of an overhead pedestrian walkway leading from the Government Center Plaza to the historic Faneuil Hall - Quincy Market area. In 1972, the tentatively designated developer of this parcel submitted to BRA final working drawings and a statement of financial capability for development of the site. BRA failed to act upon the final submission by the developer; the financial committment lapsed. At the time of our study, the developer expressed no interest in submitting a second proposal.

The reasons the BRA failed to act on the developer's final submission for the 60 State Street site are primarily political. For more than two years, the mayor, with extensive help from the BRA director and staff, has been pushing the development of the Park Plaza Project along the southern edge of the CBD and Boston Common. Planning, design, and construction of the project would be carried out privately, although the BRA would utilize eminent domain to acquire land which could not be acquired by the developer. The price of land acquired by BRA would be based on an "as is" basis rather than on the value of the proposed re-use. The BRA has been aided in evaluation of proposals for the area by a Citizens Advisory Committee composed of prominent area businessmen, realtors, and developers. However, not all members of these community groups have actively supported the Park Plaza development.

Therefore, the mayor, acting through the BRA, has withheld approval of development in other areas of the city, including the 60 State Street site. While the mayor's tactics for the development of Park Plaza may ultimately be successful, his actions may have brought about a somewhat negative reaction from members of the business community.

The repercussions of the delay in development of the key 60 State Street parcel are numerous. The future marketability of other office building sites in the area is questioned. Also important is an increased lack of confidence in both the BRA and the city government within the traditional Boston business and real estate communities. The latter could have a major impact on future construction in urban renewal areas, as a significant amount of development in these areas to date has been carried out by prominent Boston firms.

c. Uncertainty of Tax Assessment Policies for New Commercial Buildings in Downtown Boston

The lack of confidence in the BRA has also arisen due to the uncertainty of future tax assessment policies on new commercial development downtown. Tax letters have been used to encourage office and other commercial development in urban renewal areas, the understanding being that this taxing method will be applied for a considerable period of time. Recently, some developers of office space have experienced increases in their tax bills, undermining the understanding that had been developing between these developers, the BRA, and the city.

d. "Land-banking" by Tentatively Designated Developers

In the land disposition process in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall area, tentatively designated developers have extensively delayed the disposition parcel for several years prior to final submission of a development proposal to the BRA. Reasons for "land banking" by a developer may be market-related and often include the inability of the developer to retain commitment of a principal tenant for the proposed building, thus making it difficult to obtain financial backing for the project.

In the case of the delay in the development of the Harbor Towers complex, the original owners of the land were reluctant to close up a financially profitable 1,200 car parking lot in order to construct more than 600 luxury apartment units in an urban renewal area pre-

viously occupied by primarily non-residential uses. In most instances involving land banking, the BRA has been reluctant to rescind this designation for non-performance unless another potential developer is available.

e. Potential Competition to the Marketability of Major Re-use Parcels from Proposed Park Plaza Development

The Park Plaza development has been in the planning stages for several years. While definite plans for the area have not been finalized, the sites to be offered at Park Plaza would offer significant competition to the marketing of similar sites in the Waterfront urban renewal area. Both projects are located adjacent to the CBD and within easy access of major employment centers in Boston. Both plan mixed land uses in the final development--luxury apartment, housing, office space, hotel, etc.

f. Lack of Marketability of Specific Re-Uses

While it appears that the original Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall urban renewal plan was basically sound in its proposed re-use pattern, there have been examples of lack of marketability of specific re-uses. The lengthy period required for relocation of the food wholesalers, the relocation of Atlantic Avenue decreased the marketability of land designated for office re-use. During this period, extensive office building construction had taken place elsewhere in downtown Boston creating a somewhat "soft" office space market and significantly reducing the demand for office space in a building in the Waterfront area, which is somewhat removed from the traditional Boston financial district and office centers. For example, the present proposals to change Parcel A-6 from the originally proposed office re-use to residential re-use seems timely and appropriate in light of the presently "soft" office market in downtown Boston (reportedly 10-11 percent vacancy rate in new office buildings) and the successful marketing of the Harbor Towers apartment and other residential developments in the area.

3. Local Management-Related Factors

A number of causes of delay can be classified as local management related -- occurring primarily as a result of decisions or actions (avoidable or unavoidable) by the local public agency. These have occurred or have had an impact on various stages of the urban renewal process. These include the following key elements:

a. Delays Related to the Elaborate Original Urban Renewal Plan and Design Scheme for the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Area

The original urban renewal plan for the waterfront area was extremely ambitious. In addition to requiring an entirely new land use pattern for the area, the relocation of Atlantic Avenue, and the disposition of a large proportion of the land for rehabilitation rather than new construction, the plan also proposed an elaborate design concept to create a "Walk to the Sea" along State Street. This involved the construction of several office buildings which would utilize the air rights beneath the Central Artery for parking and shopping arcades, thus increasing pedestrian traffic to the waterfront and reducing the impact of the Central Artery as a physical and visual barrier to development on the harbor.

Undue reliance was probably placed on public actions, most outside the control of the BRA or the city, that were necessary for the completion of redevelopment of the area as planned. The most notable causes of delay in this category are as follows:

- In addition to the relocation of Atlantic Avenue, the urban renewal plan also required the abandonment of the Union Freight Railroad truck line which ran through the area along the Atlantic Avenue right-of-way. While lengthy and involved negotiations were begun with the New Haven Railroad and the ICC for acquisition and abandonment of the railroad as early as 1966, the railroad was not acquired by the BRA until 1971. The difficulties of relocating a railroad perhaps were not adequately perceived at the time of planning. Consequently, the execution of the whole project was delayed until that was accomplished.

- The original urban renewal plan called for the removal and/or relocation of several ramps to and from the Central Artery. The purpose of this action was to reduce truck traffic into and through the area, eliminate a portion of the physical and visual barrier created by the roadway, and permit assemblage of several disposition parcels. The plan further suggests air rights-development under the Central Artery. Both federal and state governments, most specifically the state Department of Public Works, must be involved in these actions. Also, costs associated with expressway reconstruction are substantial. To date, only one ramp to the Central Artery has been removed and there seem to be no plans to remove or relocate others. The

design concept of the urban renewal plan, in terms of linking the historic Faneuil Hall area to the waterfront is commendable. However, the problems of dealing with the agencies responsible for highway planning and construction, operation, and maintenance should have been perceived and programmed into the redevelopment program.

- The implementation of the urban renewal plan required legislation to clarify ownership and control of the "tidelands" or flats surrounding the wharves in the harbor. Original passage of the "tidelands" legislation, giving the BRA authorization to grant licenses for development of the tidelands to approved developers, was passed prior to the commencement of project execution. However, dependence on legislation to implement an urban renewal project produces conditions beyond the control of the BRA or the city and creates a situation in which the project might be doomed to major delays. Fortunately, while renewal of the tidelands legislation in 1970 required a considerable period of time, it was not a cause of delay in project execution.

b. Excessive Expected Reliance on Dynamic Leadership to Execute the Urban Renewal Plan

The creation of such a complex and ambitious urban renewal plan for the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall area assumed the continued existance of dynamic leadership in the BRA and a large, competent and dedicated staff to carry out the project. Since the initiation of planning for the waterfront area, the BRA has experienced frequent turnovers in executive directors and in staff assigned to administer the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project. The results of this frequent change in leadership, especially since 1968, has been a loss of momentum in project execution; a loss of staff continuity in decision-making, particularly at the higher levels; and a lack of familiarity with the project and the original plan.

c. Delay Resulting from Lack of Systematic Disposition Plan for Major Re-Use Parcels

It is understandable and possibly unavoidable that the original timetable for execution of the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project was delayed as a result of major relocation problems and actions beyond the control of BRA and the city. However, in several instances the disposition of major re-use parcels was delayed by actions

taken by BRA, following initial offering of the parcel for redevelopment proposals. The most significant example of this delay causing factor occurred in relation to Parcel C-2, a large parcel located at the northern end of the project area, adjacent to the North End community. Proposed re-use for Parcel C-2 was (and remains) predominantly residential, with neighborhood commercial uses scattered throughout the area. The original disposition strategy was to solicit proposals for development by one, or more major developers, each of which would redevelop a significant portion of the total area. The type of redevelopment for the area -- rehabilitation vs. new construction -- was not specified, but left up to the developer to determine as part of the preliminary proposal. The parcel was advertised according to the above disposition strategy in 1970 or 1971 and several substantial responses were received, some from area residents and developers.

At approximately the same time that the land disposition process for Parcel C-2 was being initiated, the BRA was undergoing extensive reorganization and changes in leadership. Following the appointment of Mr. Robert Kenney as BRA director in mid-1971 and a change in the project director for the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project, the existing proposals for development of Parcel C-2 were discarded and the disposition strategy for the parcel changed. The parcel would now be offered as approximately 80 smaller parcels or structures to be rehabilitated by future owner occupants who have qualified as developer for the parcel, based on criteria of design and financial capability. Priority for developers for Parcel C-2 would be given to residents of the surrounding area, including both the North End and the waterfront communities. Political pressure from area residents and/or representatives to make more development opportunities available to persons presently living in the area is assumed to be at least partially responsible for the change. The move by waterfront residents to block demolition of <u>any</u> buildings in Parcel C-2 on grounds of historical significance may also have led to the strategy change.

Following the change in disposition strategy for Parcel C-2, 12 sites along Fulton Street were advertized; proposals were received and reviewed in September 1972. The parcels were sold to owner occupants for rehabilitation as 3-5-flat structures. Further offering of the remaining structures and/or parcels was halted until recently by the citizen's suit against BRA and the court-imposed moratorium on continued project execution pending a restudy of selected portions of the regional urban renewal plan. Review is being com-

pleted on the 148 proposals that have been received in response to the offerings.

Changing the disposition strategy for Parcel C-2 resulted in a significant (2 + years) delay in selection of redevelopers for the area. Significantly, the elapsed time permitted the organization and growth of a forceful residents association in the area. This group, through its court actions and the resulting restudy, delayed important action throughout the project for one year and has delayed future action in some areas indefinitely.

c. Insufficient Screening of Redevelopers

One of the most difficult aspects of urban renewal land disposition is the selection of redevelopers with financial capability, interest, and expertise to see the project through to completion. In general, the BRA has been successful in selecting qualified developers with an interest in the renewal of Boston and/or a particular urban renewal area who have been able to secure sufficient financial support for the proposed project. In most instances, the BRA has tried to select prominent developers, local to the Boston area. However, in situations where some market risk may be involved or where the proposed development is extremely complex and requires specific expertise and financial capabilities, nationally known firms are solicited and given careful consideration.

In most instances regarding urban renewal areas, the BRA gives special consideration or preference to any family, individual, or non-residential concern displaced or to be displaced as a direct result of urban renewal activities. In the waterfront area, the BRA has also given special consideration to residents and businessmen of the densely populated adjacent North End community who wish to remain in the area.

In the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Project, for example, insufficient screening of redevelopers has resulted in significant delays in land disposition. The most notable example would be the slowness in disposition or leasing of the North and South Market building and the Quincy Market buildings to a qualified developer. Following an extensive study of the historic restoration work required on the buildings exteriors, the BRA advertised nationally in 1971 for a developer who would lease the buildings from the city and BRA; complete both exterior and interior renovation; and complete the marketing and management of the interior space. The estimated total cost of the project

was then about $15 million. Several responses were received by the BRA, the most significant was a group under the Architectural Heritage of Boston, then a tenant in the Faneuil Hall building (PARD, architects); Van Arkle Associates and a Philadelphia firm involved in Society Hill renovations, with Ben Thompson of Cambridge as architect; and Fred Mahoney and Co., San Francisco, with the architectural firm of Wurster, Bernardi, and Emmons. This architectural group designed San Francisco's Ghiradelli Square.

Van Arkle Associates were chosen tentatively designated developers in the Spring of 1971. However, they later withdrew because of lack of financial capability. The BRA subsequently obtained historic preservation funding from HUD for the exterior restoration of both the North and South Market buildings and, in the Summer of 1972, began negotiations with the Rouse Company, Columbia, Maryland, for lease of the buildings and development of the interior space. If the BRA has been sufficiently aware of the problems of rehabilitation and marketing of the historic market buildings, more adequate screening of potential developers may have resulted in earlier disposition of these key development parcels. There is still a question as to whether the exterior restoration and rehabilitation of the 150-year-old structures will be completed adequately or on schedule. Unfortunately, insufficient screening of developers has occurred elsewhere in the waterfront area, with the same results.

The screening of redevelopers is of key importance in the land disposition process and in completing project execution. If several persons with a knowledge and understanding of real estate development and financing, particularly as they relate to the marketing areas, were placed on the staff of the BRA, the capabilities of all potential redevelopers could be studied in depth. Marketing problems related to particular sites might also be perceived prior to the screening of redevelopers. Similarly trained persons should also be found in the HUD area office in order to review proposed re-use plans, or suggested changes in those plans, in light of the existing marketability of the area.

d. Delay Due to Actions Taken by the Waterfront Residents' Association Against BRA

Delays in the planning stages and during earlier project execution activities in the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall area have been

further extended and compounded by actions taken by the Waterfront Residents' Association in recent years. Because the waterfront area essentially had no resident population when the urban renewal program for the area was initiated, no provisions were made for the formation of an official project area committee (PAC) as later required by HUD regulations. The urban renewal plan for the waterfront, initiated by the Chamber of Commerce, has the support of the Boston business community. The North End community, aware of the effects of relocation and demolition in the West End urban renewal area, were excluded from the waterfront project area at their request.

In approximately 1969, new residents of the waterfront area, living primarily in the recently opened Harbor Towers apartments and in the rehabilitated warehouse buildings at the northern end of the project area, organized a Waterfront Residents' Association. Aware of the impact that urban renewal was having in the area, and aware also of the HUD requirements for citizen participation in the urban renewal process through a recognized PAC, the Waterfront Residents' Association applied to the BRA for designation as the official representative citizens' organization for the area.

In summary, the residents were involved in a series of negotiations with several project directors and BRA directors over a period of years. In the spring of 1972, having received general recognition as the official area PAC but no contract, the Waterfront Residents' Association filed suit against the BRA in the Federal District Court, charging that:

1. BRA had not created an official PAC as required by HUD regulations

2. A federal environmental impact statement had not been filed in regard to the proposed demolition of selected buildings in Parcel C-2

3. There had been a failure to have a current federally approved workable program

A major delay resulting from the citizen lawsuit was a court-imposed moratorium on the execution of all urban renewal activities on those portions of the project area for which the original plans were being challenged. Thus, during most of 1972, urban renewal activities were halted in much of the area east of the Central Artery,

particularly in Parcel C-2, in the area of the proposed waterfront park, and in the areas surrounding the relocation of Atlantic Avenue. The suit was settled out of court by a "Stipulation and Agreement" handed down by the U.S. District Court in January 1973. The "Stipulation and Agreement" established a 26 - member citizens committee, the North End Waterfront Restudy Committee, to examine the original BRA plan for the area and to make recommendations for reformulating key portions of the plan in accord with community needs and the new priorities of the 1970's.

e. Delays Caused by the Uncertainty of Future Development Plans For the Area

The North End Waterfront Restudy Committee, composed of members selected from the North End and Waterfront communities, developers, conservationists (including the Sierra Club and Boston Conservation Commission) and civic organizations, made an intensive study of the project area during the first half of 1973, assisted in this effort by designated BRA staff members and a private consultant. Following the court order, the committee examined housing needs in the area, particularly for the elderly; recreational opportunities; transportation needs and requirements, especially relating to the scale and alignment of Atlantic Avenue; commercial development; and design control standards for buildings to be erected along State Street and elsewhere. The committee's final proposals, contained in a report entitled "The Restudy Committee Plan for Selected Portions of the Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall Urban Renewal Project," were submitted to the BRA in July 1973. In August 1973, the BRA submitted a response, entitled "Waterfront Restudy - Final Report of the BRA Review Group". As the BRA and the Restudy Committee did not agree on several major issues, throughout the period of our study, negotiations were ongoing with all groups concerned to come to an agreement about future plans for the area. Major areas of contention include the scale and realignment of the New Atlantic Avenue, the size of the proposed waterfront park, and the amount of office re-use to be included in the area.

Thus, throughout 1973, future plans for the waterfront area remained uncertain. The size of the waterfront park and the location of New Atlantic Avenue were in question, so major project improvements, essential to attracting developers to the area, remained in the

planning stages. At the close of our study, the BRA and the Restudy Committee had agreed on changing of the proposed re-use of Parcel A-6 on State Street from office to residential. A compromise had been reached on the location New Atlantic Avenue and the size of the park, which is to be enlarged from 2 acres to more than 4 acres. However, further delays may ensue, as an application for a major plan change must be prepared, submitted to HUD, and approved before execution of the revised plan can begin.

The citizens' suit against the BRA and the subsequent restudy of the urban renewal plan and probable major plan revisions have caused and will continue to cause significant delays in land disposition and project completion. Had the original plan for the area been carried out expeditiously, much of the project improvements and land disposition challenged now would have been complete. Given the time frame in which project execution was being carried out and given the complexity of the original plan, the delays brought about by the citizen's actions were probably to a large extent unavoidable. However, more consistent and meaningful relations between the BRA and the waterfront area residents, most of whom are sophisticated, aware professional people, may have reduced the extent of the delay.

The uncertainty of future development plans in the waterfront area has been further complicated recently by the undertaking by BRA of a major study for the state Department of Public Works investigating the possibility of tunneling the Central Artery and Atlantic Avenue. While the Restudy Committee could not carry out an analysis of this scope, the suggestion was made that the possibility of depressing the major roadways be examined. The study is expected to take at least six months. During this time, no renewal activities, particularly land disposition, can take place on those parcels adjacent to the Central Artery. The cost involved in the tunneling of the roadways - to say nothing of the problems of relocating traffic from the Central Artery versus the benefits that would accrue - namely, creating a pedestrian zone from Faneuil Hall to the waterfront - seems to indicate that the results of the study may prove the unfeasibility of this proposal. In the meantime, more time will have passed with uncertainty hanging over the area.

f. Lack of Momentum and Interest in Local Government Agencies for Expeditiously Implementing and Completing the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Plan

Adjacent to the Boston financial and business districts and the Government Center complex and steeped in historic interest, the Downtown-Faneuil Hall urban renewal area has a potential for development far greater than most other urban renewal areas in the city. When the project was originated, it had the active support of the local business and real estate community as well as the renewal agency and the city. During recent years, however, there seems to have been a decline of direct support in the marketing and development of the remaining sites, particularly the non-residential parcels. Project improvements have proceeded slowly, particularly in the central portion east of the Central Artery and along the northern waterfront. Should the Park Plaza development be accepted and construction started in the near future, the marketing of sites in Park Plaza will compete directly with the marketing of hotel, office and other non-residential sites on the waterfront.

4. Exogenous Factors

Socioeconomic trends and forces in society which have generally been present in communities and metropolitan areas throughout the United States have had some impact on the marketability of land within the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project area. However, major socioeconomic forces evident elsewhere, such as the flight to the suburbs, the increase in minority population in central cities, the decline of the public school system, within the central city, etc., may have less of an impact on the marketability of land in the waterfront area. A significant market for housing in the waterfront area can be found among adult-oriented households attracted by the diversity of cultural facilities and employment opportunities offered to the urban dweller in Boston.

Table VIII 6

EXOGENOUS DELAY --

DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT – FANEUIL HALL (Mass. R-77)

FACTOR NUMBER	V IMPACT MATRIX (Page 1) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
1	INCREASED USE OF AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES	-- / A	--	A / O	– / O	+ / O	– / O	0 / O	0 / O	–	+	–	0
2	RADIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	-- / A	--	A / A	– / -	+ / O	– / +	0 / O	0 / O	–	+	–	0
3	CIRCUMFERENTIAL EXPRESSWAY CONSTRUCTION	– / -	--	– / -	– / -	0 / -	– / +	0 / O	0 / O	0	0	–	0
4	DECLINE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION	-- / -	–	– / O	+ / A	+ / +	0 / O	0 / O	0 / O	+	–	–	0
5	INCREASED AIR TRAVEL	0 / +	–	– / A	– / +	0 / O	– / O	0 / O	0 / O	0	0	–	0
6	RESISTANCE TO URBAN EXPRESSWAYS	0 / O	–	– / O	0 / O	0 / O	+ / +	0 / O	-- / -	A	A	--	–
7	HIGH-LEVEL TOTAL HOUSING PRODUCTION	– / -	–	– / O	-- / -	-- / -	– / O	0 / O	0 / O	–	–	0	0
8	SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAMS	A / O	–	+ / O	-- / O	++ / ++	+ / +	++ / ++	--	–	++	–	++
9	OUTLYING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING	– / O	–	– / O	+ / +	– / O	0 / O	0 / O	–	+	–	0	0
10	RISING DEPENDENCY AMONG PUBLIC HOUSING FAMILIES	– / O	–	– / O	-- / O	-- / O	– / +	– / -	–	–	--	–	–
11	EXCLUSIONARY HOUSING LAWS	– / O	+	+ / +	– / -	+ / +	+ / +	– / -	+	–	+	–	–
12	UNEQUAL HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT	0 / O	0	0 / O	– / O	– / O	0 / O	0 / O	0 / O	–	–	–	–
13	INCREASED SIZE OF NEW HOUSING UNITS	0 / O	0	– / O	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	0 / O	0 / O	+	+	0	0
14	RAPID CHANGES IN HOUSING TECHNOLOGY AND STYLES	– / O	–	0 / O	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	0 / O	0 / O	+	+	–	0
15	RACIALLY-SEGREGATED HOUSING MARKETS	– / O	–	– / O	– / A	A / A	– / A	0 / O	– / --	–	A	–	0
16	MINORITY-GROUP EXPANSION	– / O	–	– / O	– / -	A / A	A / A	– / O	0 / -	–	A	–	–
17	RACIAL DESEGREGATION (in South only)	–	–	–	–	A	–	–	0	–	A	0	0
18	RACIAL DISORDERS	– / O	–	– / O	– / O	– / O	++ / ++	– / -	-- / -	--	–	–	–
19	RISING URBAN CRIME RATES	– / O	--	– / O	-- / -	-- / -	+ / ++	– / -	– / -	--	–	--	–
20	MORE ADULT-ORIENTED HOUSEHOLDS	+ / +	+	+ / ++	++ / ++	+ / +	+ / ++	+ / +	0 / O	+	+	+	+
21	CHANGE TOWARDS MORE CASUAL AND LEISURE-ORIENTED LIFE STYLES	– / +	–	0 / O	-- / +	– / O	– / O	–	0 / O	--	–	–	–
22	RELATIVE DECLINE IN PERCEIVED QUALITY OF CENTRAL-CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS	– / O	–	– / O	-- / -	-- / -	+ / ++	–	0 / O	--	--	–	–

WATERFRONT

WATERFRONT

FACTOR NUMBER	V. IMPACT MATRIX (Page 2) / EXOGENOUS FACTORS	IMPACTS ON CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS								IMPACTS ON NON-CBD-RELATED RENEWAL PROJECTS			
		A CBD RETAIL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	B CBD INDUSTRIAL AND WHOLESALE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	C CBD OFFICE SPACE RE-USE MARKETABILITY	D CBD MIDDLE- AND UPPER- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	E CBD LOW- AND MODERATE- INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	F LOCAL SUPPORT OF AND CONCERN FOR CBD RENEWAL EFFORTS	G MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR CBD RENEWAL PROJECTS	H SPEED OF NON-MARKET PARTS OF THE RENEWAL PROCESS	I MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	J LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	K NON-RESIDENTIAL RE-USE MARKETABILITY	L MORTGAGE CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR RENEWAL PROJECTS
23	LOOSE MONETARY CONDITIONS	0 / O	0	+ / +	+ / +	+ / ++	0 / O	++ / ++	+ / +	+	+	+	++
24	TIGHT MONETARY CONDITIONS	0 / O	0	− / -	− / -	− / -	0 / O	−− / −−	−− / -	−	−	−	−−
25	RED-LINING	0 / O	0	0 / O	0 / O	− / O	A / A	− / -	0 / O	−	−−	−−	−−
26	RISING REAL INCOMES AND CONSUMPTION STANDARDS	+ / +	−	+ / +	+ / ++	+ / +	+ / +	0 / O	0 / O	+	A	+	+
27	FISCAL SQUEEZE ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS	0 / O	−	0 / -	− / O	0 / O	A / A	− / -	−− / −−	−−	−	−	−
28	OUTLYING SHOPPING CENTERS	−− / O	−	− / -	− / O	0 / O	− / O	0 / O	0 / O	−	−	−−	0
29	INCREASED USE OF OFFICE SPACE	++ / +	+	++ / ++	+ / ++	+ / +	+ / +	++	0 / O	+	+	+	0
30	INVOLVEMENT OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN REAL ESTATE	0 / O	0	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	+ / +	++	−−	0	0	0	+
31	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY NEEDS	− / O	A	+ / +	− / O	− / O	+ / O	+	+	−	0	A	+
32	NON-BRANCH BANKING	A	0	++	0	0	++	+	+	0	0	−	+
33	LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL OR INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES	A / O	+	++ / ++	+ / ++	0 / O	++ / ++	+ / +	+ / ++	+	0	++	+
34	ANTI-GOVERNMENT ORIENTATION OF LOCAL LEADERS	− / O	−	0 / -	− / O	− / O	−− / −−	− / O	−− / −−	−	−	−	−
35	SPATIAL EXPANSION OF URBAN GROWTH	−− / O	−−	− / -	++ / ++	0 / O	+ / +	0 / O	0 / O	++	A	−	0
36	CONTINUED AGING OF OLDER BUILDINGS	+ / O	A	++ / ++	++ / ++	+ / +	+ / ++	0 / O	0 / O	++	+	+	−
37	OBSOLESCENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE	− / −−	−−	0 / O	− / -	0 / O	+ / +	− / O	−− / −−	−	0	−−	−
38	FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTS AND LACK OF REGIONAL PLANNING	0 / O	−	0 / O	0 / O	0 / O	− / O	− / O	+ / -	0	0	−	−

LEGEND

++ MAJOR STRENGTHENING IMPACT

+ SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT MAJOR, STRENGTHENING IMPACT

0 NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

A AMBIGUOUS IMPACT

− SIGNIFICANT BUT NOT MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

−− MAJOR WEAKENING IMPACT

Prepared By REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL, R-77

Types of Factors (See Previous Text)

(E) Signifies Exogenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors
(MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors
(NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors

Stage during which factor was significant
1 - Pre-planning
2 - Planning
3 - Execution

FACTORS	STAGE	SIGNIFICANCE: Somewhat Important (A)	Important (B)	Very Important (C)	Crucial (D)	AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE: Definitely Unavoidable (A)	Probably Unavoidable (B)	Possibly Avoidable (C)	Probably Avoidable (D)	Definitely Avoidable (E)
• (E) Adequate and satisfactory completion of exterior restoration of market buildings prior to lease to permanent developer.	3				●		●			
• (LMR) Consideration and study of the advisability and feasibility of depressing the central artery.	3			●				●		
• (LMR, MARK) Direction of attention and administrative efforts by BRA to other development areas of city, possibly creating competition to the marketing of certain sites in the Waterfront area.	3			●					●	
• (LMR) BRA delay in consideration and response to unsolicited proposals prior to offering of urban renewal site.	3		●						●	
• (LMR) Lack of incentives and/or established deadlines from BRA to require developer to move ahead expeditiously after tentative designation.	3		●						●	
• (LMR) Uncertainty of future development plans for area.	3				●		●			
• (LMR) Lengthy design review between tentative designation and submission of final plans and financial feasibility.	3		●						●	
• (LMR) Lack of organized disposition plan.	3			●					●	
• (LMR) Citizens suite against BRA and subsequent restudy of certain aspects of original urban renewal plan.	3			●				●		
• (LMR) Conflict between citizens' groups over control of certain residential and commercial parcels.	3		●						●	
• (LMR) BRA changes in disposition parcelization and tactics after initial offering but prior to tentative designation.	3			●					●	
• (LMR) Inaction or delay by State Department of Public Works in carrying out their promise to remove and/or relocate certain ramps to the central artery.	3			●			●			
• (LMR) Lack of momentum on part of BRA to follow through in original timetable or staging of development.	3		●						●	
• (LMR) Loss of power base outside of city government structure for maintaining interest, pushing ahead with Waterfront development	3		●				●			
• (LMR) Environmental conditions poor because of slowness in carrying out utility and road construction, creation of parks and public open space.	3				●				●	
• (LMR) Relocation of wholesalers from area.	3			●		●				

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DELAY—CAUSING FACTORS

DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT - FANEUIL HALL, R-77

Types of Factors (See Previous Text)

(E) Signifies Exogenous Factor
(LMR) Signifies Local Management Related Factors
(MARK) Signifies Local Market Related Factors
(NPR) Signifies National Program Related Factors

Stage during which factor was significant
1 - Pre-planning
2 - Planning
3 - Execution

SIGNIFICANCE: Somewhat Important (A) | Important (B) | Very Important (C) | Crucial (D)

AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE: Definitely Unavoidable (A) | Probably Unavoidable (B) | Possibly Avoidable (C) | Probably Avoidable (D) | Definitely Avoidable (E)

FACTORS	STAGE
• (LMR) Relocation of Atlantic Avenue, requiring discontinuance of Union Freight Railroad.	3
• (LMR) Complexity of concepts behind original urban renewal plan.	3
• (LMR) BRA's apparent lack of urgency about area east of the central artery.	3
• (LMR) Apparent inflexibility in consideration of developer proposals varying from original land use plan.	3
• (LMR) Lengthy negotiations with developer in negotiating leasing rather than purchase of land from BRA.	3
• (LMR) Excessive expected reliance on dynamic leadership to execute project plan.	3
• (LMR) Lengthy negotiations to obtain City Council approval of bond issue to fund project improvements.	3
• (LMR) Frequent turnover in BRA personnel involved in administering the Waterfront project.	3
• (MARK) Delay in development of strategic office building site straddling border between the Waterfront and Government Center urban renewal areas.	3
• (MARK) Uncertainty of tax assessment policies for new commercial buildings in downtown Boston.	3
• (MARK) Inability of tentatively designated non-residential developers to find and retain principal tenant.	3
• (MARK) Lengthy process of finding financially capable developer for extremely complex and somewhat risky rehabilitation and marketing site.	3
• (MARK) "Land banking" by tentatively designated developers, either due to inability to obtain financing and/or principal tenant or because present use (i.e. parking lot) is more profitable and less risky than proposed development.	3
• (NPR) Drying up of federal housing subsidies, rehabilitation assistance funds.	3
• (NPR) Absence of strong HUD guidelines for timing of plan submissions, approvals, and subsequent development of an urban renewal parcel; i.e., lack of understanding of development process in HUD area and regional offices.	3
• (NPR) Lack of flexibility and understanding in HUD office in terms of evaluating changes in disposition strategy suggested by LPA.	3

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ADDENDA "A"

IV. CATALOG OF EXOGENOUS FACTORS – Page 1

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Transportation Factors	1	Increased use of automotive vehicles	Rising use of automobiles by persons going to and from work, and for shopping and other trips and of trucks for business and commercial purposes.	Increased steadily throughout period from 1945 through present; still rising.	Depends upon energy situation. We believe increased use of autos through more two-or-more-car families is likely in long run, but with greater emphasis upon smaller cars.
	2	Radial expressway construction	Building of major roadways linking central business districts with outlying suburbs.	Most radial expressways completed in large metropolitan areas.	Rate of construction likely to be reduced sharply because of completion of main networks, and resistance to further work.
	3	Circumferential expressway construction	Building of major roadways around the periphery of metropolitan areas.	Became most significant in late 1960s and early 1970s.	Likely to continue in the future as further outward growth requires more fill-in road networks on urban periphery.
	4	Decline of public transportation	As shift to automobiles increased, public transportation ridership declined. This plus higher wages increased per-mile cost and required higher fares, further cutting ridership. Services were cut back and general quality and use fell steadily.	Public transportation hit peak in World War II, then declined steadily in total ridership as auto usage expanded rapidly in 1950s and 1960s. Several new fixed-rail systems started in late 1960s and early 1970s, however.	Americans basically regard public transportation of most types as "inferior good" to be more and more avoided as their real incomes rise. Gasoline shortages may cause temporary resurgence of bus usage in near future. Also, fixed rail systems will be built in several major areas in response to congestion caused by auto popularity. Yet low-density urban form preferred by most Americans, plus flexibility of individual vehicles, seem likely to keep public transit in "residual" role in most areas for indefinite future.
	5	Increased air travel	Greater use of airlines for business purposes and other travel, with subsequent increased importance of airports as transportation centers.	Steadily rose until 1969-1970 recession; resumed slower growth after 1971.	Airports likely to become more significant as centers of office space competitive with CBDs, but few new major airports are likely to be built in near future.
	6	Resistance to urban expressways	Political and other resistance to continued construction of major urban expressways through residential areas or urban centers, often resulting in halts in construction and failure to complete planned networks.	Resistance was weak in 1950s and early 1960s; became intensive in late 1960s and early 1970s.	Future resistance to urban clearance and rebuilding is likely to limit in-city expressway expansion drastically, and even to make expansion in built-up portions of suburbs extremely difficult.

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Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Housing-Related Factors	7	High-level total housing production	Production of record numbers of total housing units, mainly in suburban areas, in period from 1968 through 1973—especially in 1971, 1972, and 1973.	Housing production was high in 1950, then varied countercyclically with business cycle, with average of about 1.6 million per year until big production after 1967.	Increased environmental and ecological resistance to urban growth, plus higher level of interest rates, may cause lower average total housing production in next few years than in period from 1971 through 1973, but not as low as in 1960s on the average.
	8	Subsidized housing programs	Federal housing subsidies paid to producers of units enabled them to build units for occupancy by low- and moderate-income households who could not afford "decent" new or even moderately older units. This provided a type of re-use on urban renewal sites capable of housing households who had been displaced by clearance. But large numbers of public housing units near CBDs weakened marketability of middle- and upper-income housing nearby.	Subsidies played minor role in total production but major renewal role up to 1968. Then rising role in total output peaked at over 20% of non-mobile-home units in 1971—also more emphasis on subsidized units in renewal areas after 1968. Moratorium occurred in 1973 and drastically slowed production.	Future role of direct subsidies for low- and moderate-income households very uncertain. If promoted as housing allowance only, will help up-grade older inventory but will not encourage production of new units. Yet some new production subsidies available for central-city renewal areas seem quite likely in future under most scenarios. Less likely to have new production subsidies for units dispersed outside of inner-city areas, especially in suburbs, at least in near future.
	9	Outlying subsidized housing	Construction of large numbers of subsidized housing units for low and moderate-income households in outlying areas away from inner-city renewal areas. This was mainly in Southern metropolitan areas.	Confined mainly to South. Occurred mainly from 1970 to 1973.	Depends upon future of construction-oriented subsidy programs — now opposed by the Administratio Some production subsidies are likely, but suburban emphasis will not be large in most parts of the nation
	10	Rising dependency among public housing families	Increased percentage of all households living in public housing consisting of those on welfare or otherwise dependent, as a result of court decisions making relocation of displaced households of this type in public housing mandatory.	Shift towards higher proportions of dependent households accelerated in late 1960s because of legal decisions sponsored by Office of Economic Opportunity cases.	Possible reduction in such proportions depends upon whether subsidy approach shifts to housing allowanc and involves dismantling of public housing projects. Probably not likely to occur in near future, but few additional large-scale projects likely to be added either.
	11	Exclusionary housing laws	Maintenance of high-cost construction requirements and zoning regulations in suburban areas, having the effect of preventing low- and moderate-income households from moving into such areas.	Such regulations became widespread in the late 1950s and early 1960s; still largely in effect.	Legal attack on exclusionary zoning is underway in a few states. Nevertheless, radical reduction of qualit standards required for suburban new construction is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Housing-Related Factors (continued)	12	Unequal housing code enforcement	Rigorous enforcement of high quality standards in new-growth areas, but very lax enforcement in older areas with consequent concentration of severe blight in older neighborhoods occupied by lowest-income residents.	This duality of standards was practiced much more rigorously after World War II than before, but has been prevalent through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.	Some duality of code enforcement standards will probably persist for the indefinite future, even though legal action against exclusionary zoning may ease new-growth-area quality standards slightly where large-lot-zoning and very large unit-area requirements now prevail. The realities of low-rent-paying ability among low-income households make full equality of housing standards unrealistic.
	13	Increased size of new housing units	As living standards rose, builders responded by raising the average size of new dwelling units. This raised occupancy costs, but also made older smaller units obsolete more rapidly.	Steady rise in size of average new units from 1950 through 1968. Then shift to more adult-oriented households caused change in new-unit mix towards more units for smaller households.	Rise in unit quality likely to continue as reflection of rising real incomes. But shift in household composition to more adult-oriented households means smaller average total square feet, because fewer bedrooms and less play space needed. Yet may be more amenities per unit and greater costlines per square foot – and even larger size per household of any given size. Only need to counter rising heating cost pushes other way.
	14	Rapid changes in housing technology and styles	Constant shifts in both technical features (such as air conditioning and built-in appliances) and living styles (such as family rooms and bigger kitchens) tended to make housing become obsolete faster after it was built, and old housing hard to market.	Steady development of this trend throughout post-World-War-II era. But probably speeded up after 1960 because by then shortage of housing units over, and more emphasis upon marketing quality of units.	Tendency to build units suitable to both rental and ownership (even when multi-family) will rise, allowing more flexibility of design through remodelling (because units larger). Also, relative constancy of household size, or smaller sizes, will reduce pressure to change homes over time, increase desire to remodel instead. Hence likely to be more future emphasis upon initial flexibility of design and re-doing units to keep up with technical change, to offset continued high speed of such change.
	15	Racially segregated housing markets	Continued racial separation of white and nonwhite housing markets through discriminatory behavior, mainly by white realtors builders, developers, homeowners, and households.	Racially segregated housing markets have prevailed in U.S. northern cities throughout this century, and in the South since school desegregation.	Some racial integration of markets in all-white areas will occur in middle- and upper-income areas where blacks and other minority-group households with money can already gain access. But white withdrawal from any situation where minority-groups appear likely to constitute a significant part of the population will keep housing markets basically segregated for a long time, unless (1) quotas for minority-groups be come politically and legally acceptable or (2) many whites become willing to live in majority-black areas (an outcome we believe is unlikely in most cities).

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Population Composition and Behavior Factors	16	Minority-group expansion	Growth of minority-group populations within central cities, and their spatial expansion into formerly mainly-white areas through a process of "massive transition" in local housing occupancy.	Steady spatial expansion of minority-groups came after restrictive covenants ruled unconstitutional in 1948, and acute housing shortage eased after 1950.	Minority-group expansion due to population increase alone is likely to slow down somewhat because of lower birth rates and slower in-migration to big cities. Yet abandonment of the worst units in urban core, plus rising minority-group incomes, will continue shift of minorities outward into better housing, unless slowdown of peripheral growth causes renewed area-wide housing shortages and restricts mobility.
	17	Racial desegregation	Racial desegregation of public facilities and public schools, especially in Southern areas, with consequent shift of central business district patronage from mainly white to partly or mainly black. Tendency of many whites in central city areas with school-age children to move to suburbs to avoid desegregated schools with black majorities.	Desegregation of public schools and facilities in the South occurred mainly in the late 1960s and early 1970s in most areas, though earlier in a few border states.	Southern school systems and public facilities will be almost completely desegregated legally and physically in the near future, but will probably be re-segregated in fact by increasing withdrawal of white households – especially from black-majority school systems and residential areas. Then de facto segregation will prevail in both North and South.
	18	Racial disorders	Major riots and disorders erupted in many cities in black neighborhoods with poverty concentrations. National media coverage heightened fear of racial integration or inner-city living among whites as a result.	Disorders began in 1964 and 1965, hit peak of intensity and geographic spread in 1967 and early 1968. Have sharply declined since then; few occurring now.	Nationwide disorders of same type as in 1960s are unlikely to resume, though occasional individual ones may occur in isolated cities. Whether other types of racial violence will occur depends upon level of inter-racial tensions in inner-city areas. If housing shortages return because suburban growth is cut down sharply, then conflict over expansion of minority-groups into all-white areas could become more intensive, even violent. Yet large-scale disorders seem unlikely as a sustained future force.
	19	Rising urban crime rates	In all urban areas, but especially in low-income inner-city areas, rates of major crimes against both persons and property rose rapidly throughout the period after 1960. Greater personal insecurity and fear accelerated the withdrawal of middle-income households from concentrated poverty areas, and inhibited marketing of new or existing housing in such areas to households who could afford market rents (and thus had other locational choices).	Crime rates rose especially fast in the 1960s because of growth of teenage groups in major cities, and other factors not known. Rate of increase accelerated after 1965 in most areas.	Future course of crime rates is difficult to foresee. Age distribution changes will favor adults more than young children in most areas, and may help reduce rates. But basic reform in criminal justice systems (especially courts and prisons) is required to make public response to crimes at all effective in reducing rates. Security considerations will remain crucial factors in households' choices of where to live and work – though less so among adult-oriented households than among child-oriented ones. Hence there will be a somewhat better chance of attracting adult-oriented households into renewal areas near high-crime areas, if strong security is provided within those renewal areas themselves.

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Population Composition and Behavior Factors (continued)	20	More adult-oriented households	Rising importance of adult-oriented households in total population composition as result of falling birth rates and new mores in late 1960s and early 1970s onward.	Decline in birth and fertility rates in late 1960s, plus splitting off of young adults caused by prosperity in late 1960s, emphasized this trend in late 1960s and early 1970s.	Continued declines in birth and fertility rates are likely. They will offset rise in formation of young households in child-bearing ages. Slower, but steady rise in real incomes will allow proliferation of young adult households to match any increases in housing supply permitted by supply-side constraints — especially financial conditions and environmental resistance to new development. So this trend will continue.
	21	Change toward more casual and leisure-oriented life styles	More casual living and greater leisure in the post-World-War-II era changed housing styles, put more emphasis upon outdoor activities and outdoor-orientation in home design, and later upon more travel and away-from-home recreation.	Shift in life-styles was greatest in late 1950s and early 1960s. Then change to smaller households plus higher land costs made multi-family units more widely acceptable even in suburban areas.	1970s will see greater dominance of cultural styles by adult-oriented fashions and developments, rather than child-oriented as in 1950s, or youth-oriented as in 1960s. Leisure will still be important, but more structured recreation will emerge in urban areas. Home design will emphasize smaller but more luxurious units, more "atrium" fashion than outdoor-oriented living, more emphasis upon freedom from maintenance and care. Travel will be somewhat restricted in near future by energy shortage, then will resume gains.
	22	Relative decline in perceived quality of central-city public school systems	Increasing dominance of central-city public schools by low-income and minority-group children in big cities caused many middle-income households to perceive those schools as inferior to suburban systems; hence many middle-income families with school-aged children moved out of central cities or would not move into them.	This was a steady development throughout the post-World-War-II period, but most pronounced in 1960s because of minority-group growth in big cities, and desegregation of public school systems in South.	In spite of some court decisions seeking to tie central-city school systems to those in nearby suburbs, it will be difficult to change dominance of central-city school systems by lower-income and minority-group children in the foreseeable future. Inner-city renewal projects for middle- and upper-income households will be mainly adult-oriented, or linked to private schools if child-oriented, or served by special public schools attended only by children in those projects.
Financial and Economic Factors	23	Loose monetary conditions	Periods when easy mortgage credit availability encouraged home buying and real estate development of all types.	Mortgage credit available most easily in recessions when few other uses of funds compete; most recently from 1970 through mid-1973	Continued linkage of mortgage availability to business cycles is likely, with availability rising in recessions and falling when general prosperity surges towards peak of boom. But recent restructuring of capital markets with more sources of funds for real estate will make mortgage funds more available even in "crunches" than in past, and and will make "crunches" shorter in duration. On the other hand, increasing capital competition caused by drive to develop new energy sources will keep long-term interest rate structure higher than in the recent past.
	24	Tight monetary conditions	Periods when lack of mortgage credit availability made home buying and real estate development of all types very difficult to finance.	Tight money periods usually occur in middle of rising prosperity just before cycle peak; examples are 1966, 1970, and 1973.	

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Financial and Economic Factors (continued)	25	Red-lining	Practice of financial institutions of refusing to make any mortgage loans in certain designated inner-city areas considered of too high a risk for proper security. This results in inability to finance rehabilitation or repairs there, thus causing further deterioration.	Extensive in central-city areas until late 1960's when FHA liberalized its lending policies in such areas; more liberal there until 1973 moratorium following inner-city FHA scandals.	Uncertain now what future policies of FHA will be, but probably red-lining will continue by private lenders and even FHA except in areas where cities agree to increase level of public services to help maintain neighborhood quality, or where renewal alters whole local environment. Realities of higher risks in older, concentrated poverty neighborhoods must ultimately be reflected in lending policies.
	26	Rising real incomes and consumption standards	Increased real incomes, and thus higher standards of both personal and business consumption, among most American households and business enterprises – and even among public agencies. This results in less willingness to continue occupying old, obsolete housing or nonresidential property.	Rising real income for all households through most of post-World-War-II era, except during inflationary period in late 1960's. Rising real income for businesses and institutions throughout this era.	In long run, real incomes will continue rising – even among most low-income households. Current "energy crisis" will raise relative price of energy rapidly, and slow real income rises for some households for several years. But the long-run increase in quality standards and requirements among all consumer groups is likely to continue – offset only by the need to conserve scarce inputs and resources.
	27	Fiscal squeeze on municipal governments	Slow-rising property values of older structures, plus limited other tax sources, contrasted with rapid increases in both the scope of municipal services demanded by the public, and the level of wages for public employees and other costs. The result was increasing difficulty of attaining fiscal balance in many large, older central cities and suburbs.	Fiscal squeeze hit cities at different times, but was probably worst in late 1960s recession; then somewhat eased by early 1970s prosperity and first federal revenue sharing, plus more state aid from rising State revenues in early 1970s prosperity.	Nature of future municipal finances partly depends upon type of revenue sharing arrangements adopted by federal government. Allowing cities to exercise broader tax powers (as some states have done), plus revenue sharing, plus expanded state aids, may ease property tax burdens in some cities. Municipal employees will continue seeking to "capture" revenue increases in higher pay. If slowdown in suburban growth rates causes rising central-city property values, municipal tax resources may rise to aid financing.
Commercial and Industrial Factors	28	Outlying shopping centers	Development of many large and small automobile-oriented retail shopping centers in suburban and other outlying locations, competitive with the central business district but better located to serve the growing suburban population.	Centers began in 1950s and continued appearing through present time. Average size increased over time to major 3-and-4 department store regional centers in late 1960s, with enclosed air-conditioned malls.	Tendency of major regional centers to become new highly-urbanized nodes will increase in future as office buildings, theaters, hotels, apartments cluster around – and sometimes inside – retail malls. Hence competition for downtowns will become more intense–unless superior public transit access of downtowns provides a temporary advantage during gasoline shortage years.
	29	Increased use of office space	Major expansion of office-space used by firms of all types, often located in central business districts, as part of shift in labor force and up-grading of business and other space usage.	Office-space building hit peak in 1960s in most metropolitan areas, causing temporary oversupply. But growth of occupancy remained more rapid than most had forecast.	More and more activity will shift to offices in the long run, continuing a rapid expansion of this type of space as economic activity grows. However, smaller share of total office space in each metropolitan area will need to be clustered in one central spot. Hence a long-run tendency for some dispersal of offices will affect downtown office-space dominance somewhat.

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Commercial and Industrial Factors (continued)	30	Involvement of large corporations in real estate development	Many large industrial corporations began real estate development projects in the 1960s in spite of lack of prior experience or real knowledge of the field. This led to unsuccessful projects and some outright fiascos, as well as delays.	Basic expansion of real estate development through entry of large firms occurred in late 1960s. Part of general shift of capital-flow structure that favored real estate more than formerly.	Large industrial firms remaining in real estate are gaining more experience, and thus avoiding initial errors. Yet flight of capital from other forms of investment will continue to put novice investors in the real estate field until they get burned through failures of major projects. However, cities and key developers will become more sophisticated and less likely to repeat the error of making projects too large and complex for markets they serve.
	31	Spatial expansion of industry needs	Increased requirements for building and land space by industries caused by more extensive single-floor work layouts, desire to preserve room for future expansion, immediate growth needs, and desire for ample parking. This caused many industries to move from central cities to bigger sites in the suburbs.	Movement of industries and distribution centers out of cities occurred steadily throughout 1950s and 1960s and perhaps fastest in 1960s in response to better suburban road networks, plus sustained prosperity among business firms.	Reliance of industries and distribution facilities upon trucks for goods and autos for workers is not likely to change in the future unless drastic shortages of gasoline emerge. Hence the tendency to use efficient one-story lay-outs and choose outlying sites will continue. Renewal of inner-city areas through creation of industrial parks there could work if parks were on major expressways accessible to suburbs, and were also isolated enough from residential poverty concentrations so as to provide worker security. But this can capture only small fraction of total future industrial expansion.
	32	Non-branch banking	In cities where no branch banking was allowed, large downtown banks had strong interests in upgrading the central business district. This desire was much weaker where branch banking was legal.	Downtown orientation of non-branching banks still strong as long as no branching allowed. Some dilution by one-bank holding companies in 1960s.	Branch banking in some form likely to be adopted almost everywhere eventually. This could weaken commitment of major banks to downtowns (as retailers' commitment was weakened by outlying retail centers). But many have already sunk heavy capital investments there they need to protect.
	33	Local institutional or industrial resources	Presence of some large national firm headquarters, or one or more major institutions locally-based, with a more-than-purely-profit-oriented stake or interest in the local central city and its prosperity and condition. Communities where such resources exist have sometimes succeeded in motivating them to aid in central city redevelopment to a degree beyond that required by "pure" profit maximization.	Commitments by such firms to aiding in local urban renewal efforts were greatest in late 1950s through late 1960s after urban disorders.	Firms that committed themselves to participation in such efforts will continue to protect investments made at that time, but may not expand commitments. Nature of future willingness to make such commitments will depend in part upon black/white relationships in each city. Black political influence in central cities is rising rapidly, and will become dominant in many large cities during lifetime of investments now being made. Realization by major firms of their stake in the community can nevertheless continue to be an argument for their support for and participation in some renewal efforts.

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Commercial and Industrial Factors (continued)	34	Anti-government orientation of local leaders	In many communities, local leaders were hostile to any federally-supported programs. Also, nearly all developers have been skeptical about the ability of urban renewal authorities to actually deliver on their promises (such as clearing proposed sites within stated times).	Hostility to federally-supported programs was at peak in 1950s, declined in most areas by 1960s as far as recognition of need was concerned. But skepticism about federal program ability and worthiness rose sharply in late 1960s.	Local leaders in most areas have recognized the need to use any tools they can to combat local problems, and therefore have overcome initial ideological hostility to federal funds. However, skepticism about effectiveness of federal programs has risen so high more leaders are likely to be willing to conduct more action on their own private initiative – perhaps with state rather than federal partnerships. This gives widespread support to some type of federal revenue sharing.
Physical Factors	35	Spatial expansion of urban growth	Tendency of urban growth to spread out spatially on the edges of the already-built-up areas through extensive, relatively low-density development that pushed the edges of new development farther and farther away from the central business district, thereby making it more and more vulnerable to "interception" by competitive outlying retail, office-space, and other facilities.	Spatial spread of development rapid throughout post-World-War-II era. Accelerated by radial and circumferential expressway networks, in spite of shift to higher-density housing in many suburban areas. Suburbs steadily became more "urbanized" with creation of non-residential facilities of all types in suburbs in 1960s.	Anti-growth movement will slow rate of suburban spatial expansion somewhat in some areas, but basic outward direction of future population-accommodating development will remain unchanged. Higher cost of energy will cause more intensive development of in-close areas before "leap-frog" movement to farther-out suburbs than in past two decades. Some greater emphasis upon public transit will also aid downtowns. But it will not cause any major change in future urbanization patterns away from a relatively low-density structure towards very high density nodes as the dominant form of growth (though some such nodes will grow up around regional shopping centers).
	36	Continued aging of older buildings	Increased physical deterioration and obsolescence in many existing residential and non-residential structures in central cities caused by aging inherent in the passage of time.	Major clearance of older structures in 1950s and early 1960s for urban renewal and highways cut out some of the worst decay. Clearance slowed in late 1960s, allowing aging to continue in remaining decayed areas.	Rate of future physical decay and obsolescence in older central city areas quite variable. Depends upon degree of future public urban renewal funding (low at present); rate of speed of suburban housing construction (the slower that construction, the greater the pressure to up-grade the older central city inventory rather than let it decay); seriousness of energy shortages (the more public transit must be used, the more pressure for up-grading older central-city areas). Yet the older inventory is so large, major aging and decay-spread seems likely in largest, oldest cities.

Basic Type	Number	Short Name	Nature of the Factor	Type of Timing	Likely Future Course
Physical Factors (continued)	37	Obsolescence of infrastructure	Water, sewer, and utility systems in many older city areas were inadequate to bear loads from new higher-density structures, or new more-power-using consumer behavior patterns. This often required costly reconstruction of infrastructures before renewal of final improvements was possible.	Obsolescence was most acute in 1950s but remains a problem in cities that have not invested in major utility improvements – as many cities did in late 1950s and especially in 1960s.	This problem remains serious in many cities, especially since standards for utilities and other systems have risen sharply as part of environmental-quality-improvement programs. Hence many major cities will have to make big capital investments in improving sewer, water, and other utility systems – especially pollution reduction – in the near future.
Miscellaneous Factors	38	Fragmented governments and lack of regional planning	Division of the metropolitan area into dozens of unco-ordinated governmental units prevented any real co-ordination of planning or execution of region-wide facilities in many areas – including utility systems, highways, and location of major shopping centers and other commercial properties.	Fragmentation remained strong in most areas during last four decades – rose where many new suburbs were formed. But some area-wide agencies for highways, water systems, utilities were established in 1960s; weak regional planning also began then but has little power of implementation.	Few major metropolitan areas will adopt full-scale metropolitan governments in the future (unless major federally-financed incentives for doing so are created, which is unlikely). But the need to achieve co-ordination in controlling urban growth and combatting environmental pollution will make some type of regional planning with effective powers increasingly acceptable in most areas. This may lead to regional land-use-control-review agencies in more and more areas (like the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council approach), perhaps coming down from the statewide level rather than upwards from the individual municipality level.

ADDENDA "B"

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

William Adams, Project Engineer, South End, BRA
Joseph Barese, Boston Municipal Research Bureau
Joseph Berlandi, Director of Non-Residential Development, BRA
John Bok, Citizens Housing and Planning Association
Philip Bradley, Emergency Tenants Council and SEPAC Board
James Breagy, Citizens Housing and Planning Association
Harold Burg, Blair Associates, Developer of Washington Park Shopping Center and Head of Blair Food Store
Royal Cloyd, Boston Arts Center, First Chairman of South End Urban Renewal Committee
Kent Colten, Housing Research Analyst, BRA
Ronald Cornew, Waterfront Residents Association
Matthew Curry, Project Director, South End Project, BRA
Rev. Walter C. Davis, Director, Charles Street Church, Developer in Washington Park
Frank Del Vecchio, Director, Community Development, HUD Regional Office, Region 1
James Derba, Former Project Director, South End, BRA
James Doland, Former Land Disposition Officer, BRA
Cathy Dunaher, Formerly with Justin Gray Associates, Consultant to North End Waterfront Residents Committee Report
Ralph Fine, Boston Finance Commission
Stuart Forbes, Deputy Director for Development, BRA
Elliot Friedman, Former Project Director, South Cove, Now Planner with Boston University
Alexander Gans, Director of Research, BRA
Richard Garver, HUD, Liaison, BRA
Adriana Gianturco, Waterfront Residents Association
Dunn Guifford, Vice President Urban Affairs, Cabot, Cabot & Forbes, Developer Designated for 60 State Street
William Haynesworth, Massachusetts Housing and Finance, Formerly BRA
Marvin Hightower, Project Director, Washington Park, BRA
Richard Joslin, Planning Division, BRA
Robert Kenney, Director of BRA
Ann Kerrey, Housing Specialist, Emergency Tenants Council
Robert Kiley, Mayor's Office
David La Lima, Project Director, South Cove, BRA
James Linehan, Principal, Development Corporation of America, Developer in South Cove and Washington Park
Richard Lockhart, Former Project Director for South Cove, Now with Cambridge City Planning Department

Robert Loverud, Waterfront Development Planner, Chief of Design, BRA, and Waterfront Project Director, Now Principal with Design Sciences International, Cambridge
Jack Lonigan, Berenson Corporation, Developing in Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall
Robert Lovinger, Planner, Tufts-New England Medical Center
Louis Maples, Attorney for Peoples Market, Designated Developer, South End
James Marcellino, Attorney, Former Project Director, Waterfront
Robert McGovern, Real Estate Officer, BRA
Robert McKay, Citizens Housing and Planning Association
George Michaels, Attorney for United Wholesale Flower Dealers
George Niles, Chief Finance Officer, BRA
Andrew Olins, Mayor's Office
John O'Neill, Jr., Chief, Business Relocation, BRA
Wally Orpin, Head of Engineering Department, BRA
Eli Post, Deputy Director For Planning, BRA
Daniel Richardson, HUD Area Office Director, Boston
Philip Salomine, Community Development, HUD Area Office, Boston
John Sayers, Assistant Project Director, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project, BRA
Marvin Siflinger, Area HUD Office, Boston
Myles Slossberg, Green Shoe (Stride Rite)
Joan Smith, Director Family Relocation and Social Services, BRA
Loring Smith, President, L.E. Smith Management, Manager of 221 d (3) and 236 Housing in Washington Park and South Cove Projects
Muriel Snowden, Freedom House
Otto Snowden, Freedom House
Richard Spaulding, Principal, Spaulding and Slye, Tentatively Designated Developer
Charles Speliotis, Residential Land Disposition Officer, BRA
John Stainton, Consultant, Former Chief of Planning, BRA
Thaddeus Tercyak, Former Project Director, Washington Park Project and South End Project, Currently with Cambridge Renewal Authority
Patricia Twohig, Disposition and Re-Use Appraisals, BRA
Mr. Vinios, John Philopolous Associates, Developers, South Cove Project

Robert Walsh, Deputy Director for Community Development, and Former Project Director, South End, BRA

David Weiner, Project Director, Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Project, BRA

Robert Whittlesey, Greater Boston Community Development Corporation

Ann Wolpert, Librarian, BRA

Robert Yilton, State Street Development, Boston

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